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This dissertation consists of three essays: 
Essay 1 
In recent years, the physician practice landscape has been characterized by a shift away from 
small, single specialty physician practices and towards larger, more integrated providers. 
Responses to this trend have been mixed, with some hailing it as a cost saving cure-all and 
others warning about the dangers of increased market power and the potential for anti-
competitive behavior. This trade-off has been debated by health care professionals, 
economists and government agencies in boardrooms, academia and courts. The discussion 
of integration has been impeded by a failure to carefully define terms and distinguish 
between two distinct components of integration: administrative and behavioral.  
Administrative, or financial, integration happens when providers merge, or hospitals 
purchase physician practices. This type of integration is associated with increased bargaining 
power and higher reimbursements. Furthermore, through profit sharing, financial integration 
can create an incentive for providers to refer patients to other specialists for more tests or 
more care, some of which may be unnecessary. In contrasts, behavioral integration refers to 
doctors working together and coordinating care. It has been associated with decreased waste 
and more efficient care. Previous work has often used measures of administrative 
integration, such as the share of physician practices owned by hospitals, to proxy for 
behavioral integration.  Those modeling decisions are understandable as, up to this point, a 
metric which separately captures behavioral integration in a systematic way has not existed. 
  
The lack of a metric has been a hurdle to evaluating these two components separately. In this 
paper, I use Medicare data on physician patient sharing patterns to develop metrics that 
capture physician practice integration at the behavioral level. I compare these behavioral 
integration metrics to a more standard organizational level integration metric. The low 
correlation, only 0.30, demonstrates that these metrics are distinct. Using all these metrics, I 
examine the impact of these two types of physician integration on the utilization of medical 
care. With national data over time, I use changes in integration and utilization within regions 
to estimate how the different types of integration impact the ability to provide quality care 
at a low cost, which I refer to as efficiency. As a model of physician behavior predicts, I find 
that behavioral integration reduces cost while improving quality. In contrasts, financial 
integration appears to increase cost without having an impact on quality. These results are 
robust to different measures of behavioral integration and different identification strategies. 
 
Essay 2 
When health care providers and managed care organizations (MCOs) bargain, the main tool 
providers have is the threat to refuse to be in the MCO’s network. In fact, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that a major mechanism that practices employ to maximize profits in the face of 
differing insurer reimbursements, limited capacity and stochastic demand is to choose 
insurers discriminately. Providers do not accept patients from every MCO, however, 
providers do not exclusively accept the most profitable MCO. In this paper, I apply these 
institutional facts to a Nash cooperative bargaining framework to develop a bargaining 
model that explicitly models the provider’s disagreement point with the MCOs. In doing 
  
this, I am able to solve analytically for the interdependence of prices between MCOs and 
add to previous bargaining models by making the value of a MCO to a provider more 
explicit. This model shows the impact of MCO market structure on prices. By introducing 
provider capacity constraints, I am able to model two important provider-side 
considerations: the risk capacity will be unused, and the risk that a low-paying patient will 
displace a higher-paying patient. Neither of these two effects have been previously captured 
in the bargaining literature, which typically has featured marginal costs as the limiting factor 
for providers contracting with MCOs. I also show how predictions in my model match 
empirical observations and estimates from other work. I demonstrate a strong negative 
association between MCOs’ market power and negotiated prices, and show that the degree 
of market level price differences predicted by this model is similar to what has been 
observed. Finally, recent empirical work has found that that price increases for Medicare are 
positively associated with private MCOs’ prices and that this impact is stronger in areas with 
more concentrated insurers, and areas in which Medicare patients represent a larger share of 
the market. My model analytically makes these predictions and can explain the underlying 
mechanisms. 
 
Essay 3 
This paper examines how primary care providers (PCPs) change their referral patterns to 
specialists after they join a Medicare Shared Savings Program Accountable Care 
Organization (ACO). We find that primary-care providers respond differently to ACO 
formation depending on the degree to which the providers have a pre-existing relationship 
  
with specialists in the ACO. Relatively speaking, the smaller the previous PCP-specialist 
relationship, the bigger the response. We also find that primary-care providers without a pre-
existing relationship with ACO specialists make up a large share of the ACOs PCPs and 
referrals. PCPs that sent a large share of referrals to specialists that join an ACO in the years 
prior to ACO formation decrease the number of patient they refer to those specialists. 
iii 
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Efficiency Implications of Physician Integration  
Behavioral vs Administrative  
 
Abstract 
In recent years, the physician practice landscape has been characterized by a shift away from 
small, single specialty physician practices and towards larger, more integrated providers. 
Responses to this trend have been mixed, with some hailing it as a cost saving cure-all and 
others warning about the dangers of increased market power and the potential for 
anticompetitive behavior. This trade-off has been debated by health care professionals, 
economists and government agencies in boardrooms, academia and courts. The discussion 
of integration has been impeded by a failure to carefully define terms and distinguish 
between two distinct components of integration: administrative and behavioral.  
Administrative, or financial, integration happens when providers merge, or hospitals 
purchase physician practices. This type of integration is associated with increased bargaining 
power and higher reimbursements. Furthermore, through profit sharing, financial integration 
can create an incentive for providers to refer patients to other specialists for more tests or 
more care, some of which may be unnecessary. In contrasts, behavioral integration refers to 
doctors working together and coordinating care. It has been associated with decreased waste 
and more efficient care. Previous work has often used measures of administrative 
integration, such as the share of physician practices owned by hospitals, to proxy for 
behavioral integration.  Those modeling decisions are understandable as, up to this point, a 
metric which separately captures behavioral integration in a systematic way has not existed. 
The lack of a metric has been a hurdle to evaluating these two components separately. In this 
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paper, I use Medicare data on physician patient sharing patterns to develop metrics that 
capture physician practice integration at the behavioral level. I compare these behavioral 
integration metrics to a more standard organizational level integration metric. The low 
correlation, only 0.30, demonstrates that these metrics are distinct. Using all these metrics, I 
examine the impact of these two types of physician integration on the utilization of medical 
care. With national data over time, I use changes in integration and utilization within regions 
to estimate how the different types of integration impact the ability to provide quality care 
at a low cost, which I refer to as efficiency. As a model of physician behavior predicts, I find 
that behavioral integration reduces cost while improving quality. In contrasts, financial 
integration appears to increase cost without having an impact on quality. These results are 
robust to different measures of behavioral integration and different identification strategies. 
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1  Introduction 
The move towards larger, more integrated physician practices has been well documented. 
The risk of higher prices has been documented as well. The government seems to echo this 
tension, as on one hand they encourage coordination, but on the other they try to avoid the 
negative impacts. One way they’ve promoted coordination is through the push for 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), collections of providers that join together to take 
some financial responsibility for a set of beneficiaries. The government has, however, 
opposed large consolidation among physician practices by challenging mergers and 
acquisitions on antitrust grounds such as St. Luke’s health system in Idaho. A major driver 
towards larger, more integrated practices is the desire for efficiency and the belief that a 
“siloed-approach” to medicine is ineffective and wasteful. 
In this paper, I address this empirical question by examining the impact of integration on 
quantity. I look at both physician practice structure and treatment patterns and relate them to 
healthcare efficiency and outcomes. I explore competing definitions of integration and 
develop innovative metrics to capture different aspects of vertical integration. 
In his New Yorker article, The Cost Conundrum, Atul Gawande illustrated the disparities in 
treatment costs across regions, the lack of a correlation with health outcomes, and pointed 
to integrated care as a solution. The belief in coordinated care as a driver of efficiency was 
a driver in some of the provisions of the 2010 Affordable Care Act. Accountable Care 
Organizations are a group of hospitals, physicians and other providers that are assigned a 
particular set of patients. The Medicare Shared Savings Program rewards ACOs that provide 
care to their assigned patient population at less than expected cost, while maintaining quality. 
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The idea behind this program is that by working together and sharing information the ACOs 
can lower the cost of care. 
The Institute of Medicine was tasked with investigating whether the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) should change their reimbursement policies to reward lower 
utilization areas. However, in their comprehensive report they were not able to find evidence 
of efficiency differences across areas. In fact, they found that “after accounting for 
differences in age, sex, and health status, geographic variation is not further explained by 
other beneficiary demographic factors, insurance plan factors, or market-level 
characteristics.” (Institute of Medicine 2013). The conclusion of their 207-page report was 
that the Center Medicare and Medicaid Services should not alter payments for regional 
efficiency, but should instead seek to “incentivize the clinical and financial integration of 
health care delivery systems”. This advocacy of coordinated care stands out because it was 
not supported by any of the analyses in the report.  
The promotion of vertical integration and the promotion of coordinated care is not without 
risks, such as higher prices or physician induced higher quantities. These risks have been 
recognized by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and acknowledged by the guidelines 
put out by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission regarding the 
formation of Accountable Care Organizations and antitrust concerns. The government 
demonstrated they were willing to enforce antitrust  
However, antitrust law and economic theory differentiates between horizontal integration 
and vertical integration. The effect of horizontal integration both theoretically and 
empirically is to increase prices. Vertical integration is less straightforward as in some 
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industries there can be efficiencies gains both through changing the production function but 
also by eliminating transactional inefficiencies such as double marginalization. Furthermore, 
in the medical services market prices are set through bargaining between providers and 
insurance companies. Two providers looking to vertically integrate, operating in different 
sectors with different market power can potentially merge and use bargaining power in one 
sector to raise prices in another. The early empirical work looking at the price impacts 
indicates that this is happening.  
But while the price impacts of integration are important, the quantity impacts of integration 
matter as well. This concern is especially pronounced in the medical services sector as 
physicians often have a lot of control over the quantity of medical care that a patient receives. 
The concern over physician induced demand shows up in legislation through STARK laws, 
which prohibit certain types of physician self-referrals, and anti-kickback measures, which 
prohibit other providers from paying for referrals. But these laws are limited in their 
application as they do not apply to certain physician group arrangements, or physicians who 
are employed. Furthermore, Accountable Care Organizations are eligible to apply for 
waivers, the justification being that these are needed to effectively coordinate care. 
In an integrated system, the profits from increasing quantity are internalized. If the general 
practitioner and the cardiologist are in the same practice, then whenever the GP refers a 
patient to the cardiologist for extra work this increases the practices profitability. 
Many recent organizational changes and policies have been undertaken with the assumption 
that there are large benefits to coordinated care and integration. The risk of increased prices 
is known, but the prediction about changes in the quantity of care is ambiguous as we have 
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two competing narratives. The optimists from the medical profession and the policy realm 
believe that integration means efficiency and should be encouraged and pursued. The 
pessimistic economist warns about perverse incentives and the potential of vertically 
integrated providers to increase the quantity of care. 
 
2  Previous Literature 
The increasing prevalence of large practices, and hospital owned practices has been 
documented in several sources. According to Kocher et al, between 2000 and 2008 hospital 
ownership of physician practices doubled (2011). Other authors have demonstrated that this 
pattern has continued. For example, Neprash et al find that hospital ownership increased 
from 18.0% to 21.3% between 2008 and 2012 (Neprash, Chernew, Hicks, Gibson and 
McWilliams 2015). Using a different data source Burns et al observes a similar, but more 
pronounced rise is hospital ownership from 17% of physicians to 33.8% (2013), between 
2003 and 2012. The same article also documents a rise in the average practice size, with 
physician-owned groups rising from 16.4 to 21.3 and hospital-owned groups doubling in 
size from 64.3 to 120.6 during the same period. 
The impact on efficiency of this consolidation is not clear theoretically or empirically. The 
literature on vertical integration is mixed in terms of its impact, and Gaynor’s survey of 
vertical integration in healthcare ignored the potential quantity effects (Gaynor 2006). 
Vertical integration in the healthcare sector is potentially more problematic than in other 
sectors due to the potential for providers to induce demand. There is a substantial body of 
literature that documents physicians’ responses to financial incentives. It has been shown 
that physicians who own MRI machines order more test (Baker et al 2010), those whose can 
7 
 
make profits by prescribing drugs order more expensive name brand drugs (Iizuka 2012), 
and physicians practices which are owned by hospitals are more likely to refer patients to 
those hospitals (Baker 2014). Hospital consolidation has also been shown to lead to an 
increase in referrals for advanced procedures (Nakamura 2007). 
Other empirical literature shows efficiency gains from integration and size, while showing 
increasing prices with vertical integration. Weeks et al (2010) find that large multi-specialty 
groups associated with both higher quality and lower cost of care, finding savings of $272 
per patient (3.6 percent) for physicians in integrated groups. Neprash did not find a 
utilization or spending benefit when physician practices were acquired, but did find a price 
increase for outpatient services. Similar price increasing effects were found by Baker et 
(2014). More recently, studies on the efficacy of ACOs have found modest gains to 
integration (Nyweide 2015). 
A theoretical basis for promoting vertical integration stems from the idea that there are 
increased efficiencies available through information sharing and the coordination of care. A 
2008 synthesis of the literature relating physician organization to quality and efficiency 
supported this view concluding that concludes that “Evidence increasingly shows that 
improved “systemness” drives quality and efficiency” (Tollen 2008). This efficiency does 
not need to involve the transfer of physical goods, as Atalay (2014) demonstrated. The 
principal result of vertical integration can be the intrafirm transfers of intangible inputs. 
There also is reason to believe that larger firms may promote efficiency in terms of patient 
outcomes. One role of firms is to manage within-firm capital and labor allocation, 
empowering each means of production to maximize its contribution. It has been shown, 
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using data on obstetricians, that physician group practices perform a similar role in 
efficiently matching patients with specialists (Epstein, Ketcham and Nicholson 2010). 
 Not all studies find a positive relation between practice size and patient outcomes. In a study 
on 1,045 primary care based practices, Casalino et al find that small practices have fewer 
preventable hospital admissions (2014). However, they also find that physician-owned 
practices had fewer preventable admissions, and they only looked at practices with less than 
19 physicians. 
Empirical studies at the patient level have consistently indicated that increasing the 
continuity of care leads to lower costs and better outcomes (Maarsingh 2016). Furthermore, 
it has been shown that when there is a strong link between hospitals and SNF readmissions 
were lower (Rahman 2013), and highly integrated SNF have lower spending (Afendulis 
2011). Casalino points to the integrated system’s ability “to create organized processes to 
proactively improve care” as one driver of increased efficiency (Casalino 2003). 
One point of potential inefficiency is the transfer of patient information as patients move 
between practices. Studies have documented that “many referrals... often contain insufficient 
data for medical decision making” (Mehrotra et al. 2011). This loss of data can lead to 
inefficiencies in terms of unnecessary or inappropriate care. 
A potential indicator of inefficiencies in the healthcare sector is the regional variation in per 
capita spending for Medicare patients. Since 1988 Dartmouth Atlas has been cataloging 
these stark differences, and researchers have tested a variety of explanations. It has been 
shown that there is an association between the number of  health resources (doctors, 
hospital beds, etc.) and the amount of spending. The degree to which this relationship is 
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causal (hospitals want to fill their beds) or incidental (sicker patients need more hospitals) is 
not clear. It has also been demonstrated that patient preferences only explain a small portion 
of variation (Baker 2014b). 
Medicare’s reimbursements are not uniform across regions, which has led some to question 
whether regional differences were truly reflective of differences in utilization or an artifact 
of reimbursement methodology. However, Gottlieb et al (2010) carefully analyzed 
Medicare’s reimbursement system and constructed standardized measures of utilization that 
removed differences in the reimbursement rates. Even with that source of variation removed, 
large regional differences in utilization remain. However, whether this remaining variation 
reflects differences in efficiencies has not conclusively been established. 
 
 
3  Theoretical Framework 
What follows is a stylized model of physician behavior that formalizes the expected 
relationship between the quantity of care provided and integration. Prior to proceeding, it is 
critical to establish a working definition of integration. Integration colloquially means the 
joining of separate parts into a combined entity. Previous literature has used legal 
relationship between providers such as hospital ownership (see Neprash et al 2015, 
Afendulis 2011) or group practice size (Weeks et al 2010) as proxies for integration.  
However, this legal and administrative connection is not usually what the medical profession 
and the policy makers are referring to when they advocate increased integration. Instead, 
they are talking about increased information sharing and moving towards a system where 
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providers work together seamlessly. This could take the form of lower transaction costs for 
patient hand-offs, better information sharing, the alignment of practice patterns and 
strategies or better matching of patient needs with specialists  
Therefore, it is useful to think of integration as having two separate components: 
administrative/financial integration and behavioral integration. Administrative integration 
occurs when physicians form large groups, or hospitals purchase physician practices. 
Behavioral integration may occur with administrative integration, but it is a separate concept. 
It is providers seamlessly working together to provide patient care. The expectation from 
policy makers and the public health community is that this behavior change is what leads to 
more efficient care. An ownership change will not necessarily be accompanied by a change 
in information sharing or patient sharing. Hospitals acquire practices for other reasons than 
increasing efficiency. If the goal of the acquisition is to or to increase market share and 
market power, then there is no reason to think integration will increase at all. I will show 
below how administrative integration and efficiency (through behavioral integration) have 
different expected impacts on utilization. 
Through the following model, I highlight how increased efficiency and altered financial 
incentives have competing effects. This model is an adaptation of the model developed in 
Chandra and Skinner (2012), my main addition is including parameters to capture changes 
in efficiency (z) and changes in the physicians’ return to quantity (y). 
In this model, physicians receive utility from two outputs: the health of their patients and 
their income. They receive income based upon the quantity of services provided, however 
physicians vary on how much they receive for different procedures, both because of prices 
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and because of differing levels of financial integration. A solo practicing primary care 
provider will not receive a monetary benefit if one of his patients needs to visit the urologist. 
While an important component, I abstract away from the exact method through which 
providers receive compensation. The model holds as long as integration leads to the 
physician having a financial stake in a broader set of services and procedures – even if this 
impact is indirect. I capture the relationship with the parameter 𝑦𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 below where k indexes 
procedures, i indexes patients and j indexes physicians. Physician j’s profit function from 
patient i is given by: 
Π𝑖𝑗(𝒙, 𝒑, 𝒚) = ∑𝑦𝑘,𝑗𝜋𝑘,𝑗𝑥𝑘,𝑖
𝑘
 
where 𝒙𝒌,𝒊 represents the quantity of procedure k performed for patient i, 𝜋𝑘,𝑗 is the profit 
from procedure k, and 𝒚𝒌,𝒋 represents the share of the profits that go physician j when 
procedure k is performed. The parameter 𝒚𝒌,𝒋 varies from 0 to 1 and captures the degree to 
which a physician j is financially rewarded for patient i receiving procedure k. The parameter 
for patient (i) who has an office visit (k) to a solo-practicing primary care physician (j) would 
be 1 for that physician/patient/procedure combination. For that same primary care physician 
and patient, an antegrade pyelogram performed by a urologist would have a parameter of 0. 
If those physicians were to join into a multispecialty practice, the y-parameter would be 
somewhere between 0 and 1. 
Physicians also care about the value of health care for patients, which is given by Ψ𝑠(𝑧𝑥). 
The parameter Ψ represents the patient’s willingness to pay for that level of health, and 𝑠(∗) 
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is the health production function, which takes x as an input and produces health at a positive 
but decreasing rate (𝑠′′(∗) < 0). Adding procedures at first increases patient well-being, 
however, at some point the extra procedures have a negative impact (𝑠′(∗) < 0). I have 
included an efficiency factor, z, which captures the effectiveness of the inputs. Unnecessary 
test and procedures, due to incomplete information or misaligned incentives, would lead to 
a low z. Physicians face a simple constraint in terms of demand or capacity, which I simply 
summarize by the parameter ?̅?. The parameter 𝜔 represents the relative value a physician 
puts on income. The objective function is given by: 
max
𝑥
Ψs(zx) + ωpyx 
𝑠. 𝑡.       𝑥 ≤ ?̅? 
The corresponding first order condition is therefore: 
zΨ𝑠′(𝑧𝑥) + ω𝑝𝑦 = 0 
The first term is the marginal value (to the patient) of care and the second term is the marginal 
dollar that the physician receives. I must note that in this very simplistic model without the 
constraints, the physician would like to continue to provide care until marginal value of care 
is negative.  
The figure below illustrates the relationship between these variables and the physician’s 
optimal quantity. Since s’ is decreasing in x, the effect of an increase in z is a decrease in x*. 
This is shown by a move from point A to B. An increase in financial integration is an increase 
in the procedures for which the provider has a financial interest and represented by a change 
in y. This will increase x, shown by a move from B to D (or A to C). 
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Figure 1: Theoretical Impact of Integration  
 
In this model, the theoretical net effect of integration is ambiguous; it depends on the 
magnitude of the efficiency gains, the change in financial integration, and the health 
production function. I show in Appendix A that a change in y will increase x* if the percent 
change in z (efficiency) is less than the percent change in y (the revenue share). As is detailed 
below, I will estimate the relationship between utilization (x) my measure of behavioral 
integration (which integration proponents argue positively impacts z) and 
administrate/financial integration (y). 
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4  Integration Definition 
As demonstrated above, it is important to be able to measure integration as provider behavior 
in addition to observing organizational structure. One possible reason that previous empirical 
work has not distinguished between administrative and behavioral integration is that 
behavioral integration is hard to quantifiably measure and there is no well-established 
methodology. In contrast, administrative/financial integration is fairly easy to quantify and 
measure. Both hospital ownership of practices and average group size capture this.  
A contribution of this paper is the development of easily calculable summary metrics for 
behavioral integration. My metric features reasonable data requirements and is suitable for 
aggregation and comparison compared across regions and time. It captures the degree to 
which physicians consistently work together, and serves as a good proxy for their ability to 
seamlessly work together, share information, and align practice patterns and patient care 
patterns. 
I propose two complementary metrics for behavioral integration which I construct using the 
patient sharing data from CMS (detailed below). Both metrics are built at the level of an 
individual physician and can be easily aggregated to the geographical level for analysis 
purposes. 
My first metric I term the “share in-group”. To compute this for physician j in group A, I 
calculate the total number of patients seen, the total number of patient visits (within 30 days) 
to other providers, and of those other visits, the number that were in group A. On a patient 
level, this metric approximates the share of care a patient can expect to receive in provider 
j's group. Mathematically, the integration metric is: 
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𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 = [𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝]𝑗
=
[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑗′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠] + [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑗′𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠′ 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐴]
[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑗′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠] + [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑗′𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠′ 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠]
 
This approximates the share of a physician’s patient’s care that the patient receives from the 
physician’s practice for an episode of care under the following simplifying assumptions: 
each visit to a provider receives equal weight, and the episode of care extends 30 days out 
from the first visit. 
In a non-integrated system, the patient will see a large number of disconnected providers. If 
that disconnection is related to being in different practices, the above "share in-group" metric 
will capture this. In this type of system, the transfer of patients between providers can often 
lead to lost or incorrect patient information. On top of the inconvenience of missing 
information, and the potential disasters caused by incorrect information, studies have 
consistently shown that care that is more closely tailored to patient-specific circumstances 
generally leads to better care (Weiner et al 2013, Barry, Edgman-Levitan 2012). In a fully 
integrated system, the patient receives the entirety of their care in that system, and all 
information about the patient is shared between all the patient’s healthcare providers, 
perhaps with the help of a unified electronic medical record system (EMR). In this case, the 
integration measure “share in-group” will be high (100%). 
It is also possible, however, that providers can be behaviorally integrated, in the sense that 
they effectively share data and work as a unit, without being in the same practice. To deal 
with this possibility I create a separate metric that captures the level of concentration in a 
provider’s referral network. The idea is that a more concentrated network should be 
correlated with better information sharing as it potentially reflects relationships that are more 
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established and purposeful. For each physician, I calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of the physician’s referrals for each specialty (s). HHI is a metric which is commonly 
used to measure market concentration and is defined as the sum of the squared market shares 
times 10,000. The HHIs for the physician specialties are aggregated to the physician level 
by taking an average weighted by the number of referrals. 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 = 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  ∑𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗,𝑠
𝑠
 
= ∑[(
∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑘,𝑗𝑘∈𝑠
∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑘,𝑗𝑘
)(∑(
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑘.𝑗
∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑘,𝑗𝑘∈𝑠
)
𝑘∈𝑠
2
∗ 10,000 )]
𝑠
 
Where in the above equation j indexes the physician, k indexes all other physicians and s 
indexes other physician’s specialties.  
One may worry that these measures could mechanically relate increased utilization with 
decreased integration. This would be the case if sicker patients needed to see a wider range 
of specialists. This would change the level of integration for the share-in-group measure by 
changing the amount of the patients care that could be provided within the group. However, 
this would not be a change in integration as the group’s ability to provide care has not 
changed. With the referral-network-concentration measure, this could change the level of 
integration if it increased the share of patients who received care in specialties the physician 
had less of a relationship with, that is specialties where the patient referral pattern is more 
dispersed and thus has a lower HHI. 
To control for both of these possibilities, I also created weighted versions of these metrics 
where I hold fixed across time and across regions the weight given to each specialty from 
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each specialty. That is, the level of integration for the referrals from a primary care provider 
to a urologist in Nebraska in 2012 will receive the same weight as a primary care provider 
to a urologist in New York City in 2014. This eliminates the potential for mechanical 
correlation between the level of care needed for patients and the integration metrics. Results 
are reported with and without the specialty weights. 
 
5  Data Sources 
I use data on physician relationships and patient sharing patterns from Medicare patient 
referral data to create my behavioral integration metrics. While Medicare refers to this as 
“patient referral” data, it is more properly termed “shared patient” data as the dataset records 
any patient sharing relationship between providers of health services within a certain time 
frame (either 30, 60, 90 or 180 days) regardless of whether or not a formal referral exist1. A 
patient visiting one specialists then choosing to get a second, independent opinion from 
another specialist would be recorded as being “referred”, whereas, in fact, the two physicians 
only shared a common patient. This dataset is based on the National Claims History (NCH) 
database which includes most Medicare claim types: Inpatient, Outpatient, Home Health 
Agency (HHA), Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNF), Carrier claims and Durable Medical 
Equipment Regional Carrier (DMERC) claims. This data set extends from 2009 through part 
of 2015, allowing me to observe changing patterns over time. 
The dataset includes a source National Provider Identifier (NPI), a target NPI and the number 
of shared connections and the number of shared patients. The “source” physician is the 
                                                 
1 Following the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, I use the terms “shared patient” and “referral” interchangeably 
in this text. 
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physician that the patient saw first in the dataset, and the “target” physician is the physician 
seen later. I use this data set to construct my measures of physician behavioral integration, 
and explain my methodology below. One limitation of this data set is that it omits 
connections that share fewer than 10 patients. To illustrate how this data is constructed: if a 
patient visits physician A on March 1, and physician B on April 15 (46 days), this connection 
will be counted in the datasets including the 60, 90 and 180-day window, but not the 30-day 
window. If that a patient visits physician A on September 1 and physician B on September 
12, then that connection will be included in all four datasets.  
In order to assign physicians to practices, I use the Provider Enrollment, Chain, and 
Ownership System (PECOS) organization identifier taken from the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) Physician Compare database. I use this identifier both to create 
my measure of in-practice patient sharing and to create a measure of regional physician 
practice concentration.  
Using the Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data (MPUP) file, I also construct 
another commonly used measure of vertical integration: the share of physician practices 
owned by a hospital. I follow the method, explained in Neprash, et al (2015), of identifying 
hospital ownership through the use of the place of service field. I validate that the estimates 
using the MPUP data closely tracked with those in their paper and the paper’s technical 
appendix. Ownership is one definition of vertical integration and I below contrast this 
measure with the physician connection-based metric of integration.  
My main dependent variable comes from The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. I use market 
level race, age, gender and price adjusted per capita Medicare spending as a measure of 
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utilization. Dartmouth Atlas breaks spending into five categories of spending: hospital and 
SNF, physician, outpatient, hospice and equipment.  
The Geographic Variation Public Use File from the Center for Medicare and Medicare 
Cervices (CMS) includes different utilization measures that are unadjusted, standardized 
using methodology that differs from Dartmouth Atlas, and adjusted for patient health-risk. 
Finally, as a check on health outcomes I use readmission rates from the CMS’s Medicare 
Hospital Compare dataset. 
 For a full list of data sources and some brief descriptions about the construction of 
each measure, see Appendix B:Data Sources and Technical Notes. 
 
6  Descriptive Statistics 
For reasons described below (7 Estimation Strategy), I perform my analysis at the region 
level; specifically I use Dartmouth Atlas’ Health Referral Region (HRR) as my unit of 
analysis2. Health Referral Regions (HRRs) are used often in the literature on regional 
variation in health expenditures. They have been constructed by Dartmouth Atlas to capture 
distinct, but complete regional markets for medical care. The defining requirement for a 
HRR is that it contains at least one hospital where patients can receive major cardiovascular 
procedures. HRRs are made up of a collection of Hospital Service Areas (HSAs). HSAs are 
areas built to contain the area from which a hospital’s patients are primary drawn and are 
constructed using patient flow data. There are 306 HRRs and 3,436 HSAs. A map of the 
HRRs shaded by total spending follows. 
                                                 
2 I also examined using Metropolitan Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) and the older Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs). My results are robust to using these other measures. 
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Figure 2: HRR by Adjusted Total Medicare Spending3 
 
 
The tables below contain basic summary statistics of the analysis data at the HRR level and 
the HSA level. The first two tables (Table 1, Table 3) for HRRs and HSAs, respectively, 
show for each variable that will be used as the dependent variable the means, standard 
deviations, minimums, maximums, coefficients of variation, and correlations between each 
respective variable and the main dependent variable - Age, Sex, Race & Price Adjusted 
spending per beneficiary. The tables following those (Table 2 and Table 4) show the means, 
standard deviations, minimums, maximums for the dependent variables. 
Average adjusted per beneficiary overall Medicare spending in a HRR is $9,427, and the 
standard deviation across HRRs is $1,241. The variations across time are much smaller with 
                                                 
3 Reproduced from Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care © 2017 The Trustees of Dartmouth College 
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the average absolute change between 2009 and 2014 being $348 and the average overall 
change between 2012 and 2014 being $192. The alternative utilization measures have similar 
means and standard deviations with the exception of the risk-adjusted measure of utilization 
which is less variable than the other measures.  
Hospital/SNF spending is the largest category, making up about 45% of the total – 
approximately equal to the next two highest: physician services (~27%) and outpatient 
services (~16%). Most of the components move together and are fairly correlated with 
overall spending across HRRs. The exception is outpatient services which is negatively 
correlated with the main explanatory variable. The coefficient of variation is much smaller 
for the sum of physician and outpatient than for either component individually, which is an 
indicator of the negative correlation between these two components (correlation = -0.63). 
Based on the coefficient of variation, home health care is the most variable of the 
components, but only makes up a small share of total spending (~6%).  
As my metrics for behavioral integration are new, it is necessary to check to see first, whether 
they are capturing behavioral integration, and second, whether they are different from 
previous metrics such as the share hospital owned practices, as well as the standard measure 
of horizontal concentration, HHI4 (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and group practice size.   
As a test of my metrics validity I examined the areas which score high on the measure, and 
looked to see if there are reasons to believe that these areas are highly integrated. For 
reference, at the HRR level, the average level of in-practice referral percent is about 50%, 
                                                 
4 HHI is defined for a particular market as the sum of the square of the market shares of each firm. I use the PECOS practice 
indicators to associate providers with practices and use practice as the firm. I created HHIs measures based on both on the 
number of physicians and the share of Medicare allowed amounts, using MPUP data. Results did not substantially differ 
between the two versions. 
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and the standard deviation is 6.5%. By the measure, the least integrated HRR is Harlingen, 
TX with an integration measure of 32.0% and the highest is Rochester, MN with 78.8%. 
Many other highly behaviorally integrated HRRs are also in the Midwest, with La Crosse, 
WI (72.6%), Grand Forks, ND (70.5%), Minneapolis, MN (59.6%) and Madison, WI 
(64.7%). Other regions which are noted for their integrated providers also score high with 
my integration metric, such as Cleveland, OH (Cleveland Clinic – 59.8%), Danville, PA 
(Geisinger – 54.6%) Boise, ID (St. Luke’s – 56.3%).  
Having one large, integrated practice is not the only way to achieve a high integration score. 
If a region is populated with smaller players that keep their patients “in house”, those regions 
will also show a high level of integration. Some notable examples of that are Urbana, IL 
(physician HHI 1,280, integration 67.3%), Madison, WI (physician HHI 980, integration 
64.7%), and Seattle, WA (physician HHI 170, integration 64.2%). 
Below, I compare my behavioral integration metric to the share of practices that are owned 
by a hospital, a frequently used measure of vertical integration that mainly captures 
administrative integration. The HRR level correlation between the two metrics is fairly low, 
only 0.30. The following maps contrast the areas that are more behaviorally integrated (in 
red) and less integrated (green)5. In some regions, they agree – such as the Northwest and 
Southeast, but in other areas there is significant disagreement. The difference is starkest in 
the Midwest. I have included a close view to illustrate this contrast (Figure 6). 
Another commonly used measure of integration is HHI. The correlation between physician 
HHI and my measure of behavioral integration is 0.49. This reflects the fact that they are 
                                                 
5 Note: These maps display CBSAs. The HRR map is similar.  
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codetermined in that a very highly horizontally integrated system will by construction also 
measure as highly vertically integrated, and there will be a similar correspondence at the 
other end of the spectrum. However, there is a good deal of variation in the middle, as 
demonstrated by some of the examples highlighted above. 
The final two metrics I examine are simpler: the average size of a practice in a region and 
the share of providers that are solo practitioners. Both correlate strongly with my measure 
of vertical integration, with average practice size correlating 0.45 and the share of solo 
practices correlating -0.57 across regions. To determine whether my metric is capturing a 
different phenomenon than these two measures, I will run my regression specifications with 
and without these measures as covariates. 
To be useful, my behavioral integration should be able to capture not only differences 
between regions, but also changes across time. In response to Atul Gawande’s piece in The 
New Yorker, and along with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act’s Accountable 
Care Organizations there was a recognized push towards integrated care in McAllen, TX. 
This push has widely been recognized as successful6. While McAllen is still one of the most 
expensive HRRs, average costs have dropped from $14,750 in 2009 ($5,273 above the US 
average) to $12,654 in 2014 ($3,066 above average). The third highest spending HRR is 
Monroe, LA. Over the same time period, spending was virtually unchanged, from $12,914 
to $12,435. My metric captures the large change behavioral integration: between 2009 and 
2014 behavioral integration increased by 14% in McAllen. There was very little change in 
                                                 
6 See the Kocher & Mostashari in New York Times: A Health Care Success Story,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/opinion/a-health-care-success-story.html?_r=3&assetType=opinion  
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Monroe (2%). The figure below shows the changes in behavioral integration and spending 
in those two regions.  
 
Figure 3: McAllen, TX and Monroe, LA – Integration and Medicare Spending over Time 
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Figure 4: Share of Practices Owned by a Hospital by Region 
 
 
Figure 5:  Level of behavioral integration by Region 
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Figure 6:  Contrasting Hospital Owned Practices and Behavioral Integration in the Midwest  
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Table 1: Sample Statistics of Dependent Variables - HRR 
 Avg StD Min Max COV 
Corr w/main 
utilization metric 
Readmission Rate 17.47 2.03 11.16 25.39 0.12 62.9% 
Age, Sex, Race & Price Adjusted $9,427 $1,241 $6,724 $13,596 0.13 100.0% 
Alternative Utilization Metrics       
No Price Adjustment $9,251 $1,204 $6,877 $14,165 0.13 75.7% 
Raw Spending $9,129 $1,364 $6,341 $15,364 0.15 72.0% 
CMS Standardized $8,775 $1,294 $5,686 $13,965 0.15 96.1% 
CMS Risk-Adjusted $9,354 $827 $6,334 $11,677 0.09 78.5% 
Spending Category:       
Hospital/SNF $4,268 $669 $2,523 $6,237 0.16 90.5% 
Physician $2,515 $541 $1,181 $4,359 0.22 59.6% 
Outpatient $1,516 $334 $584 $2,803 0.22 -2.2% 
Physician+Outpatient $4,030 $437 $2,882 $5,682 0.11 72.2% 
Home Health Care $528 $302 $65 $2,145 0.57 77.1% 
Hospice $382 $156 $55 $899 0.41 40.5% 
Equipment $218 $45 $90 $409 0.21 34.4% 
Note: N = 306 HRRs x 3 Years = 918 
 
Table 2: Sample Statistics of Independent Variables - HRR 
 Avg StD Min Max 
Share in-group 50.3% 6.4% 32.6% 78.8% 
SPC Wtd Share in-group 40.7% 5.5% 26.8% 68.1% 
Physician Network 
Concentration 3,092 473 2,016 4,718 
SPC Wtd Network Concentration 1,964 417 1,090 3,405 
Share Phy Hosp Owned 29.1% 7.3% 13.7% 60.1% 
Physician HHI 542 563 49 4,264 
Hospital HHI 2,676 1,727 185 9,053 
Avg Group Size 90.4 122.6 4.0 1,502.6 
Share Solo Practitioner 20.3% 5.8% 7.9% 51.7% 
Num Docs 2,273 2,424 279 16,093 
Num Enrollees 85,035 78,715 12,283 499,734 
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Docs/Enrollee 32.61 11.97 2.97 109.41 
Notes: N = 306 HRRs x 3 Years = 918 
 
Table 3: Sample Statistics of Dependent Variables - HSA 
 Avg StD Min Max COV 
Corr w/main 
utilization metric 
Readmission Rate 17.26 1.84 11.16 24.17 0.11 46.0% 
Age, Sex, Race & Price Adjusted $9,479 $1,516 $5,395 $19,170 0.16 100.0% 
Spending Category:       
Hospital/SNF $4,336 $921 $1,674 $12,283 0.21 90.5% 
Physician $2,279 $628 $801 $5,248 0.28 47.9% 
Outpatient $1,801 $618 $718 $6,588 0.34 8.7% 
Physician+Outpatient $4,080 $537 $2,435 $7,786 0.13 66.0% 
Home Health Care $511 $361 $21 $3,119 0.71 64.1% 
Hospice $372 $210 $30 $2,313 0.57 36.8% 
Notes:  N=3,428 HSAs with no missing data x 3 Years = 10,284 
The omitted other dependent variables were not available at the HSA level 
 
Table 4: Sample Statistics of Independent Variables - HSA 
 Avg StD Min Max 
Share in-group 46.8% 9.6% 6.6% 100.0% 
SPC Wtd Share in-group 36.3% 9.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
Physician Network 
Concentration 4,320 1,404 293 10,000 
SPC Wtd Network Concentration 3,158 1,547 0 10,000 
Share Phy Hosp Owned 28.1% 16.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
Physician HHI 1,938 1,880 116 10,000 
Hospital HHI 9,211 1,906 629 10,000 
Avg Group Size 15.6 50.5 1.0 1,678.7 
Share Solo Practitioner 37.9% 19.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
Num Docs 128 323 1 5,694 
Num Enrollees 7,624 12,949 66 190,548 
Docs/Enrollee 23.99 24.29 0.27 712.51 
Notes: N=3,428 HSAs with no missing data x 3 Years = 10,284 
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Table 5: HRR Level Correlations for Dependent Variables 
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Table 6: HRR Level Correlations for Independent Variables 
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Physician 46.5% 59.6% 71.3% 69.4% 63.7% 45.5% 38.9% 100.0%
Outpatient -12.2% -2.2% -26.7% -23.0% -5.6% 7.8% 3.2% -59.2% 100.0%
Physician+Outpatient 48.3% 72.2% 67.9% 68.4% 74.7% 62.4% 50.7% 78.7% 3.2% 100.0%
Home 35.2% 77.1% 56.3% 53.4% 76.7% 61.5% 59.0% 36.3% -13.3% 34.8% 100.0%
Hospice -5.0% 40.5% 8.4% 5.9% 38.1% 50.4% 22.0% 12.7% -10.2% 8.0% 49.4% 100.0%
Equipment 8.7% 34.4% 2.8% -3.4% 24.3% 39.6% 36.2% 4.2% -9.5% -2.0% 30.2% 36.1% 100.0%
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7  Estimation Strategy 
I use my created metrics of behavioral integration and established measures of administrative 
integration to separately identify efficiency of the healthcare production function by looking at 
utilization and outcomes. Behavioral integration increases efficiently if it either decreases 
utilization while not decreasing quality outcomes, or increases quality outcomes while not 
increasing utilization. 
I use a reduced form approach, examining differences across health referral regions (HRRs) and 
changes in HRRs over time with the goal of investigating loosely how the healthcare production 
function changes when doctors integrate. 
Attempting to identify the effect on individual physicians or practices is problematic. 
Conceptually, this analysis is confounded by several selection issues: selection of patients by 
doctors, selection of doctors by patients, and selection of doctors into groups. Take the example 
of trying to establish the efficiency of an integrated practice that has achieved a high level of 
quality.  
Patients choose a practice based on their health status, the convenience of the practice like travel 
and wait times, and the perceived quality of the practice. A sicker patient may be willing to 
sacrifice some convenience to get quality. If these underlying health differences are not fully 
observed or controlled for this may downwardly bias any measure of a high-quality practice’s 
effectiveness. 
High quality practices may also have the ability to choose patients with higher expected returns. 
This introduces a similar bias in that if effectiveness is being measured by resource usage and the 
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patient’s needs are not fully controlled for the high-quality practice will be observed as using more 
resources. 
Finally, physicians self-select into groups. If high quality physicians choose to only practice with 
high quality physicians than what we are observing is not an increase in efficiency through 
integration, but the concentration of the efficient doctors in one practice. There may not be any 
change in the aggregate level of efficiency. 
These selection issues are greatly eased if we instead study the aggregate efficiency of the region. 
Because healthcare is generally delivered locally, if a practice increases integration we can observe 
the effect on aggregate health and utilization and infer the impact of that integration. 
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Figure 7: Identifying the impact of integration by comparing across practices  
 
Figure 8: Identifying the impact of integration by comparing across years 
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The ability to look at behavioral integration at the market level is an advantage of my metric as it 
is easily aggregated. Most previous studies looking at coordinated care have only been able to look 
at specific providers or specific groups of providers that are identified as either “integrated” or 
“not integrated”.  
With the exception of fully integrated systems such as Kaiser, care is generally provided by many 
different doctors in different systems. For example, a 2007 study of Medicare patients found that 
over a two-year period they saw a median of two PCPs and five specialists, and those physicians 
worked in an average of four practices (Pham et al. 2007). Furthermore, it has been noted that, 
among top ranked hospitals, in the last 6 months of life, 34% of patients see more than 10 
physicians (Mehrotra et al. 2011).  
Running this analysis at the region level also allows me to sidestep the difficulty of assigning 
patients to practices and disentangling both their usage and outcome levels. These difficulties have 
been highlighted both by the experience of Medicare Share Savings Program participants and 
attempts to analyze that program’s effectiveness (see, for example McWilliams 2014).  
Furthermore, because my measure of integration is continuous I can capture small changes over 
time. This gives me the ability to look at changes and include region level fixed effects and control 
for potentially unobserved covariates.  
As described earlier, my metric seems to capture behavioral integration, in that regions noted for 
coordinating care are high. Is it worth noting the potential sources for these regional differences. 
The Mayo Clinic has been committed to the team practice of medicine since its founding in the 
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1860s and Geisinger was founded in the early 20th century to be a Mayo Clinic clone. Its location 
is somewhat an accident of history as Abigail Geisinger chose to use her late husband’s iron mining 
fortune to found a hospital in Danville, PA because that is where she grew up and lived. A portion 
of regional differences is caused by the persistence of these type of historical accidents. Part of the 
persistence of these differences is due to the transfer of a region’s medical practice culture to new 
physicians (Song, Skinner, Bynum, Sutherland, Wennberg, Fisher 2010). This cultural difference 
can also be negative. In the previously mentioned New Yorker article on McAllen, TX, Gawande 
notes a certain “entrepreneurial spirit” among physicians there, many of whom were not only 
doctors, but owned other businesses and properties as well. Competitive forces can also lead to a 
high integration metric. The Urbana HRR has one of the highest levels of behavioral integration 
as measured by my metric. This HRR is characterized by the competition between two large 
systems, Carle and the Christie Clinic. These systems rarely share patients. Madison, WI is similar 
with the University of Wisconsin Health system rarely sharing patients with the SSM Health Care 
System. 
Various forces can cause a region’s practice norms and culture to change. The negative press 
McAllen, TX received from that article, along with the formation of several accountable care 
organizations, made McAllen one of the faster integrating areas, according to my metric. 
Legislative and organizational changes can drive behavioral integration. San Mateo formed a large 
ACO in 2012 and this change is accompanied by a large shift in the integration metric for that 
HRR. Finally, competitive forces also can serve as the driver for a shift, as behavioral can also 
follow administrative integration. Fierce competition in Pennsylvania has led to increasing levels 
of vertical integration. York, Lancaster and Pittsburgh all are above average both in their level of 
behavioral integration, and in terms of the changes over the past couple years.  
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My main empirical strategy is to control for market specific structures, by using fixed effects and 
other variables which capture market characteristics, and examine changes over time in order to 
identify the effect of integration on utilization. The necessary identifying assumption is that within-
HRR changes in my measure of behavioral integration are uncorrelated with the time-HRR error 
term, conditional on the other covariates. This assumption would be violated if there is some factor 
that impacts both average cost of care for a Medicare patient and my metric, conditional on the 
other covariates such as average group size, share hospital owned or the number of doctors. An 
example of this could be a health system simultaneously pursuing a set of other changes along 
with changing referral patters, such as hiring more qualified doctors from other regions7, changing 
internal system processes such as check lists or streamlining follow up care. In that case, the 
increased behavioral integration is only incidental and not the driving force in decreasing costs.  
However, it is important to note that the goal of this research is not to argue that referral patterns 
are the causal mechanism that decreases the costs of care. Rather, referral patterns, and my metric, 
serve as a proxy for the level of behavioral integration more broadly defined, which could include 
such things as more streamlined sharing of patient data or careful management of preexisting 
conditions across providers. Furthermore, I would not be concerned with the choice to increase 
behavioral integration being driven by a region being high-cost. As long as my metric of behavioral 
reflects changes in care patterns and as long as this is the channel through which costs are saved, 
the estimated equation would be showing returns to behavioral integration. 
                                                 
7 As noted, this is an advantage of aggregating to the region level. Healthcare provider shifting based on skill, 
or patient shifting based on health status will only bias the results if it is both systematic, that is, correlated with the 
main explanatory variables, and cross-region. 
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As a complementary approach, for robustness, I perform the analysis at the smaller HSA level, 
still using HRR fixed effects to control for other market-level characteristics. For this specification, 
the necessary identifying assumption is that conditional on the other covariates, such as average 
group size, share hospital owned, across HSA, within-HRR differences in behavioral integration 
are uncorrelated with other causes of across HSA, within-HRR differences in the average cost of 
care for a Medicare patient. 
Finally, I also do my analysis without fixed effects for comparison and to allow integration to 
explain regional differences. I aggregate my integration to the HSA or HRR level, as detailed 
above and then estimate variations of the following specifications: 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟,𝑡 = β
u𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛾
𝑢𝑃𝑐𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑟,𝑡 + 𝑿𝒓,𝒕𝚿
u + Γ𝑟
𝑢 + 𝜏𝑡
𝑢
+ 𝜀𝑟,𝑡
𝑢  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟,𝑡 = β
O𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛾
𝑂𝑃𝑐𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑟,𝑡 + 𝑿𝒓,𝒕𝚿
𝐎 + Γ𝑟
𝑂 + 𝜏𝑡
𝑂
+ 𝜀𝑟,𝑡
𝑂  
where r denotes region and t denotes HRR region. Utilization is primarily measured by Dartmouth 
Atlas’s price, age, race and gender adjusted measure of Medicare spending. The results are robust 
to using other measures of spending (details below). My main outcome variable is hospital 
readmission rate. 
The coefficients of interest are 𝛽𝑢 and 𝛽𝑂, which capture the impacts of my behavioral integration 
metric. I include estimates with alternate integration measures in the appendix. Of secondary 
interest are the coefficients 𝛾𝑢 and 𝛾𝑂,  which show the association of the share of practices owned 
by a hospital with the outcome variables. I also include year and HRR fixed effects, Γ𝑟 and 𝜏𝑡 
38 
 
respectively, and an array of market-level characteristics, 𝑿𝒓,𝒕, consisting of physician practice 
HHI, number of doctors per enrollee, the share of doctors in a solo practice, average group size 
and the log of the number of physicians. I run the estimations with and without these market-level 
controls to see to what extend my metric is capturing something different than market structure. 
While these variables may not exogenous, the inclusion of them serves as an indicator of the degree 
to which the level of behavioral integration is a function of these market characteristics. If the 
estimates on 𝛽 differ significantly with and without these controls this may indicate potential 
endogeneity issues. 
 
8  Results 
Using the behavioral integration metric which I constructed, detailed above, I estimate the impact 
of increased behavioral integration on efficiency. First, I look at Dartmouth Atlas’s total spending 
per beneficiary and perform my analysis at the HRR level. This measure has been adjusted for 
race, age, gender and price. The price adjustment eliminates regional variation driven by 
differences in Medicare reimbursement rates, therefore this measure can be viewed as a measure 
of healthcare resource utilization. I also used utilization measures that are unadjusted, standardized 
using methodology that differs from Dartmouth Atlas, and adjusted for patient health-risk8. Next, 
I run my analysis on the HSA level using HRR fixed effects and identifying through the variation 
across HSAs within an HRR. For all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the HRR or 
                                                 
8 For details regarding the risk-adjustment methodology, see the CMS documentation: https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Geographic-Variation/GV_PUF.html  
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HSA level9.I also run specifications without HRR fixed effects, allowing the explanatory variables 
to account for regional differences in health care spending.  
I run the specification with and without the following covariates: physician and hospital 
concentration (HHI) within the HRR (or HSA), average group size, share of doctors in a solo 
practice, number of doctors per enrollee and the log of the total number of doctors. In the pooled 
regressions especially, I primarily view both HHI and the share of providers owned by a hospital 
as controls for otherwise unobserved market dynamics, however, the estimates provide some 
suggestive evidence and can be used to inform areas in need of future research. 
I also run the estimations separately on different spending categories. Using Dartmouth Atlas’s 
categories, spending is separated into the categories of hospital / SNF, physician services, 
outpatient services, home health care, hospice and equipment. 
Finally, I estimate the impact of integration on readmission rates, which serve as a proxy for the 
quality of care and overall effectiveness. The estimates were little changed when I instead used a 
measure from the Institute of Medicine’s report which adjust for illness using Hierarchical 
Condition Categories (HCCs) (results not reported). 
For ease of interpretation, I have converted the behavioral integration metrics to z-scores10, 
therefore the coefficients represent the effect of a one standard deviation change in the relevant 
behavioral integration metric. 
                                                 
9 Specifically, I used SAS’s panel with the “HCCME=3 cluster” options for panel data and SAS’s proc genmod with HRR as the 
repeated subject. Furthermore, for the proc genmod I used the finite sample size adjustment to standard errors as described here: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X10001923  
10 The z-score is calculated as the number of standard deviations away from the average. Specifically, the integration z-score for 
region r is define as: 
𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑟 =
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 − 𝐴𝑣𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
𝑆𝐷(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
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Utilization 
 
Fixed Effects 
The first specifications (Table 7) includes both year and HRR fixed effects. The negative 
coefficient on behavioral integration implies that there is an association between increased 
integration and decrease spending at the HRR level. Without the covariates, the unweighted 
estimated coefficient for the share of in-group referrals is -98.4 (Table 7); meaning a one standard 
deviation change in integration would decrease spending by nearly 100 dollars per beneficiary. 
This estimate is significant at the 5% level (standard errors were clustered at the HRR level for all 
specifications). The estimate using the specialty weighted metric is lower (-63.6) and only 
significant at the 10% level. To put this level of reduction in context, by one estimate, the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program saved an average of $67 per beneficiary attributed to an ACO (Williams 
2016). Some authors have argued that this estimate is on the high side, and the actual impact is 
lower (for example, see Chernew, Barbey, McWilliams 2017).  
Surprisingly, the estimates using the practice-agnostic behavioral integration measure, based on 
the tightness of a provider’s referral network, are quite similar. The unweighted coefficient for this 
metric is -81.4 and it is only significant at the 10% level. The weighted coefficient is -62.8 and it 
is not significant. 
These estimates do not change substantially when the covariates are excluded, indicating that the 
integration metrics are orthogonal to the other controls and capturing something different than the 
traditional measures of integration. 
The estimates on the share of physicians owned by a hospital are positive and the estimates on 
both physician and hospital HHI are negative. However, with the exception of physician HHI, 
which is weakly significant for some specifications, none of these estimates are statistically 
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significant. All of the coefficients are similar across the different integration measures and when 
run without any integration measure. When year dummies are excluded (not reported) the 
estimates are similar, but the referral network concentration measures of integration because larger 
(around -110) and significant. 
 
Pooled 
Variation across regions is much larger than variation across time. In fact, a regression that only 
includes year and HRR dummies has an R2 of 0.991. The year over year HRR level correlation for 
the level of integration is 0.98. Both integration and utilization rates are slow to change.  
If the benefits to integration take time to accumulate then a panel data estimation may 
underestimate the long-term impact of integration. In the case of the FTC vs St. Luke’s, Alain 
Enthoven, a professor at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business and St. Luke’s primary 
efficiencies expert, testified that it would take St. Luke’s ten years or more to achieve their desired 
results from integration11. For comparison and in order to allow for this possibility, I also estimate 
a pooled, cross sectional model. 
Table 9 and Table 10 show the results of a regression without HRR fixed effects. Using this 
approach, the estimated effect are considerably larger: a one standard deviation change in 
integration decreases per-capita cost by around 600 dollars for three of the behavioral integration 
metrics. The outlier is the weighted in-group share integration measure as the estimate with this 
                                                 
11 Plaintiffs' Joint Pre-Trial Memorandum - Federal Trade Commission; ST. LUKE'S HEALTH SYSTEM, LTD. Et al v. 
FTC  https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/130910stlukepretrialmemo.pdf  
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coefficient is a decrease of only 150 and is not statistically significant. All the other coefficients 
are significant at the one-percent level. 
In these specifications, a one-percent increase in the hospital ownership of physician practices 
increases cost by around $22 per year/beneficiary.  These estimates were not affected by the 
inclusion of different measures of behavioral integration and all were significant at the 5% level. 
Interestingly, in this specification another variable shows a consistently significant effect at the 
5% level - the share of physicians that are solo practitioners. A one-percent increase in the share 
of physicians that are solo practitioners increases cost by around $100 per year/beneficiary.  No 
other variables were significant across all specifications. 
One possible interpretation of the large difference between the models with and without HRR fixed 
effects is that the fixed effect model captures the immediate, one-year change impact while the 
cross-sectional estimates capture the long-term effects. This could be the result of slow to 
accumulate advantages to integration. However, this also could be the result of uncontrolled for 
regional differences, or some other factors that correlate with integration. I receive very similar 
estimates both when I run the model without year fixed effects (not reported) and when I run this 
estimation on each year independently, allowing both the intercepts and slopes to vary by year (not 
reported). 
 
HSA Level 
As discussed earlier, Health Referral Region are made up of between 1 and 75 Hospital Service 
Areas (HSAs). As an alternative method of identification, I perform similar regressions at the HSA 
level using HRR fixed effects. This method is identified through the variation across HSAs within 
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HRR regions. The estimates were similar when run on individual years (not reported) or run on all 
three years with year fixed effects. Broadly, the estimates were similar to the ones from the model 
identified only through the year-over-year changes within HRRs. The estimated impact of a 1-
standard deviation increase in behavioral integration varying from -96 to -128 depending on the 
version of the metric, and the estimated impact of a change in the share of physicians owned by a 
hospital is again positive, with a one percentage point change increasing cost by between eight and 
nine dollars per beneficiary per year. In these models, all the estimates for behavioral integration 
and the share of physicians owned by a hospital are significant at the 1% level. 
Robustness – Other Dependent Variables 
As a robustness check against the possibility that these results might be either somehow correlated 
with the construction of the adjusted version of Medicare health care spending, or correlated with 
the underlying risk profile of the patients I also run the specifications using other versions of total 
spending as alternate dependent variables. The four different dependent variables I use are a 
version that does not include the price adjustment (but is still adjusted for age, sex and race), an 
unadjusted spending measure, a measure that is standardized by CMS and not adjusted for age, 
sex and race and finally, a measure that is adjusted for patient health-risk. The results are presented 
in Table 12 and organized into four sub-tables based on the four versions of the behavioral 
integration metric. Most of the estimates are in-line with the main specifications using the age, 
sex, race and price adjusted metric. A graph of the estimates follows tables of the regressions 
(Figure 9). 
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Decomposing Utilization 
In an attempt to better understand the channels through which behavioral and administrative 
integration impacts utilization I use The Dartmouth Atlas’s decomposition of spending into the 
categories of hospital / skilled nursing facilities (SNF), physician services, outpatient services, 
home health care, hospice and equipment and regress these on my metrics for behavioral and 
administrative integration using both the fixed effects and pooled specifications. Across HRRs, 
Physician and outpatient services negatively correlate, the correlation is -0.63. To account for the 
possibility that these services are substitutes for each other, I also included as a dependent variable 
the sum of physician and outpatient services. 
With the HRR fixed effects and in-group share as the measure of behavioral integration (Table 
13), the effect seems to come primarily from hospital/SNF and physician services. Hospice, home 
health care and outpatient services are secondary, though in the decomposed regression few 
coefficients were statistically significant. Using the referral network concentration metric for 
behavioral integration the effect seems to primarily come from hospital/SNF and outpatient 
services. 
Interestingly, hospital ownership of physician practices decreased physician spending while 
increasing outpatient and hospital/SNF. This was true regardless of what measure of physician 
behavioral integration was used. The coefficients on physician utilization and outpatient utilization 
are both significant at the one-percent level. 
In the cross-sectional regressions (Table 14), the estimated coefficients for each component are 
higher. Three of the seven components consistently show a significant and negative relationship 
with behavioral integration (hospital/SNF, physician, physician+outpatient, and home health care). 
While the weighted in-group measure is different, the other three measures have similar 
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coefficients for the physician and hospital/ SNF components of spending. In all three, a standard 
deviation increase in behavioral spending is estimated to decrease hospital spending by around 
$300/patient and physician spending $200 patient/yr. The coefficients on home health care may 
seem high in light of the fact that home health care makes up a small (6%) average portion of 
spending. However, there is a lot of variability across regions and previous studies have shown 
integrated care is connected to lower home health care cost, with 2002 US Department of Health 
and Human Services noting that “primary nurses have greater control over the development of 
their patients' care plans in low-volume states” (US Department of Health and Human Services, 
2002). 
With hospital ownership we see the same pattern where physician spending is lower, while 
hospital/ SNF and outpatient spending are higher. As with the other specifications, the causal 
implication of the ownership coefficient estimates is questionable. This is especially true for cross 
sectional estimates. The high coefficient on hospital spending could reflect hospitals with higher 
volume being financially healthier, and that financial health being a driver in the acquisition of 
physician practices. While ownership and HHI are primarily included to control for otherwise 
unobserved market characteristics, they do indicate a clear difference between ownership and 
behavioral integration as their inclusion does not significantly change the estimate effect of 
behavioral integration (regression not shown). 
 
Health Outcomes 
To establish that this is an increase in efficiency, and not a tradeoff between health and utilization, 
I next estimate integration’s impact on health outcomes. If integration is increasing efficiency, then 
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it should not cause a decrease in health outcomes. I use hospital readmission rates to proxy for 
quality.  
For each version of behavioral integration, an increase in behavioral integration is predicted to 
decrease the readmission rate, however, the effect is weakly significant (10%) for the unweighted 
version of the share in-group measure and statistically insignificant for the other versions of the 
metric. In contrast, hospital ownership is predicted to increase the readmission rate. While this 
effect is significant at the 10% level, it is quite small. A one percent change in hospital ownership 
is predicted to increase the readmission rate by 1.5 basis points (0.015%). No other variables are 
significantly related to readmission. 
As with the utilization regressions, I also run specifications with the HRR fixed effects omitted 
(Table 16). I estimate that a one standard deviation increase in integration decreases readmissions 
by between 50 and 100 basis points for three of the behavioral integration measures, all statistically 
significant at the one-percent level. The exception, again, is the weighted version of the in-group 
share where the estimated decrease is only 7 basis points, and the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. With the cross-sectional specification, I estimate that a one-percent increase in hospital 
ownership increases readmission rates by around 6 basis points. 
As with the utilization regression, the results are robust to running the regression on any one year 
from 2010-2014. These specifications explain a non-trivial portion of readmission rates (R2 = 
0.255-0.425), with the referral network concentration metrics adding the most explanatory power. 
These coefficients may at first glance seem small, but readmission rates do not change very much 
over time. The national readmission rate fell significantly when legislation was passed to tie 
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readmissions to reimbursements, and that significant change was approximately 1% (from around 
18.2% to around 17.2%).  
 
9  Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper speaks to two competing claims regarding health care integration. The first claim is that 
integration will lead to an increase in efficiency as the coordination of care leads to a decrease in 
unnecessary utilization. The second claim is that integration will lead to a decrease in efficiency 
due to physician agency and the internalization of the monetary benefits of increased utilization.  
I differentiate between two different types of integration, behavioral and administrative. 
Behavioral integration refers to patient and information sharing while administrative integration is 
related to ownership, or other formal relationship. While these two concepts are related, they are 
not the same and empirically when looking across geographic areas there is only weak correlation 
between the two measures. I demonstrate how the first claim, the coordination of care will increase 
efficiency, relates to behavioral integration, and the second claim, integration will lead to perverse 
incentives, relates to administrative integration. By developing new metrics that capture behavioral 
integration I am able to explore the different effects of behavioral and administrative integration 
on the healthcare system efficiency, as measured by utilization and health outcomes. I find some 
evidence to support both claims.  
My results suggest that behavioral integration both decreases resource utilization and increases 
health outcomes. This evidence supports the optimistic story that integration leads to efficiency 
gains, when integration is measured behaviorally as the tightness of the physician patient-sharing 
network. I estimate that a one standard deviation change in integration would save approximately 
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$75/patient year, when HRR fixed effects are included, though this increases to $120 when the 
model is identified using HSAs. In terms of magnitude, these estimates seem to be in same range 
as Weeks et al (2010) who found savings of $272 per patient/year in large, multi-specialty groups. 
When fixed effects are not included the estimated effect is $600 per patient per year. This 
difference could reflect slow to accumulate benefits from integration, or point to potentially 
uncontrolled for differences other HRR specific variables. 
There is also some limited evidence to support the pessimistic story when looking at physician 
practice ownership by hospitals. While it is possible to question the causal nature of these 
estimates, as a hospital could target high volume physician practices, but what is clear is that 
behavioral integration is a distinct from ownership both in conceptual definition and in empirical 
results. This distinction should be kept in mind both in policy discussions and in future research. 
Interestingly, hospital ownership of physician practices decreased physician spending while 
increasing outpatient and hospital/SNF. This was true regardless of what measure of physician 
behavioral integration was used. The coefficients on physician utilization and outpatient utilization 
are both significant at the one-percent level. The focus out outpatient services is complimented by 
Neprash et al (2015) who note that practices acquired by hospitals increased their prices for 
outpatient services. 
While these metrics as I diagnostic and empirical tool, I would caution policy makers or health 
system administrators against the use of these metrics as any sort of target or goal. While I believe 
that these behavioral integration metrics track well with actual behavioral integration metrics, as a 
target it is fairly easy to game the system and increase these integration metrics without changing 
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the underlying, efficiency producing behaviors such as efficient patient sorting or information 
sharing. 
This study is limited due to the fact that identification is only based on changes over time, or across 
HSAs. The lack of an exogenous shock weakens the causal case that behavioral integration impacts 
efficiency, and leaves open the possibility that tight referral networks may simply be one of many 
things done in tandem to improve efficiency. However, even if my measure of vertical integration 
is simply capturing an indicator of more efficient providers, it does demonstrate a robust 
relationship between behavioral integration and efficiency. Furthermore, it providers evidence to 
support the belief that differences in integration and efficiency do in fact account for a share of 
regional variation in healthcare utilization. 
The findings of this paper are bolstered by anecdotal evidence. As noted earlier, with the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act prompting the formation of Accountable Care 
Organizations, there was a push toward integrated care in McAllen, TX, moving it from a ridiculed 
outlier to a success story. This change, which was previously only observable in a qualitative way, 
is captured quantitatively through my behavioral integration metrics. 
This paper contributes to conversation about the impacts of physician integration. It emphasizes 
the two different components of integration, behavioral and administrative, and introduces a new 
way to measure the behavioral portion. No prior metric cleanly captures behavioral integration 
using administrative data. 
These results contribute to the discussion as a data point in a developing body of evidence about 
the efficacy of integration. The results are encouraging as they support the conventional wisdom 
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that coordinated care increases efficiency, while lending support to those concerned about 
unintended consequences and incentives.   
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10  Tables 
Table 7: Total Utilization, Year/HRR FE  
 
Table 8: Total Utilization, Year/HRR FE – No Other Controls 
 
 
Regression Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Avg Pct In-Group -98.35 ** -63.56 *
(41.97) (35.43)
Ref Network Concentration -81.38 * -62.75
(44.74) (42.70)
Pct Hosp Owned 6.26 6.71 6.65 6.40 6.60
(4.17) (4.15) (4.15) (4.14) (4.17)
Phy HHI -0.138 * -0.091 -0.132 * -0.110 -0.130
(0.078) (0.084) (0.080) (0.083) (0.080)
Hosp HHI -0.026 -0.032 -0.034 -0.033 -0.032
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Avg Grp Size -0.349 -0.208 -0.414 -0.196 -0.389
(0.380) (0.382) (0.392) (0.387) (0.386)
Pct Solo -0.360 -2.371 -0.303 -1.270 -0.145
(4.790) (4.847) (4.776) (4.778) (4.777)
Docs/Enrl 2.178 2.830 2.587 1.915 2.732
(4.718) (4.719) (4.706) (4.682) (4.717)
ln(NumDocs) -41.47 -70.27 -45.65 -46.87 -47.65
(87.08) (87.80) (86.46) (86.56) (86.54)
HRR FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918
R2 0.1645 0.1733 0.1721 0.1698 0.1687
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
Regression Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Avg Pct In-Group -109.61 *** -79.21 ***
(35.30) (30.18)
Ref Network Concentration -66.39 -47.71
(45.01) (42.10)
HRR FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918
R2 0.1439 0.1572 0.1492 0.1539 0.1465
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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Table 9: Total Utilization, Pooled, Year FE 
 
 
Table 10: Total Utilization, Pooled, Year FE – No Other Controls  
 
Regression Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Avg Pct In-Group -646.51 *** -151.05
(98.59) (97.81)
Ref Network Concentration -570.76 *** -623.98 ***
(69.38) (67.54)
Pct Hosp Owned 24.17 ** 21.94 ** 23.58 *** 24.12 ** 21.05 **
(11.22) (9.85) (8.80) (11.05) (8.20)
Phy HHI -0.07 0.43 ** 0.02 0.06 0.00
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13)
Hosp HHI 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 ** 0.00 -0.16 ***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Pct Solo 114.81 *** 72.17 *** 103.02 *** 105.44 *** 94.02 ***
(15.66) (15.33) (13.76) (16.69) (13.85)
Avg Grp Size -0.66 -0.33 -0.75 -0.51 -0.64
(0.65) (0.76) (0.68) (0.67) (0.59)
Docs/Enrl -0.19 12.94 * 11.79 0.40 16.07 **
(7.68) (7.56) (7.37) (7.74) (7.08)
ln(NumDocs) 337.24 ** 283.40 * -32.08 326.31 ** -95.31
(153.96) (147.27) (155.94) (154.59) (155.41)
HRR FE
Year FE X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918
R2 0.256 0.377 0.437 0.263 0.464
Stardard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
Regression Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Avg Pct In-Group -637.55 *** -418.26 ***
(69.46) (79.40)
Ref Network Concentration -583.73 *** -650.54 ***
(66.50) (62.88)
HRR FE
Year FE X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918
R2 0.002 0.263 0.222 0.114 0.276
Stardard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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Table 11: Total Utilization, Year/HRR FE – HSA level 
 
 
 
  
Regression Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Avg Pct In-Group -125.803 *** -120.277 ***
(21.640) (21.355)
Ref Network Concentration -96.106 *** -127.952 ***
(28.047) (28.787)
Pct Hosp Owned 9.130 *** 8.171 *** 8.951 *** 7.946 *** 8.941 ***
(1.339) (1.344) (1.340) (1.349) (1.336)
Phy HHI 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.012
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Avg Grp Size -0.525 ** -0.235 -0.477 * -0.326 -0.445 *
(0.260) (0.235) (0.252) (0.239) (0.251)
Pct Solo 5.105 *** 3.885 *** 5.301 *** 4.028 *** 5.352 ***
(1.167) (1.146) (1.208) (1.171) (1.207)
Docs/Enrl 0.825 1.072 0.937 0.910 1.094
(1.293) (1.411) (1.337) (1.338) (1.394)
ln(NumDocs) -78.801 *** -67.634 *** -112.940 *** -55.028 ** -121.472 ***
(21.156) (21.664) (24.315) (21.727) (24.034)
HRR FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918
R2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Stardard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HSA level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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Table 12: Total Utilization, Year/HRR FE – Alternative Dependent Variables 
a. Behavioral Integration Metric: Share in-group 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable:
No Price 
Adjustment
Raw Cost
CMS 
Standardized
CMS 
Risk Adjusted
Avg Pct In-Group -127.366 *** -150.511 *** -106.229 *** -112.938 ***
(41.750) (39.201) (36.805) (41.851)
Pct Hosp Owned 6.707 * 5.468 * 3.738 6.435
(3.713) (3.086) (2.912) (4.805)
Phy HHI -0.138 * -0.057 -0.083 -0.082
(0.076) (0.065) (0.059) (0.071)
Hosp HHI -0.020 -0.026 -0.007 0.006
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.039)
Avg Grp Size 0.718 ** 0.517 * 0.356 0.812 **
(0.334) (0.291) (0.235) (0.357)
Pct Solo 3.447 2.499 1.394 6.152
(4.604) (4.064) (3.992) (5.084)
Docs/Enrl -4.271 -7.156 * -7.121 ** -16.189 ***
(4.001) (4.037) (3.403) (4.422)
ln(NumDocs) 39.457 107.757 91.210 234.436 ***
(79.310) (78.686) (68.236) (88.120)
HRR FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918
R2 0.1933 0.0959 0.1394 0.2411
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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b. Behavioral Integration Metric: Referral Network Concentration  
 
The regression coefficients for other controls were similar to the ones shown in table 12a. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:
No Price 
Adjustment
Raw Cost
CMS 
Standardized
CMS 
Risk Adjusted
Ref Network Concentration -101.479 * -83.700 ** -87.699 *** -138.329 ***
(52.698) (41.851) (32.385) (38.523)
Pct Hosp Owned 6.613 * 5.180 3.675 6.588
(3.781) (3.152) (2.877) (4.803)
Other Controls X X X X
HRR FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918
R2 0.1902 0.0782 0.1373 0.2505
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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c. Behavioral Integration Metric: Share in-group – Specialty Weighted 
 
The regression coefficients for other controls were similar to the ones shown in table 12a. 
  
Dependent Variable:
No Price 
Adjustment
Raw Cost
CMS 
Standardized
CMS 
Risk Adjusted
Avg W Pct In-Group -82.082 ** -90.812 *** -61.475 ** -56.874
(37.670) (34.282) (29.997) (36.774)
Pct Hosp Owned 6.301 * 4.974 3.383 6.039
(3.742) (3.131) (2.929) (4.853)
Other Controls X X X X
HRR FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918
R2 0.1871 0.0823 0.1314 0.2346
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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d. Behavioral Integration Metric: Referral Network Concentration – Specialty Weighted 
 
The regression coefficients for other controls were similar to the ones shown in table 12a.  
Dependent Variable:
No Price 
Adjustment
Raw Cost
CMS 
Standardized
CMS 
Risk Adjusted
W Ref Network Concentration -70.438 -57.758 -65.167 ** -101.666 **
(49.862) (39.321) (32.191) (42.683)
Pct Hosp Owned 6.499 * 5.084 3.599 6.463
(3.810) (3.163) (2.913) (4.838)
Other Controls X X X X
HRR FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918
R2 0.1832 0.0718 0.1306 0.2406
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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Figure 9: Comparison of Estimates of the Effect of Behavioral Integration on Various Measures 
of Utilization 
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Table 13: Utilization by Type: HRR/Year FE 
 
Behavioral Integration Metric: Share in-group  
 
  
Regression Total Hosp_SNF Physician Outpatient Phy+Out Home Hospice Equipment
Avg Pct In-Group -98.355 ** -35.517 -38.426 ** 9.682 -28.744 -17.406 ** -14.393 * -2.679
(41.966) (27.111) (17.901) (20.008) (20.240) (8.084) (7.618) (2.311)
Pct Hosp Owned 6.71 2.22 -3.31 ** 8.73 *** 5.41 ** -0.95 0.11 0.04
(4.15) (2.31) (1.34) (2.78) (2.18) (1.18) (0.45) (0.18)
Phy HHI -0.091 -0.031 -0.019 -0.025 -0.044 0.001 -0.004 -0.009 **
(0.084) (0.059) (0.032) (0.042) (0.055) (0.015) (0.016) (0.004)
Hosp HHI -0.032 -0.014 -0.015 ** 0.005 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.024) (0.019) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002)
Avg Grp Size -0.208 -0.189 0.219 * -0.406 * -0.187 0.051 0.042 0.054
(0.382) (0.262) (0.116) (0.232) (0.186) (0.076) (0.061) (0.018)
Pct Solo -2.371 -3.064 -4.943 *** 5.571 *** 0.628 1.215 -0.996 -0.296
(4.847) (3.259) (1.535) (2.076) (2.352) (0.882) (0.894) (0.258)
Docs/Enrl 2.830 1.056 1.438 0.871 2.308 -0.856 1.319 ** -0.387
(4.719) (3.056) (1.310) (1.876) (1.878) (0.857) (0.659) (0.235)
ln(NumDocs) -70.27 -24.26 -57.49 ** 15.14 -42.34 20.55 -32.63 ** -2.28
(87.80) (56.89) (28.74) (36.99) (37.43) (15.65) (13.76) (4.78)
HRR FE X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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b. Behavioral Integration Metric: Referral Network Concentration 
 
c. Behavioral Integration Metric: Share in-group – Specialty Weighted 
 
d. Behavioral Integration Metric: Referral Network Concentration – Specialty Weighted 
 
 
Table 14: Utilization by Type: Pooled, Year FE 
a. Behavioral Integration Metric: Share in-group  
Regression Total Hosp_SNF Physician Outpatient Phy+Out Home Hospice Equipment
Ref Ntwrk Conc -81.377 * -28.481 -5.109 -39.372 ** -44.481 ** -9.723 6.388 -7.857 ***
(44.744) (26.558) (11.376) (19.246) (20.182) (8.630) (7.922) (2.435)
Other Controls X X X X X X X X
HRR FE X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Regression Total Hosp_SNF Physician Outpatient Phy+Out Home Hospice Equipment
Wtd Avg Pct In-Group -63.555 * -12.948 -17.447 -8.916 -26.363 -11.579 -11.190 * -0.044
(35.427) (22.864) (13.264) (14.801) (16.866) (7.596) (6.292) (2.355)
Other Controls X X X X X X X X
HRR FE X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Regression Total Hosp_SNF Physician Outpatient Phy+Out Home Hospice Equipment
Wtd Ref Ntwrk Conc -62.752 -27.588 -1.476 -38.587 ** -40.063 ** -2.097 12.633 -5.674 **
(42.702) (27.886) (13.910) (19.209) (20.266) (7.797) (8.889) (2.580)
Other Controls X X X X X X X X
HRR FE X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
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b. Behavioral Integration Metric: Referral Network Concentration 
 
c. Behavioral Integration Metric: Share in-group – Specialty Weighted 
Regression Total Hosp_SNF Physician Outpatient Phy+Out Home Hospice Equipment
Avg Pct In-Group -646.51 *** -309.08 *** -153.81 *** 21.26 -132.55 *** -138.84 *** -49.14 *** -13.93 ***
(79.683) (44.282) (26.752) (18.658) (25.969) (22.621) (12.963) (2.595)
Pct Hosp Owned 21.94 *** 14.42 *** -17.56 *** 19.33 *** 1.77 5.01 *** 0.86 -0.03
(7.963) (5.078) (2.672) (2.353) (2.705) (1.771) (1.272) (0.277)
Phy HHI 0.43 *** 0.18 *** 0.09 * 0.06 0.16 *** 0.06 0.02 0.01 *
(0.135) (0.067) (0.051) (0.037) (0.052) (0.043) (0.026) (0.005)
Hosp HHI -0.05 -0.05 * 0.05 *** -0.02 * 0.03 ** -0.02 ** 0.00 0.00
(0.043) (0.026) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.002)
Avg Grp Size -0.33 0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.18 -0.12 -0.08 -0.02
(0.616) (0.369) (0.234) (0.156) (0.166) (0.142) (0.082) (0.017)
Pct Solo 72.17 *** 18.07 ** 47.09 *** -10.49 *** 36.60 *** 14.33 *** 1.64 -0.14
(12.390) (7.420) (4.784) (2.865) (4.376) (3.948) (1.865) (0.463)
Docs/Enrl 12.94 ** 5.92 * 1.57 -1.46 0.11 4.93 *** 1.01 0.12
(6.107) (3.338) (1.952) (1.387) (1.910) (1.763) (0.795) (0.178)
ln(NumDocs) 283.40 ** 23.70 400.23 *** -127.35 *** 272.89 *** -5.21 -5.84 -4.16
119.03 67.71 40.16 28.50 38.57 31.45 17.36 3.93
HRR FE X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918
R2 0.377 0.221 0.586 0.434 0.430 0.296 0.103 0.404
Stardard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
Regression Total Hosp_SNF Physician Outpatient Phy+Out Home Hospice Equipment
Ref Ntwrk Conc -570.76 *** -300.09 *** -190.36 *** -1.16 -191.53 *** -62.68 *** -14.03 -3.26
(56.079) (33.641) (22.565) (16.059) (17.795) (14.966) (9.637) (2.487)
Other Controls X X X X X X X X
HRR FE
Year FE X X X X X X X X
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d. Behavioral Integration Metric: Referral Network Concentration – Specialty Weighted 
Regression Total Hosp_SNF Physician Outpatient Phy+Out Home Hospice Equipment
Wtd Avg Pct In-Group -151.05 * -53.05 -46.71 * 23.30 -23.42 -48.86 ** -17.16 -5.25 **
(79.056) (46.717) (24.529) (20.904) (24.042) (20.345) (11.603) (2.653)
Other Controls X X X X X X X X
HRR FE
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Regression Total Hosp_SNF Physician Outpatient Phy+Out Home Hospice Equipment
Wtd Ref Ntwrk Conc -623.98 *** -337.99 *** -215.29 *** 6.44 -208.84 *** -67.95 *** -7.91 -1.64
(54.592) (31.338) (22.609) (16.886) (18.249) (14.810) (9.491) (2.592)
Other Controls X X X X X X X X
HRR FE
Year FE X X X X X X X X
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Table 15: Hospital Readmission Rate (basis points): Year/HRR FE 
 
 
 
Table 16: Hospital Readmission Rate (basis points), Pooled, Year FE 
Regression Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Avg Pct In-Group -27.74 * -18.07
(14.23) (11.69)
Ref Network Concentration -2.59 -3.37
(12.78) (12.58)
Pct Hosp Owned 1.50 * 1.63 * 1.51 * 1.54 * 1.52 *
(0.89) (0.90) (0.88) (0.91) (0.88)
Phy HHI 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hosp HHI 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pct Solo -0.63 -1.20 -0.63 -0.89 -0.62
(1.34) (1.30) (1.34) (1.32) (1.34)
Avg Grp Size -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Docs/Enrl -1.09 -0.91 -1.08 -1.17 -1.06
(1.16) (1.16) (1.16) (1.18) (1.15)
ln(NumDocs) 20.87 12.75 20.74 19.34 20.54
(23.09) (23.26) (23.11) (23.43) (23.07)
HRR FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918
R2 0.3295 0.3354 0.3295 0.3332 0.3296
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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Regression Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Avg Pct In-Group -54.45 *** -7.25
(18.83) (16.59)
Ref Network Concentration -86.69 *** -100.78 ***
(12.20) (12.00)
Pct Hosp Owned 6.16 *** 5.97 *** 6.07 *** 6.16 *** 5.65 ***
(1.99) (1.92) (1.77) (1.98) (1.67)
Phy HHI 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Hosp HHI 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Avg Grp Size 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14)
Docs/Enrl 0.99 2.09 2.81 ** 1.02 3.61 ***
(1.36) (1.37) (1.16) (1.36) (1.15)
ln(NumDocs) 78.48 *** 73.95 *** 22.39 77.96 *** 8.62
(24.97) (25.28) (24.83) (25.15) (23.97)
HRR FE
Year FE X X X X X
Obs (HRR \ Yr) 918 918 918 918 918
R2 0.223 0.255 0.379 0.224 0.425
Stardard errors in parentheses, clustered at the HRR level.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1%
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Appendix A: The Quantity Impact of an Increase in 
Integration 
In this appendix, I show the expected impact on quantity of an increase in integration. Because 
an increase in integration can effect two channels – efficiency and the monetary returns to 
quantity for the provider – the impact is ambiguous. 
The Impact of Efficiency on Quantity 
That an increase in efficiency (z), ceteris paribus, leads to a decrease in the level of procedures 
(x*) in this model can be shown mathematically: 
max
𝑥
Ψs(zx) + ωpyx 
𝑠. 𝑡.       𝑥 ≤ ?̅? 
If the capacity constraint does not bind the first order conditions can be written as: 
𝑓(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝜓, 𝑝, 𝑦) = 𝑧𝜓𝑠′(𝑧𝑥) + 𝑝𝑦 = 0 
This implicitly defines x as a function of 𝑧, 𝜓, 𝑝 and 𝑦. We are interested in dx*/dz. Using 
total differentiation: 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑧
𝑑𝑧 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝑥 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝜓
𝑑𝜓 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑝
𝑑𝑝 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑦
𝑑𝑦 = 0 
Because 𝑑𝜓 = 𝑑𝑝 = 𝑑𝑦 = 0, we can rewrite: 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑧
𝑑𝑧 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝑥 = 0 
And 
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𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑧
= −
𝜕𝑓/𝑑𝑧
𝜕𝑓/𝑑𝑥
 
= −
𝜓𝑠′(𝑧𝑥)
𝑧2𝜓𝑠′′(𝑧𝑥)
= −
(−)
(+)2(−)
  < 0 
The above inequality is true because we know that 𝑧 ∈ (0,1) > 0, and  𝑠′′(𝑧𝑥) < 0 by 
assumption. Also, rearranging the FOC, 𝜓𝑠′(𝑧𝑥) = −𝑝𝑦/𝑧 < 0. 
 
The Net Impact of Integration 
If we are interested in the effect when both z and y are changing: Let z and y be interrelated, 
and assume y is being changed. This means that:  
𝑑𝑧 =
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑦
𝑑𝑦 
Therefore, the effect on x can be expressed in the following way: 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝑥 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑧
𝑑𝑧 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑦
𝑑𝑦 = 0 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝑥 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑦
𝑑𝑦  +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑦
𝑑𝑦 = 0 
Rearranging: 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑦
= −(
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑦
+
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑦
) /(𝜕𝑓/𝜕𝑥) 
Substituting from the functional form assumption on f, and rearranging: 
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𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑦
= −(𝜓𝑠′(𝑧𝑥)
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑦
+ 𝑝) /(𝑧2𝜓𝑠′′(𝑧𝑥)) 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑦
= −(−
𝑝𝑦
𝑧
 
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑦
+ 𝑝) /(𝑧2𝜓𝑠′′(𝑧𝑥)) 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑦
= −
𝑝
𝑧2𝜓𝑠′′(𝑧𝑥)
(1 −
𝑦
𝑧
 
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑦
) 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑦
= −
𝑝
𝑧2𝜓𝑠′′(𝑧𝑥)
(1 −
𝜕𝑧/𝑧
𝜕𝑦/𝑦
) 
 
The conclusion is that a change in y will increase x if the percent change in z (efficiency) is 
less than the percent change in y (the revenue share). 
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Appendix B: Data Sources and Technical Notes 
Table 17: Model Variables 
Variable Description Data Source(s) 
Utilization 
Age, Race, Sex, Price adjusted Medicare spending and Age, Race, 
Sex adjusted Medicare spending measures by HSA and HRR 
Dartmouth Atlas Broken out into: hospital / skilled nursing facilities (SNF), physician 
services, outpatient services, home health care, hospice and 
equipment 
Unadjusted, Medicare Adjusted, Risk-Adjusted Medicare spending 
measures by HRR 
Medicare Geographic Variation 
Public Use File 
Readmission 
Hospital readmission rates were aggregated up to the HSA and 
HRR levels using the Dartmouth Atlas’s Hospital to HSA map. 
CMS Hospital Compare 
Dartmouth Atlas 
Behavioral Integration 
For a description on how these were constructed see Section4 4  
Integration Definition 
CMS Physician Shared Patient Data  
CMS Physician Compare Dataset 
CMS MPUP 
Hospital Ownership 
 Following Neprah et al, physicians were categorized as hospital 
owned based on their use of the hospital outpatient departments 
place of service code.12 
CMS Medicare Provider Utilization 
and Payment Data (MPUP) 
Hospital HHI 
Using aggregate hospital billing information from HCRIS, and tying 
hospitals to HRRs I calculate the hospital HHI for each HRR. 
CMS Healthcare Cost Report 
Information System (HCRIS) Data 
Physician HHI 
Using aggregate physician billing information from MPUP, and 
tying physicians to practices through the physician compare 
identifiers I calculate the physician HHI for each HRR.  
CMS Medicare Provider Utilization 
and Payment Data (MPUP) 
CMS Physician Compare Dataset 
Average Group Size 
Using the physician compare practice identifiers I calculate 
average practice size for each HRR. 
CMS Physician Compare Dataset 
Share Solo Physician 
Using the physician compare practice identifiers I calculate the 
average number of physicians in a solo practice. 
CMS Physician Compare Dataset 
 
  
                                                 
12 For more information, see the technical appendix that accompanies the paper: 
http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2463591#supplemental-tab  
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Table 18: Data Sources 
Data Source Link 
Dartmouth Atlas http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx 
Medicare Geographic Variation Public 
Use File 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Geographic-Variation/GV_PUF.html  
CMS Physician Shared Patient Data  https://questions.cms.gov/faq.php?id=5005&faqId=7977  
CMS Medicare Provider Utilization and 
Payment Data (MPUP) 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/index.html  
CMS Hospital Compare https://data.medicare.gov/data/archives/hospital-compare 
CMS Physician Compare Dataset https://data.medicare.gov/data/physician-compare 
CMS National Plan and Provider 
Enumeration System (NPPES) File 
http://download.cms.gov/nppes/NPI_Files.html 
CMS Healthcare Cost Report Information 
System (HCRIS) Data 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Downloadable-Public-Use-Files/Cost-Reports/Cost-Reports-by-
Fiscal-Year.html 
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Physician Practice and MCO Negotiation  
The impact of time sensitive supply and demand 
  
Abstract 
 
When health care providers and managed care organizations (MCOs) bargain, the main tool 
providers have is the threat to refuse to be in the MCO’s network. In fact, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that a major mechanism that practices employ to maximize profits in the face of 
differing insurer reimbursements, limited capacity and stochastic demand is to choose insurers 
discriminately. Providers do not accept patients from every MCO, however, providers do not 
exclusively accept the most profitable MCO. In this paper, I apply these institutional facts to 
a Nash cooperative bargaining framework to develop a bargaining model that explicitly 
models the provider’s disagreement point with the MCOs. In doing this, I am able to solve 
analytically for the interdependence of prices between MCOs and add to previous bargaining 
models by making the value of a MCO to a provider more explicit. This model shows the 
impact of MCO market structure on prices. By introducing provider capacity constraints, I am 
able to model two important provider-side considerations: the risk capacity will be unused, 
and the risk that a low paying patient will displace a higher paying patient. Neither of these 
two effects have been previously captured in the bargaining literature, which typically has 
featured marginal costs as the limiting factor for providers contracting with MCOs. I also 
show how predictions in my model match empirical observations and estimates from other 
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work. I demonstrate a strong negative association between MCOs’ market power and 
negotiated prices, and show that the degree of market level price differences predicted by this 
model is similar to what has been observed. Finally, recent empirical work has found that that 
price increases for Medicare are positively associated with private MCOs’ prices and that this 
impact is stronger in areas with more concentrated insurers, and areas in which Medicare 
patients represent a larger share of the market. My model analytically makes these predictions 
and can explain the underlying mechanisms. 
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1  Introduction 
Many markets feature stochastic and time sensitive consumer demand along with supplier 
capacity that is static in the short term and non-storable – use it or lose it. Everyday examples 
include the market for live performances such as concerts or sporting events, restaurants and 
airline tickets. A common feature of these types of markets is the use of price as a market 
clearing mechanisms. The price is allowed to vary with contemporaneous demand. More 
popular events and restaurants have higher equilibrium prices. Airlines rapidly vary prices to 
avoid having unsold seats. Without price flexibility the result is typically excess demand (sell 
outs) or excess capacity (empty seats). 
Though rarely applied to this context, the market for physician services also features stochastic 
and time sensitive consumer demand along with static, non-storable provider capacity. 
However, the market for physician services has both supply and demand side factors that do 
not allow a similar demand clearing mechanism. Prices for physician services are quite rigid. 
Medicare, the largest insurance provider in the United States, sets prices nationally. These 
prices are non-negotiable, and providers that participate in Medicare are forbidden from 
balance billing13. Similarly, Medicaid prices are generally set by states and are also a take it 
or leave it proposition. Reimbursement rates between physicians and private insurers are 
typically set once per year through a complex and opaque process of bilateral negotiations. 
 
                                                 
13 “Balance billing” is the practice of billing a patient the difference between the provider’s charge and 
the payment amount from a third-party payer, such as an MCO or Medicare. 
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Furthermore, there are three factors that make patient demand for medical services particularly 
unresponsive to price. First, for non-preventative care, there are often no good substitutes 
available, which means the underlying demand for physician services is generally inelastic 
with respect to price. The current best estimates of price elasticity for healthcare services are 
around 0.2 (Manning et al 1987, Newhouse et al. 1993, Zweifel and Manning 2000, Ringel et 
al 2002). Secondly, a substantial portion of the cost of care is covered by insurance, which 
means patients face neither the true cost of care or even the price that is transacted between 
their managed care organization and their healthcare provider. The result is that even if patient 
demand was more price-elastic, the price effect would be muted. Finally, even if a patient was 
particularly cost sensitive, prices are often unknown and not easily discoverable prior to 
service (Rosenthal, Lu and Cram 2013). Therefore, the mechanism through which the market 
for medical services clears must be more complex than menu prices directly influencing 
consumer demand. 
There is a body of literature on provider market power and MCO-provider bargaining. Studies 
have shown a wide variation in prices across providers and MCOs (Baker, Bundorf, Royalty 
and Levin 2014, Ginsburg 2010, Cooper et al 2015). For example, Baker et al (2014) find that 
for internal medicine, the 10th and 90th percentiles for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI, 
a common measure of market concentration, are respectively 666 and 3,154, and for urology 
they find 3,316 and 7,215. Research has shown that a factor in this price variation is market 
power, both for hospitals and physicians (Kleiner, White and Lyons 2015, Dunn and Shapiro 
2014). 
However, this literature currently does not include the above-mentioned features which are 
the mechanism through which a provider can leverage market power to receive higher prices. 
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Empirical work has examined how one payer’s price impacts the bargained price for another 
payer, for example changes in Medicare’s prices impacting private prices, see Frakt (2011) 
for a review of the evidence for hospital cost-shifting, and White (2013) for a more recent 
study. Most models used in empirical work assume bargaining outcomes that are independent 
across MCO-provider pairs (Grennan 2013, Lewis & Pflum 2015) and thus price does not 
explicitly depend on the market structure of the MCOs. 
The goal of this paper is to add to the existing literature by examining the previously described 
features of the market for medical services – stochastic, time sensitive consumer demand and 
static, non-transferable supplier capacity in the face of rigid price structures and inelastic 
consumer demand.  I will explicitly model how they impact the bargaining relationship 
between multiple managed care organizations (MCOs) and healthcare providers.  
This paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, I give more background and motivation to justify 
and support the development of my approach. I show how I am building on the relevant 
literature, and contrast my approach with was has been done previously. I then develop, in 
section 3, a model of the physician’s decision to accept or reject a Managed Care Organization 
(MCO), given the expected price with and without that MCO. I discuss the MCOs desire to 
contract with the provider (the demand side), before combining the two into a dynamic 
bargaining model which incorporates the model of physician behavior. In section 4, I present 
basic predictions from the model. Finally, in section 5, I present some numerical examples 
and simulations and compare my results with previous research.  
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2  Background & Related Literature 
An important assumption made in this paper is that in the short and medium-term physician 
and practice supply is relatively fixed. For practices, the intuition is that the main production 
inputs of space, equipment, and support staff cannot be easily varied day to day or week to 
week. For individual physicians, the idea is that their services are labor intensive. Physician 
labor responds to a price increase with competing income and substitution effects. While this 
assumption can be relaxed, the main formation of the model assumes that the effects cancel 
out and there is no aggregate supply response to price. 
This assumption is not contradicted by the current literature. In an important early work 
looking at physician behavior McGuire and Pauly (1991) provide a theoretical model to test 
whether physicians have a target income or seek to maximize profits. They found that the 
strength of physicians’ income effect controls their behavior (Gruber, Kim, Mayzlin 1999, 
Yip 1998 Mitchell, Hadley, Gaskin 2000). More recently Kantarevic, Kralj and Weinkauf 
(2008) used reforms to the physician threshold system in Ontario, Canada to study this 
empirically. They find that, as expected, both the income effect and substitution effects are 
present with the expected signs. However, for different services, different effects dominate 
and there is no predominant aggregate supply effect. 
The interplay between a practice and multiple payers, including Medicare, is an important 
mechanism in the model. A branch of the literature has sought to explain the response of 
private prices to changes in Medicare prices. Hospital administrators have advocated for 
“cost-shift theory”, that is, lower prices from one insurer will need to be made up somewhere 
to meet cost, and will then be shifted to other insurers. While economists have generally been 
skeptical of this theory, there is disagreement (Ginsburg 2003). In a 2011 review of the 
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literature, Frakt finds some evidence that cost shifting may occur, however the effects seem 
to be mild. In a more recent White (2013) finds the opposite effect – lower Medicare rates in 
hospitals resulted in lower private rates. 
For physicians, Clemens and Gottleib (2017) found consistent positive effects on private payer 
rates from increases in Medicare payments. These effects are larger both when Medicare 
makes up a larger share of the market and also when insurers have more relative market power. 
Ketcham, Nicholson, Unur and Lawrence (2014) similarly finds a positive relationship. 
There is large existing literature covering MCO bargaining with providers for inclusion in a 
network. Town and Vistnes (2001) and Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) use a logit 
demand model to construct a patient’s willingness-to-pay for inclusion of a provider based on 
observed provider and patient characteristics. These papers established the WTP concept as a 
measure of market power as well as the connection between that measure, profits, and prices. 
While originally focused on hospitals, these models have recently been applied to physicians 
as well (Carlson et al 2013, Kleiner, White and Lyons 2015). These papers, however, employ 
a standard bilateral Nash bargaining model, which does not explicitly include or model the 
interdependence of prices. The models show the impact of market concentration on the 
provider side, but cannot speak to the impact on prices stemming from different configurations 
of MCO market power. Across markets, there is wide variation in the concentration of 
insurers. According to a 2014 study by the Government Accountability Office, the three 
largest insurers in Wisconsin’s large group insurance market had a combined 39 percent of 
the total enrollees, while for most other states (37) the three largest insurers had more than 80 
percent of the total commercial market. 
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More recent research has incorporated more sophisticated bargaining models. Ho and Lee 
(2013) study the price impact of insurer consolidation, focused on two competing forces. 
Increased insurer competition lowers premiums. Lower premiums reduce the surplus available 
to split between hospital and insurers, resulting in reduced prices. However, increased insurer 
competition gives hospitals more leverage to raise prices. They specify a general bargaining 
model in which price is determined by insurers’ premiums and payments to other hospitals, 
and hospitals’ costs and reimbursements from other payers. Lewis and Plum (2014) also 
develop a hospital, MCO bargaining model. Their innovation is to separately look at 
bargaining position (value of the hospital or network) and bargaining position (ability to 
obtain a higher share of the surplus).  
I add to these bargaining models by making the value of a MCO to a provider more explicit. 
By introducing capacity constraints, I am able to model two important provider-side 
considerations: the risk capacity will be unused, and the risk that a low paying patient will 
displace a higher paying patient. Neither of these two effects have been previously captured 
in the bargaining literature, which typically has featured marginal costs as the limiting factor 
for providers contracting with MCOs. My paper will look at price differences arising from 
relative differences in MCO size stemming directly from the two effects. The model I put 
forward will not address any price differences that arise from efficiencies, bargaining ability, 
asymmetric information, or any pass-through price effects from the consumer-MCO price 
negotiations. 
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3  Model of Practice MCO Negotiation 
Below I develop a model of practice-MCO bargaining. I explicitly specify the benefit of 
contracting for both the MCO and the practice, and show how for a given provider the 
negotiated prices are interdependent for each MCO. 
In the first section, I introduce the providers problem by specifying the value to a practice of 
accepting patients of a particular type (taking prices as given). While this can be generalized 
to include any patient types that can be observable and discriminated, the focus here is on 
patients from different MCOs. Every MCO k has a price (𝑝𝑘) and a propensity (𝜆𝑙) – which 
can be thought of as the probability that a patient from MCO k takes a given time slot, given 
the provider accepts patients from all MCOs. The probability in practice will depend on the 
contracting decisions for each of the other providers, which is a major mechanism in the 
model. 
This expected value of including plan type k depends on the prices of other accepted MCOs, 
their propensities, and propensity that a given time slot is unfilled (𝜆0). This gives the value 
of the MCO to the provider. 
Second, I characterize the value of the provider to the MCO by using the option-demand 
framework, developed by Capps et al (2003), to characterize an MCO’s willingness-to-pay 
for a patient to have the provider in the network as a function of patient’s expected utility. For 
use in bargaining, this is converted from utils to dollars and standardized to WTP per time slot 
to be comparable to the value of the MCO to the provider. 
Third, I use the willingness-to-pay and the provider’s expected value in a Nash bargaining 
framework. The MCO and provider reach a deal to include the provider in the MCO network 
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if there is a price between the lowest price the provider would accept, the expected value of a 
time slot without the provider, and the highest price the MCO would pay, which is the 
willingness-to-pay. If they do reach an agreement they choose a price that splits the gains from 
inclusion by a constant fraction. Unlike previous work, the explicit specification of the 
provider’s value function allows me to solve the system of equations and derive a formula for 
equilibrium prices that is determined simultaneously, depends on the both the provider and 
MCO competitive landscape. This approach allows me to speak to the predicted relationship 
of prices across MCOs. 
Finally, I discuss the implications from and dynamics in this bargaining framework 
demonstrating predictions from the model. 
Provider’s Selection of MCOs 
In markets for restaurants, airline flights and concerts the market clears through direct price 
increases or decreases, and generally prices are uniform across consumers. In the market for 
health services, price changes happen through negotiations that generally occur once per year. 
The main threat that providers have in these negotiations is the threat not to accept an MCO’s 
patients. In the exposition below, I will concentrate on the agent being the physician practice, 
but a similar framework could characterize other types of providers’ negotiations with MCOs.  
For new patients especially, the availability of a convenient time slot not too far in the future 
can be a major determinate of choosing a doctor. Anecdotal evidence indicates that physicians 
take payer-mix into account when deciding whether to accept patients from a low paying 
insurer. For new managed care contracts, the Practice Management Resource Group 
encourages practices to evaluate “How the added patients will impact your payer-mix. Will 
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these patients increase or decrease your expected collections? Will they displace higher paying 
patients?”14 Similarly, a popular book “Mastering Patient Flow”15 discourages closing 
practices fully to new patients due to the fact that it will decrease the practice’s ability to alter 
its payer mix. The alternative suggestion to alleviate capacity issues is to end participation 
with insurance companies that pay less. 
In the model I develop here, the physician practice, indexed by j, faces K types of patients 
which it can either choose to accept or not accept – while this can be generalized to include 
any patient types that can be observable and discriminated, the focus for this exposition will 
be on patients from different MCOs.  
Each slot is then filled with a patient of type k with a probability (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘,𝑗). Also, with positive 
probability, the time slot is not filled (denoted by 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏0,𝑗). This probability can be thought of 
as being market or provider specific, and in a manner detailed below, these probabilities will 
depend on the set of MCOs with which the provider has a contract. This way of characterizing 
the value of a time slot is applicable to arrangements where the provider is compensated 
through a fee-for-service system, and less relevant for physicians who are strictly salaried, or 
are compensated through capacitated arrangements, that is one in which the physician receives 
a set amount per patient year. I make the simplifying assumption that, conditional on 
contracting with an MCO, the practice cannot discriminate between patient types through 
                                                 
14 http://www.medicalpmrg.com/payor-mix-analysis.html (last accessed April 17, 2014) 
15Woodcock, Elizabeth W. Mastering Patient Flow (MGMA, 2009) 3rd edition 
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other means. Therefore, the practice’s problem is to evaluate the payouts from each patient 
type and choose which MCOs to accept.16 
The physician wants to choose the mix of MCOs (k) to maximize revenue (= the expected 
value of the time slot): 
max
𝐾𝑗
𝐸𝑉𝐾𝐽 = max𝐾𝑗
∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘,𝑗𝑝𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
 
Probability of type k: 
If 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘,𝑗 is exogenous to the choice of 𝐾𝑗 (no capacity constraints), then all plans will be 
included. We do not observe this because, in practice, being able to accept and schedule a 
patient is conditional on having a time slot available. Therefore, a patient type with a low 
expected value (i.e. a low-paying MCO) can take the capacity away from a patient type with 
a higher expected value (a high-paying MCO). Furthermore, if there were no chance that a 
slot was not filled (excess capacity) then there would be no reason to accept any plan except 
for the highest paying. The tradeoff then is balancing the probability that no one takes the slot, 
with the probability that a patient with a lower paying plan prevents the provider from being 
able to render services to a patient with a higher paying plan. 
This tradeoff can be formalized by denoting the unconditional probability of patient type k 
(the probability if all types are included) by 𝜆𝑘. Let  𝜆0 be the probability that there are no 
                                                 
16 In the Appendices I include several variations and extensions of the model. I explicitly discuss excess 
capacity (Appendix A:). I explore an alternative formation of the provider problem using a Poisson distribution 
of patients (Error! Reference source not found.). And finally, I show how the inclusion of variable cost (0) or e
xogenous physician work hours (Appendix C:) do not significantly change the model. 
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patients in that time-period, given that all patients are accepted. I term this average excess 
capacity. 
In the appendix, I discuss provider capacity and specify how providers choose capacity given 
expectations about patient demand, the expected marginal cost and expected payment for 
patient (not conditioned patient type). Adjusting this capacity is costly and fixed in the short 
and medium term. This leads to an optimal average excess capacity, or the propensity that a 
given time slot is unfilled (𝜆0). 
With these parameters defined, given a provider accepts the set of plans 𝐾𝑗, the probability of 
patient type k is: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘,𝑗 =
𝜆𝑘
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝜅∈𝑗
 
Expected Value of a Time Slot 
Therefore, the expected value of a time slot can be expressed as follows: 
𝐸𝑉𝐾𝐽 = ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
/ [𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
] (1.0) 
 
Maximizing this leads to the rule that patients of type 𝛿 should be included iff: 
𝑝𝛿,𝑗 ≥ [ ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝛿
] / [𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝛿
] = 𝐸𝑉𝐾𝐽 
It is notable that the decision to include a particular type of patient does not depend on how 
many patients there are of that type (propensity 𝜆𝛿). All that matters is the comparison between 
the expected value of the patient compared to the expected value of the set of currently 
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accepted patients. This expected value is influenced by share of slots likely to be unfilled, so 
the sizes of the other MCOs matter. While it is a minor distinction, bargaining power for a 
large MCO does not necessarily stem from the fact that the MCO is large, but stems from the 
fact that the other MCOs are not “large enough”. The ability to withhold quantity is a useless 
threat if the provider is already at capacity. 
Prediction 1: A provider (j) will want to contract with a MCO (𝛿) if the 
expected value of a time slot without the provider is lower than the price 
the MCO is offering. 
With the rule under which a provider accepts an MCO established, we can examine some of 
the other dynamics predicted by the model. 
 
Addition of an MCO, 𝜹: 
Using this formulation, the increase in the expected value of a time slot if provider i adds an 
insurer, given other accepted insurers K and prices, is: 
𝑉𝑖(𝛿|𝐾𝑗, 𝑃) = [𝜆𝛿𝑝𝛿 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
] / [𝜆0 + 𝜆𝛿 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
] − [ ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
] / [𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
] 
=
𝜆𝛿
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
 (𝜆0(𝑝𝛿 − 0) + ∑ (𝑝𝛿 − 𝑝𝑘)𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
)/(𝜆0 + 𝜆𝛿 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
) (2.0) 
 
This is the weighted price difference between 𝛿 and the existing prices, normalized to a time 
slot, and multiplied by the percent increase in 𝜆 that 𝛿 brings.  
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Demand Side: MCO’s Willingness-to-Pay for a Provider 
To be able to discuss prices further, and to be able to examine bargaining dynamics, I first 
must specify the underlying demand system from the MCO. I do this by leveraging the option 
demand framework developed by Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003), through which 
an MCO has a willingness-to-pay to include the provider in the network.  
In their model, a patient i has ex post (that is, after the revelation of a health diagnosis requiring 
treatment) expected utility for the services from provider j given by the following form: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑅𝑗 + 𝐻𝑗
′Γ𝑋𝑖 + 𝜏1𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜏2𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖 + 𝜏3𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑗 − 𝛾(𝑋𝑖)𝑃𝑗(𝑍𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
= 𝑈(𝐻𝑗 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝑇𝑖𝑗) − 𝛾(𝑋𝑖)𝑃𝑗(𝑍𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where 𝐻𝑗 are the provider characteristics, 𝑋𝑖 are the patient characteristic and 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the 
geographical location of the patient in relation to the provider. If the error term is logit, and 
we assume there are no meaningful out of pocket cost differentials between providers, then a 
patient’s utility of having access to a network G of providers is: 
𝑉𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖𝑗) = 𝐸 max
𝑔∈𝐺
[𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑔] = 𝑙𝑛 [∑ exp 𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖𝑔)
𝑔∈𝐺
] 
And the additional utility derived from the inclusion of provider j is:  
Δ𝑉𝑗
𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) = 𝑙𝑛 (
1
1 − 𝑠𝑗(𝐻𝑗 , 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖𝑗)
) 
This is the willingness to pay, in utils, for patient i to have provider j in network G. The 
willingness for the MCO to pay to have the provider in the system is calculated by summing 
this additional utility over all of patients in the MCO. In order to be used for my purposes, and 
compared to price, this WTP is then normalized as a WTP per visit, and converted to dollars. 
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The willingness-to-pay is the highest price an MCO would pay to have a provider in the 
network.  
It is important to note that even if we assume that patient preferences do not differ 
systematically across MCOs – that is preferences only differ through the observed 
characteristics included in the utility function – the willingness-to-pay measures for a given 
provider can be different. Two main things drive this difference - the MCO’s network and the 
composition of patients. 
Both ΔWTP and 𝜆0 (average excess capacity) reflect a provider’s desirability, but it is 
important to recognize how they are different in this model. The difference is that in this 
formation ΔWTP is normalized to a patient time slot, to correspond to price, and therefore 
does not depend on the size of the population. In contrasts 𝜆0 depends on the interplay between 
the number of patients, the number of other practices, and the size of the practice. If the 
number of patients increased, with no change in characteristics, ΔWTP normalized to a patient 
time slot would not change but 𝜆0 would decrease. 
 
Provider-MCO Bargaining 
I now apply a bargaining framework between providers (j) and MCOs (ℓ)  to the above 
assumptions. In the standard Nash-bargaining framework, parties choose a price that splits the 
bargaining surplus, normalized to a per time-period amount, with constant parameter 𝛼 ∈
(0,1). The typical assumption is that price solves the following: 
𝑝ℓ𝑗 = argmax
𝑝ℓ𝑗
 (WTPℓj − 𝑝ℓ𝑗)
1−𝛼
(𝑝ℓ𝑗 − 𝑑𝑗)
𝛼
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Where 𝑑𝑗 is the disagreement point for provider j and 𝛼 is the “price Nash bargaining 
parameter.” The outcome of the bargain depends non-trivially on the disagreement point and 
my contribution is to explicitly model this as previously described, 𝑑𝑗 = 𝐸𝑉𝐾𝑗/ℓ. This makes 
the bargaining process between MCOs and providers explicitly interdependent. This is in 
contrast to other papers which assume independent bilateral bargaining (Lewis and Pflum 
2015).  
In the Nash solution, the MCO and the provider split the surplus, and this construction leads 
to the following set of price equations for each MCO (ℓ) provider (j) pair: 
 
𝑝ℓ𝑗 = (1 − 𝛼)WTPℓj + α𝐸𝑉𝐾𝑗/ℓ 
= (1 − 𝛼)ΔWTPℓj + α [ ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/ℓ
] / [𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/ℓ
] 
(3.0) 
The previously defined term, 𝐸𝑉𝐾𝑗/ℓ , means that prices are interdependent within a provider 
and thus must be determined simultaneously. Because the 𝜆′𝑠 are taken as given, for each 
provider j we have 𝐿 equations with 𝐿 unknowns, where 𝐿 is the total number of MCOs, and 
thus one can explicitly solve the equilibrium prices.  
In the following sections, I show the equilibrium prices for some configurations of insurers, 
and discuss how these prices are impacted by the underlying parameters: the 𝜆s, each MCOs 
WTP, and administratively set prices.  
Monopolist 
If insurer 𝛿 is a monopolist then 𝐸𝑉𝐾𝑗/𝛿 is 0, and the equilibrium price equation is: 
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𝑝𝛿 = (1 − 𝛼)ΔWTP𝛿𝑗 + 𝛼𝐸𝑉𝐾𝑗/𝛿 = (1 − 𝛼) ΔWTP𝛿j 
This is effectively the lowest price possible between insurer 𝛿 and provider j. 
Two Private MCOs and Medicare 
Consider the situation with two private insurers (indexed by 1 and 2), and Medicare (indexed 
by m). Because they are administratively set, in this model Medicare prices are taken as 
exogenous. This leads to the following equilibrium prices17: 
 
𝑝1
∗ = (1 − α2
𝜆1
Λ − λ2
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
)
−1
[(1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑇𝑃1 + 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ1
𝑝𝑚
+ 𝛼
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
((1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑇𝑃2 + 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ2
𝑝𝑚) ] 
(4.0) 
 
Where for expositional simplicity, I have defined Λ ≡ 𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚 
This equation characterizes the prices as a function of the underlying parameters. Price is 
related to the provider competitive landscape through the willingness to pay measure, and the 
insurer competitive landscape through the number of insurers and their relative sizes. As a 
note, the case without Medicare is equation 4.0 with 𝜆𝑚 = 0. 
  
                                                 
17 Details in Appendix E:. 
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 𝑝1
∗ =  Equilibrium price is: 
1 
(1
− α2
𝜆1
Λ − λ2
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
)
−1
 
Market concentration premium (MCP) 
2 [(1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑇𝑃1 Own MCO’s willingness-to-pay 
3 +𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ1
𝑝𝑚 First order impact of Medicare price 
4 +𝛼
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
 Other MCO price impact rate 
5 ((1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑇𝑃2 Other MCO’s willingness-to-pay 
6 +𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ2
𝑝𝑚) Second order Medicare price 
 
To explain this equilibrium price, I have separated it into six parts in the above table. The first 
part is the term (1 − α2
𝜆1
Λ−λ2
𝜆2
Λ−λ1
)
−1
 which I call the market concentration premium (MCP). 
It is always equal to or greater than 1. It captures a provider’s ability to extra a higher price 
by playing the MCOs off each other. If the prices were independently negotiated, then MCP 
would be 1. It is highest when the MCOs are the same size and for a given 𝜆0 and 𝜆𝑚.
18 
The second term is the MCO’s willingness-to-pay, multiplied by the WTP bargaining 
coefficient (1 − 𝛼). WTP is the value that MCOs puts on having access to the provider and 
can change through changes in the underlying characteristics of MCOs population or network. 
                                                 
18 In the more general case, with more than 2 insurers the MCP is 1/det(A), where A is the matrix defined 
in the technical appendix. 
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Due to the MCP, an increase in MCO 1’s WTP for provider j increases the price between 
provider j and MCO by more than the bargaining parameter (1 − 𝛼). Intuitively, one can 
envision the following process leading to larger increase: 
1. Looking at equation 3.0, when MCO 1’s WTP increases there is an immediate impact 
of an increase in 𝑝1 as they split the now larger surplus and the provider’s share is 
(1 − 𝛼). 
2. However, this impacts the bargained prices between the provider and other MCOs. 
Having secured this higher price, the provider’s threat point (the expected value 
without the other MCOs) has increased. Therefore, the provider can now go to other 
MCOs and demand a higher price.  
3. Once the provider has received the higher prices from the other providers they can 
return to MCO 1, and the process continues. 
The third part is the first order impact of the Medicare price. The first term of this is the 
bargaining parameter 𝛼, and the second term, 
𝜆𝑚
Λ−λ1
, is Medicare’s expected share of time slots 
if provider j did not accept MCO 1 patients. This is multiplied by the Medicare price, so this 
term is the contribution of Medicare to the expected value of the provider without MCO 1.  
In a similar manner, the fourth term is the expected share of time slots for MCO 2 without 
MCO 1 multiplied by the bargaining parameter 𝛼, 𝛼
𝜆2
Λ−λ1
. This term captures the degree to 
which a price change for MCO 2 impacts the price for MCO 1. However, because the price 
for MCO 2 is not exogenous, the term is not just 𝑝2. 
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The fifth and sixth reflect the impact of MCO 2’s price on MCO 1’s price. The fifth term is 
the WTP bargaining coefficient (1 − 𝛼) multiplied by MCO 2’s WTP. The sixth term is the 
same as the third, however, it is multiplied by the price propagation factor, 𝛼
𝜆2
Λ−λ1
. This is the 
second order impact of Medicare, that is the impact on MCO 1’s price that happens through 
Medicare prices impacting MCO 2’s price. 
4  Comparative Statics 
These equilibrium prices lead to the following comparative statics and predictions. The 
equation that I present are only for the case with two private MCO and Medicare, but the 
predictions should hold more generally: 
Prediction 2: The share of increase in MCO k’s demand (WTP) 
captured by provider j will be greater than the bargaining parameter (1 −
𝛼), and will depends on the market shares of all MCOs and the propensity 
for provider j to have an unfilled time slot (𝜆0). 
This prediction flows directly from equation (5) and the fact that this derivative is greater than 
the base bargaining parameter of 1 − 𝛼. This is a result of modeling the interdependence of 
prices. An increase in WTP for MCO 1 will have a first-order increase on MCO 1’s price, 
however, this increase in MCO 1’s price will have a second-order impact on MCO 2’s price, 
and this chance in MCO 2’s price will have a third-order impact on MCO 1’s price, etc. The 
increase in price above 1 − 𝛼 is result of that process being infinitely repeated, and is the 
equilibrium price. This leads to the next prediction from the model: 
 
𝜕𝑝1
∗
𝜕𝑊𝑇𝑃1
= (1 − α2
𝜆1
Λ − λ2
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
)
−1
(1 − 𝛼) ≥ (1 − 𝛼) (5) 
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Prediction 3: There is a positive relationship between MCO i’s demand 
for provider j and other MCO’s contracted price with that provider.  
The second-order effect, described above, is shown in equation (6). An increase in 
demand by MCO 1 for provider j increases the equilibrium between provider j and other 
MCOs. 
 
Prediction 4: There will be positive relationship between Medicare 
prices and private prices. 
 
The equilibrium bargained price depends strongly on the disagreement point, which is 
modeled as 𝐸𝑉𝐾𝑗/ℓ = [∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/ℓ ] / [𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/ℓ ] (from equation (1) ). The magnitude 
of the impact is the product of the market concentration premium, and the sum of what can be 
thought of as the first-order impact of the change in Medicare’s price (𝜆𝑚/(Λ − λ1)) and the 
second-order impact on MCO 1 (𝛼
𝜆2
Λ−λ1
) of the impact of the change in the Medicare price on 
MCO 2’s price (𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ−λ2
).  
In short, the price provider j can command from MCO 1 has increased with the increase in 
Medicare’s reimbursement because the providers expected value without MCO 1 has 
increased. The increase in the Medicare price has increased the disagreement point, and 
therefore surplus that the MCO and the provider are bargaining has decreased. 
 
𝜕𝑝1
∗
𝜕𝑊𝑇𝑃2
= (1 − α2
𝜆1
Λ − λ2
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
)
−1
𝛼
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
(1 − 𝛼) > 0 (6) 
𝜕𝑝1
∗
𝜕𝑝𝑚
= (1 − α2
𝜆1
Λ − λ2
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
)
−1
[𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ1
+ 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ2
𝛼
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
 ] > 0 (7) 
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Prediction 5: Even with identical underlying demand (WTP), larger 
insurers will pay a lower price.  
 
𝑝1
∗/𝑝2
∗ = [1 + α(
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2
)] / [1 + α (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1
)] (8) 
𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑗
𝜆j
𝜆0 + 𝜆j
=
𝜆0
(𝜆0 + 𝜆j)
2 > 0 (9) 
 
For predictions 5 and 6, I am ignoring Medicare and fixing WTP for MCO 1 equal to WTP 
for MCO 2. The size premium is the price discount, compared to other MCOs, that a larger 
MCO can achieve from its relative size. This ratio is less than 1 if 𝜆1 + 𝜆2(1 + 𝛼) < 𝜆2 +
𝜆1(1 + 𝛼)  ⟹ 𝛼𝜆2 < 𝛼𝜆1, which means that if insurer 1 is larger then insurer 1 will pay less. 
The mechanism for this effect is the expected value to the provider without insurer 1 is smaller 
than the expected value without insurer 2. 
 
Prediction 6: The differences in prices between large and small MCOs 
will be more pronounced among markets or providers with more excess 
capacity. 
𝜕
𝜕𝜆0
(
𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑗
𝜆j
𝜆0 + 𝜆j
) =
𝜆j − 𝜆0
(𝜆0 + 𝜆j)
3 > 0  if 𝜆j > 𝜆0 (10) 
 
With an increase in 𝜆0, the size premium increases (
𝜕
𝜕𝜆0
𝑝1
∗/𝑝2
∗ > 0). This happens because 
with a higher level of excess capacity the disagreement point for the provider, which is MCO’s 
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threat to not contract, is lower. While this is true for both MCOs, the effect is larger for the 
bigger MCO. 
5  Examples 
In this final section of the paper, I compute some expected prices, as a share of the difference 
between willingness-to-pay and cost, for several configurations of MCOs. I also show how 
prices and expected values change with the parameters.  
Many of my predicted effects match empirical observations in the literature. I should a strong 
association between MCOs HHI and prices, and the magnitude is compatible with the Dunn 
and Shapiro estimates (2012). 
I predict market level price differences that are similar to what Baker, Bundorf, Royalty, and 
Levin observe (2014). My model also matches the findings in Clemens and Gottleib (2017) 
that Medicare’s influence will be strongest in areas with concentrated insurers, and larger 
when Medicare makes up a larger share of the market. 
 
Georgia vs Alabama 
In order to illustrate the predicted differences in price as a function of market dynamics, I use 
data on the insurance markets for Alabama and Georgia. These numbers come from data on 
covered lives from the Medical Loss Ratio reports, so I’m simplifying by ignoring Medicare, 
Medicaid and self-insured plans. I also assume that the willingness-to-pay is identical across 
the insurer-providers pairs and the propensity that a given time slot is unfilled (𝜆0) is 0.2. 
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What is shown in the table below is the market shares of the top five insurers for Alabama and 
George, and the corresponding implied prices (as a multiple of WTP). 
 Alabama  Georgia 
 
Market 
Share 
Price  
Market 
Share 
Price 
1 74% 0.6950  33% 0.7940 
2 10% 0.7778  28% 0.7984 
3 8% 0.7792  15% 0.8101 
4 5% 0.7819  14% 0.8104 
5 3% 0.7849  10% 0.8115 
      
Wtd Avg  0.7162   0.8018 
 
The predicted prices for each MCO leads to the following three observations.  
First, the price ratio of the 5th largest to the largest is 1.02 in Georgia and 1.13 in Alabama. 
Second, the insurer with 10% market share in George has a 4.5% higher price than the insurer 
with the 10% market share in Alabama. This is a function of the dominant player being able 
to command a lower price, which results in a lower threat point for the rest of the insurers. 
Finally, the weighted average price is significantly (11%) lower in Alabama than in Georgia. 
The magnitude of this predicted difference is very much in line with the findings Baker, 
Bundorf, Royalty, and Levin (2014) who found the price difference in office visits between 
high HHI and low HHI regions to be between 8% and 16%. 
In Georgia, the top insurer is Humana, and the fifth largest is Aetna. I can also estimate the 
impact of the merger had it been approved.  I must note, however, that this analysis does not 
take into consideration any pass-through effects from their ability to raise prices on the plan 
consumers who purchase the plans, or any strategic responses on by providers. 
 Current  With Merger 
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Market 
Share 
Price  
Market 
Share 
Price 
Price 
Change 
1 33% 0.7940  43% 0.7776 -2.0% 
2 28% 0.7984  28% 0.7926 -0.7% 
3 15% 0.8101  15% 0.8041 -0.6% 
4 14% 0.8104  14% 0.8049 -0.6% 
5 10% 0.8115    -4.4% 
       
Wtd Avg  0.8018   0.7896 -1.5% 
 
By merging with Humana, Aetna could cut their reimbursement prices by 4.4% and Humana 
can cut theirs by 2.0%. Overall, prices drop by 1.5%, with the other insurers dropping 
reimbursements by more than 0.5%. 
Impact of an increase in WTP 
This model predicts how a change in how one MCO values a provider will change the price 
for both that MCO (prediction 3) and other MCOs (prediction 4). To illustrate with a 
numerical example, I set the bargaining parameter, 𝛼, at 0.5, the Medicare propensity, 𝜆𝑚, 
0.25, both the MCOs propensities, 𝜆1 and 𝜆2, 0.3, and the propensity of a time slot to be 
unfilled, 𝜆0, 0.15. With these levels, below are the corresponding partial effects of an increase 
in WTP for MCO 1: 
𝜕𝑝1
𝜕Δ𝑊𝑇𝑃1𝑗
= 0.5240 ∗ 𝑑Δ𝑊𝑇𝑃1𝑗 
𝜕𝑝2
𝜕Δ𝑊𝑇𝑃1𝑗
= 0.1129 ∗ 𝑑Δ𝑊𝑇𝑃1𝑗 
A model that used the same base Nash-bargaining parameters, but which ignored the 
interdependence of prices would predict an increase in price of 0.5 ∗ 𝑑Δ𝑊𝑇𝑃1𝑗 for MCO 1 
and 0 for MCO 2. My model predicts a slightly larger increase in prices for MCO 1, 
approximately 5% (0.524/0.5-1) higher than the static model. But my model also predicts that 
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there will be a considerable change in the prices for MCO 2. In fact, the provider is able to 
raise the price for MCO 2 by about 20% of the increase for MCO 1 (0.1129/.05240).  
Impact of an increase in Medicare Reimbursements 
The model also predicts a strong positive relationship between Medicare prices and private 
prices (prediction 4). Using the same parameters above, the impact of an increase in the 
Medicare price on MCO 1’s price is: 
𝜕𝑝1
𝜕𝑝𝑚
= 0.2273 ∗ 𝑑𝑝𝑚 
While this is a significant effect, the increase is much less than 1, and much smaller than 
observed by Clemens and Goettlieb (2017). However, the positive predicted effect is 
incompatible with the theory of hospital cost-shifting (Frakt 2011). 
 
Impact of MCO Size Differences 
My model also can speak directly to the relationship between the relative size of the MCO 
and the relative prices each MCO will pay (prediction 5).  
The MCO-provider negotiated prices have been modeled as a function of the characteristics 
and needs of the MCO’s customers, and the other providers already in the MCO network 
(substitutability). However, the resulting willingness-to-pay, once normalized to patient-visit, 
does not factor in the bargaining power of the MCO that stems for the relative importance of 
that MCO to the particular provider. To see how this plays out numerically I have calculated 
a couple of scenarios in which I have set average excess capacity (λ_0, in the first column), 
and the size parameters for MCO 1 and MCO 2 (𝝀𝟏 and 𝝀𝟐 in columns 3 and 4 respectively). 
From those three parameters, I calculate the prices. I am setting WTP1=WTP2=0. 
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𝝀𝟎 𝝀𝟏 𝝀𝟐 Price1 Price2 
Size 
Premium 
0.2 0.65 0.25 0.71 0.77 8.2% 
0.05 0.65 0.25 0.88 0.91 3.4% 
0.1 0.65 0.25 0.80 0.85 5.6% 
0.1 0.75 0.15 0.75 0.83 10.9% 
0.1 0.85 0.05 0.63 0.78 24.1% 
0.1 0.55 0.35 0.83 0.85 2.5% 
 
The exact size premium depends non-trivially on the values of the parameters. However, the 
size premium is consistent and for large differences in size, considerable.  
Impact of Average Excess Capacity (𝝀𝟎) 
It is important to recognize how willingness-to-pay (WTP) and 𝜆0 (average excess capacity) 
differ in this model, as both reflect aspects of a provider’s desirability. In my model, WTP is 
normalized to a patient time slot, to correspond to price, and therefore it does not depend on 
the size of the population. Instead, it depends on patient and provider characteristics such as 
location, health status, etc). In contrasts, average excess capacity (𝜆0) depends on the interplay 
between the overall number of patients, the number of other practices, the propensity for a 
patient to choose the practice and the size of the practice. An increase in the total number of 
patients, without a corresponding increase in physicians, will not increase the patient 
normalized willingness-to-pay, but it will decrease 𝜆0 (average excess capacity). An increase 
in a practice’s capacity again, would not increase the patient normalized willingness-to-pay, 
but this will increase 𝜆0. 
Below I provide a numeric example of how a change in  𝜆0 results in higher prices, even while 
ignoring any impacts from the increase in willingness-to-pay. Using the model of prices with 
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two insurers (no Medicare), the following table contains the corresponding equilibrium prices 
for two different configurations of market share, and two different values for 𝜆0, 0.2 (meaning 
that the underlying probability that a slot will be taken is 80%) and 0.1. 𝑊𝑇𝑃1 and 𝑊𝑇𝑃2 both 
are fixed at 1: 
 𝝀𝟎 = 𝟎. 𝟐  𝝀𝟎 = 𝟎. 𝟏 
 𝝀 Price  Price 
% Price 
Increase 
1 0.40 0.7500  0.846 12.8% 
2 0.40 0.7500  0.846  
      
 
𝝀 Price 
 
Price 
% Price 
Increase 
1 0.64 0.6676  0.7693 15.2% 
2 0.16 0.7543  0.8377 11.1% 
      
Wtd Avg  0.6849  0.7830 14.3% 
 
In both cases, with the MCOs have equal market share and where one is larger, there is a 
significant increase in price from the decrease in 𝜆0. The increase is smaller in the equal shares 
case, a 12.8% increase. With different shares, the larger MCO is forced to increase their 
reimbursement more than the smaller – 15.2% vs 11.1%. The weighted average price increase 
is 14.3%. These price increases do not stem from a higher willingness-to-pay for a timeslot, 
but are the result of providers being able to be firmer in their negotiations as there is a 
smaller probability that they will not find patients, given they are not accepting patients from 
an MCO. 
Finally, the following charts provide a visualization of the price dynamics with two insurers. 
I show the price for each MCO (the lines) and the expected value of a time slot (the areas). I 
show these three values along one of three dimensions: the relative size of the insurers, 
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average excess capacity (𝜆0) and the ratio of the insurers’ willingness-to-pay. Lastly, I 
compare Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and price resulting from my model. 
Varying the high-paying share 
 
 
Figure 10: Price and Expected Value by Share of Patients in Low WTP MCO 
In Figure 10, the two insurers have a different WTP, meaning the provider is more valuable 
to one MCO than to the other. This could stem from the provider’s skill set matching up better 
with the needs of one MCO’s population, or it could result from convenience and distance. 
The WTP is set to 1 for the insurer that values the provider less and the WTP is 2 for the other 
insurer. The average excess capacity, 𝜆0, is held constant at 10%. What varies on the x-axis is 
the share of patients that are in the high paying MCO. The main insight from this graphic is 
that at the two extremes the provider accepts both patients, but in the middle the provider only 
accepts the higher-paying patient type. The intuition is that if the high paying share is “high 
enough” (in this example 25%) than the risk of a low paying patient crowding out a low paying 
patient is not worth the risk of having an empty slot. On the other end, as the MCO that is 
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willing to pay more has a higher share, it is able to use that market power to drive down their 
price. Eventually, the price is low enough that the cost of a low-paying patient crowding out 
a high-paying one is small.  
Varying Average Unused Slot (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Figure 11: Price and Expected Value by Average Excess Capacity 
In Figure 11, both the size of the MCO patient population and the MCO’s WTP are held 
constant at 2 and 1. What varies is 𝜆0. For low value of 𝜆0, the provider should only accept 
patients from the high-paying MCO, which is the grey portion of Figure 11. 
The intuition is straightforward. As 𝜆0 falls, there is a smaller probability that there will be 
unused capacity if the provider drops the low paying MCO.  
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Varying the ratio of the MCOs’ willingness-to-pay 
 
Figure 12: Price and Expected Value by Ratio of MCOs’ WTP 
In the above graphic, the WTP ratios are varied in such a way as to keep the average WTP 
constant at 1. The patient populations of both MCOs are held constant and equal. The 
expected value to the provider decreases as the WTP ratio heads to one. The provider should 
accept patients from both MCOs unless the WTP ratio is higher than 1.82. 
Herfandahl-Herman Index and Average Price 
The Herfandahl-Herman Index (HHI) is a standard measure of industry concentration that is 
often used in industrial organization literature and used by government agencies tasked with 
enforcing antitrust law. The assumption is that more concentrated markets (higher HHI) on 
the producer side (in this case the providers) will result in higher prices and more concentrated 
markets on the purchaser side (in the case, the MCOs) will result in lower prices. By using 
my model, I can calculate simulate different arrangements of market structure and calculate 
the corresponding average negotiated price (as a share of willingness-to-pay). I do this for a 
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set off 2,500 various market shares with four MCOs, holding 𝜆0 constant. As shown in the 
graph below, there is a striking relationship between HHI and average price resulting from 
above model. The fitted quadratic equation is given by: 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  0.8134 +  0.015 𝐻𝐻𝐼 − 0.3101 𝐻𝐻𝐼2  
where HHI has been divided by 10,000 in the equation above for readability. In the figure 
below the fitted line is in black and the generated HHI, average price pairs are plotted in blue. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
In this paper, I propose a structural bargaining model that is most readily applicable to MCO-
healthcare provider bargaining. The main innovation of this model is to model the 
disagreement point explicitly for a provider not reaching an agreement with an MCO. In the 
model, the disagreement point is a function of the negotiated prices between other MCOs and 
the provider, as well as overall demand-side factors which play into willingness-to-pay and 
average excess capacity. In this way, the prices for each MCO are explicitly interdependent 
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within providers. I am able to model this disagreement point by exploiting the fact that two 
large factors in provider-MCO bargaining are providers have a limited ability to service 
patients, and patient demand is time sensitive and variable. 
Using this model, I demonstrate the conditions under which a provider will want to contract 
with a MCO and I analytically solves for how relative provider size and provider concentration 
impact the negotiated prices, and how price-interdependence leads to cross-price effects 
within a provider between MCOs. The magnitude and direction of the model’s predicted 
effects are validated by comparing predictions of model to previously observed statistics or 
estimated relationships, such as the average price difference between regions, the positive 
impact of an increase in Medicare prices on private MCO prices (including when that impact 
will be strongest). My model matches some previous findings, while providing a potential 
explanation for underlying causal mechanisms. 
While this model is limited by the fact that I do not explicitly model concentration on the 
provider side, and do not take into consideration the impact of MCO concentration prices on 
premiums, it adds to our understanding of MCO bargaining, as the mechanisms of limited 
capacity and time-sensitive demand have not previously been incorporated into a structural 
MCO-provider bargaining framework. While this work is most easily applied to MCO-
provider negotiation, this model could potentially be adapted to apply more closely to other 
industries as many markets face time sensitive demand and non-storable supply.  
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Appendix A: Capacity 
In this appendix, I derive the average excess capacity (𝜆0). Excess capacity is a profit 
maximizing strategy for firms when there are fixed cost associate with building that capacity 
and uncertainty about how many consumers will arrive in a given period of time. 
First, let the firm (physician) have a belief about the expected value of a given unit of capacity 
(𝐸𝑉𝑐) which is expected net price (expected price minus expected variable cost). Second, 
denote capacity by S (size) and let the cost for every unit of capacity be fixed at 𝑐𝑆. Finally, 
let the number of customers (patients) in a given time-period be approximated by a Poisson 
distribution with mean and variance x. 
The firm then chooses capacity S to maximize the following profit function:  
Π = −𝑐𝑆𝑆 + 𝐸𝑉𝑝 ∑𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑖
𝑖!
𝑆
𝑖=0
+ 𝐸𝑉𝑝 ( ∑ 𝑆
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑖
𝑖!
∞
𝑖=𝑆+1
) 
And the change in expected profit from an extra unit of capacity is: 
ΔΠ
Δ𝐶
= −𝑐𝑆 + 𝐸𝑉𝑝 [𝑆 (
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑆
𝑆!
−
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑆+1
(𝑆 + 1)!
) + ∑
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑖
𝑖!
∞
𝑖=𝑆+2
] 
Therefore, the rule to maximize profit is to add a unit of capacity if (subject to positive overall 
profit): 
𝑐𝑆 < 𝐸𝑉𝑝 [𝑆 (
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑆
𝑆!
−
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑆+1
(𝑆 + 1)!
) + ∑
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑖
𝑖!
∞
𝑖=𝑆+2
] 
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This provides the optimal level of capacity as a non-linear function of the unconditional 
average number of patients in a time-period (x) and the ratio between the cost of an extra unit 
of capacity and the expected value of a patient and also allows the average excess capacity 
(𝜆0) to be calculated. 
𝑆∗ = 𝑆 (𝑥,
𝑐𝑠
𝐸𝑉𝑝
) 
𝜆0 (𝑥,
𝑐𝑠
𝐸𝑉𝑝
) =
1
𝑆∗
∑(𝑆∗ − 𝑖)
𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑖
𝑖!
𝑆∗ 
𝑖=0
 
Optimal capacity is increasing in the unconditional mean (x) and decreasing in the 
cost/expected value ratio (holding constant EV higher cost of capacity will lead to less 
capacity). Lambda_0 is decreasing both in the unconditional mean and capacity, and 
increasing in the capacity cost to expected value ratio. To give an example, with a fixed cost-
to-expected value ratio of 10%, a provider facing a patient Poisson distribution with a mean 
of 20 will have a capacity of 30 and an average excess capacity of 33.4% percent, while a 
provider facing a patient demand distribution with a mean of 455 will have a capacity of 500 
and an average excess capacity of only 9.4% percent. 
An important note on the definitions of a time-periods and capacity. For a restaurant, capacity 
can be thought of tables, for hospitals beds and for physicians, appointment slots. The time-
period is the relevant period for which a consumer’s demand remains active. For a patient, the 
time-period should be thought of as a period in which once a patient realizes their health state, 
they can be flexible. Therefore, it will differ by type of service, and type of patient. The 
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relevant time-period for a cardiac intensive care unit may have a time-period of 30 minutes, 
while the correct time-period for primary care office may be several weeks. 
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Appendix B: Provider Problem Including Variable Costs 
If variable costs are included then the expected value of a time slot is: 
𝐸𝑉𝐾𝐽 =
∑ 𝜆𝜅(𝑝𝑘 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
=
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
− 𝑐𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
 
And the change in expected value of time slot from including patients of type 𝛿 is: 
(
𝜆𝛿(𝑝𝑘 − 𝑐𝑗) + ∑ 𝜆𝜅(𝑝𝑘 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
𝜆𝛿 + 𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
) − (
∑ 𝜆𝜅(𝑝𝑘 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
) 
This equation is very similar to equation used in the paper. Furthermore, the inclusion rule is 
very similar, it only now includes costs explicitly. This changes the amount of total surplus 
that the MCO and provider negotiate over, and therefore can change the predictions about the 
price. The underlying fact that provider’s threat point is the expected value without the MCO, 
however, remains mostly unchanged. 
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Appendix C: Time & Leisure in the Physician’s Problem 
In what follows, I allow the hours worked for the physician to depend on the expected return 
to working. 
𝑢𝑗(𝑐, 𝑞) = log (∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑞𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
) − 𝛼𝑗log (𝑋 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
)  
𝑞 = ∑ 𝑞𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
max
𝐾𝑗,𝑞
𝐸[𝑢𝑗(𝑞, 𝐾𝑗)] = max
𝐾𝑗,𝑞
(−𝛼𝑗log(𝑋 − 𝑞) + ∑ 𝑞𝑘 ∗ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
) 
Note that price should be thought of not as the list of transacted price for that patient, but full 
net expected payment taking into considerations the cost of working with that type of patient 
or insurance company. 
For simplicity let  𝑞𝑘 = 1, ∀𝑘 
FOC q: 
𝜕𝐸𝑈
𝜕𝑞
=
𝛼𝑗
𝑋 − 𝑞
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
= 0 
𝑞∗ = 𝑋 −
𝛼𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
 
 
Then using this to calculate the expected utility of accepting the set of patients K_j: 
𝐸[𝑢𝑗(𝑞 ∗ |𝐾𝑗)] = 𝛼𝑗log (𝑋 − (𝑋 −
𝛼𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
)) + (𝑋
−
𝛼𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
) ∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
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= 𝛼𝑗log (
𝛼𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
) + 𝑋 ∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
− 𝛼𝑗 
= 𝑋 ∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
− 𝛼𝑗 [1 − log(𝛼𝑗) + log ( ∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
)] 
 
Partial Derivatives for Physician Problem  
For the following derivatives prices are held constant. 
Hours Worked, wrt 𝒑𝒍: 
𝑞∗ = 𝑋 − 𝛼𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
= 𝑋 − 𝛼𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
𝜆𝑙𝑝𝑙 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙
 
𝜕𝑞∗
𝜕𝑝𝑙
= −𝛼𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
(∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 )
2 = −
𝛼𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
(
1
𝐸𝑉(𝐾𝑗)
) < 0 
Hours Worked, wrt 𝝀𝒍: 
Note that an increase in 𝜆𝑙 can be interpreted as an increase in demand by patients of 
type 𝑙. 
𝑞∗ = 𝑋 − 𝛼𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
= 𝑋 − 𝛼𝑗
𝜆𝑙
𝜆𝑙𝑝𝑙 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙
− 𝛼𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙
𝜆𝑙𝑝𝑙 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙
 
𝜕𝑞∗
𝜕𝜆𝑙
= −𝛼𝑗 [
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙
(∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 )
2 −
𝑝𝑙 (∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙 )
(∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 )
2] 
= −𝛼𝑗 [
∑ 𝜆𝜅(𝑝𝑘 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
(∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 )
2 ] 
= −𝛼𝑗 [
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
(∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 )
2 −
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑙𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
(∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 )
2] 
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= −
𝛼𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
[1 − 𝑝𝑙
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
] 
= −
𝛼𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
[1 − 𝑝𝑙 ∗ 1/𝐸𝑉(𝐾𝑗)] 
=
𝛼𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
[
𝑝𝑙
𝐸𝑉𝐾𝑗
− 1] 
So, if 𝑝𝑙 is higher than the expected value of the set then hours worked increases. Else, it 
decreases. 
Since all included 𝑝𝑙 's must be higher than the expected value (assuming ability to discriminate 
on types), then for all 𝑙, work increase with the number of patients. 
𝜕𝑞∗
𝜕𝜆𝑙
> 0 
If we're talking about 𝜆0, than p is 0 so because 𝑎𝑗 is greater than 0 the derivative is negative 
(less work). So in this simple model, doctors work more in respect to positive demand shocks, 
and less in response to negative demand shocks (as expected). The substitution effect 
dominates the income effect. 
Patients Seen (wrt 𝝀𝒍): 
Patients seen =  
𝑞∗(1 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏0) = 𝑞
∗ (1 −
𝜆0
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝜅∈𝑗
) = 𝑞∗ (
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝜅∈𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝜅∈𝑗
) 
q* rises (number of slots), and patients per slot (fill rate) rises drops as well, so patients 
seen rises. 
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Expected Value (wrt 𝝀𝒍):  
𝜕𝐸𝑉𝐾𝐽
𝜕𝜆𝑙
=
𝑝𝑙 [𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙 ]
[𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 ]
2 −
[𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙 ]
[𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 ]
2
=
𝜆0𝑝𝑙 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑙𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙 − 𝜆0 − ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/𝑙
[𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 ]
2  
=
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 (𝑝𝑙 − 𝑝𝑘)
[𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 ]
2 +
𝜆0(𝑝𝑙 − 1)
[𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 ]
2 
=
1
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
[
(𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 ) 𝑝𝑙
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
−
(𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 ) 𝑝𝑘
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
] 
=
1
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
[𝑝𝑙
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
−
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗 𝑝𝑘
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
] 
=
𝑝𝑙 − 𝐸𝑉𝐾𝐽
∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
> 0 
Not surprisingly, an increase in demand increases the expected value of a time slot. The 
magnitude of the increase depends on the difference between the price of that type and the 
expected value. 
Note: this does not take into account large changes in demand that potentially could impact 
which patient types are included. This happens if the increase pushes the expected value higher 
than the price for the lower patient types. 
 
Expected value wrt 𝒑𝒍: 
 ∂𝐸𝑉𝐾𝐽
𝜕𝑝𝑙
=
𝜆𝜅
𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑘∈𝐾𝑗
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘,𝑗 > 0 
118 
 
Note: this does not take into account large changes in price that potentially could impact which 
patient types are included. This happens if the increase pushes the expected value higher than 
the price for the lower patient types. 
 
Appendix D:   Two private insurers 
In this appendix, I work out the solutions for two private insurers (indexed with 1 and 2). The 
conditions from a bargaining equilibrium are generally: 
𝑝1𝑗 = (1 − 𝛼)ΔWTP1j + 𝛼 [ ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/1
] / [𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/1
] 
In the two-MCO case, this yields the following system of two equations in two 
unknowns: 
𝑝1𝑗 = (1 − 𝛼)ΔWTP1j + 𝛼𝜆2/(𝜆0 + 𝜆2)𝑝2𝑗 
𝑝2𝑗 = (1 − 𝛼)ΔWTP2j + 𝛼𝜆1/(𝜆0 + 𝜆1)𝑝1𝑗 
Which can be rewritten in the following matrix form: 
𝐴 [
𝑝0
𝑝1
𝑝2
] = [
0
(1 − 𝛼) 𝑊𝑇𝑃1
(1 − 𝛼) 𝑊𝑇𝑃2
] 
Where: 
𝐴 =
[
 
 
 
 
1 0 0
0 1 −𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
)  
0 −𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) 1
]
 
 
 
 
 
In this formulation, it is assumed that the provider contracts with all insurers. 
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𝐴−1
=
1
1 − 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
) 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 1 − 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
) 0 0
0 1 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
)  
0 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) 1
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This leads to the following equilibrium prices: 
𝑝0 = 0 
𝑝1
∗ =
1
1 − 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
) 
[(1 − 𝛼) 𝑊𝑇𝑃1 + 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
) (1 − 𝛼) 𝑊𝑇𝑃2] 
𝑝2
∗ =
1
1 − 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
) 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) 
[(1 − 𝛼) 𝑊𝑇𝑃2 + 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) (1 − 𝛼) 𝑊𝑇𝑃1 ] 
 
𝑝1
∗ = (1 − 𝛼) [1 − 𝛼2
𝜆1𝜆2
(𝜆0 + 𝜆1) (𝜆0 + 𝜆2) 
]
−1
[ 𝑊𝑇𝑃1 + 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
)𝑊𝑇𝑃2] 
𝑝2
∗ = (1 − 𝛼) [1 − 𝛼2
𝜆1𝜆2
(𝜆0 + 𝜆2) (𝜆0 + 𝜆1) 
]
−1
[𝑊𝑇𝑃2 + 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
)  𝑊𝑇𝑃1 ] 
The relationship between prices and size 
The equilibrium price ratio is: 
[ 𝑊𝑇𝑃1 + 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
)𝑊𝑇𝑃2] / [𝑊𝑇𝑃2 + 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) 𝑊𝑇𝑃1 ] 
If two insurers have the same WTP then the ratio of prices is: 
𝑝1
∗/𝑝2
∗ = [1 + 𝛼 (
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
)] / [1 + 𝛼 (
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
)] 
𝑝1
∗/𝑝2
∗ = (
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝛼𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 
) / (
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝛼𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 
) 
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𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑗
𝜆j
𝜆0 + 𝜆j
=
𝜆0
(𝜆0 + 𝜆j)
2 > 0 
Which means that if insurer 1 is larger, the denominator will be larger than the numerator and 
the ratio will be less than 1, meaning insurer 1 will pay less. The mechanism is that the 
expected value to the provider without insurer 1 is smaller than the expected value without 
insurer 2. 
 
Appendix E: Two MCOs and Medicare 
In a manner similar to Appendix D, I work out the solutions for two private insurers (indexed 
with 1 and 2) and an exogenously set public payor (indexed with m). The conditions from a 
bargaining equilibrium are generally: 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = (1 − 𝛼)ΔWTPij + 𝛼 [ ∑ 𝜆𝜅𝑝𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/i
] / [𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝜅
𝑘∈𝐾𝑗/i
] 
𝑝1𝑗 = (1 − 𝛼)𝛥𝑊𝑇𝑃1𝑗 + 𝛼
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
𝑝2𝑗 + 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
𝑝𝑚 
𝑝2𝑗 = (1 − 𝛼)ΔWTP2j + 𝛼
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑚
𝑝1𝑗 + 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑚
𝑝𝑚 
𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝𝑚̅̅ ̅̅  
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Consider the situation with two private insurers (indexed with 1 and 2). This leads to the 
following matrix formation of the simultaneous equations: 
𝐴 [
𝑝1
𝑝2
𝑝𝑚
] = [
(1 − 𝛼) 𝑊𝑇𝑃1
(1 − 𝛼) 𝑊𝑇𝑃2
𝑝𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
] 
Where: 
𝐴 =
[
 
 
 
 1 −𝛼
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
 −𝛼
𝜆𝑚
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
−𝛼
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑚
1 −𝛼
𝜆𝑚
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑚
0 0 1 ]
 
 
 
 
In this formulation, it is assumed that the provider contracts with all insurers. 
𝐴−1 =
1
det (𝐴)
[
 
 
 
 
1 −1 0
𝛼
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
1 0
𝛼
𝜆𝑚
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
+ 𝛼2
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
𝜆𝑚
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑚
𝛼
𝜆𝑚
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑚
+ 𝛼2
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑚
𝜆𝑚
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
1 − 𝛼2
𝜆1
𝜆0 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑚
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚]
 
 
 
 
 
 
det(𝐴) = 1 + 𝛼
𝜆2
𝜆0 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆𝑚
  
This leads to the following equilibrium prices: 
𝑝1
∗ = (1 − α2
𝜆1
Λ − λ2
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
)
−1
[(1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑇𝑃1 + 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ1
𝑝𝑚 + 𝛼
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
((1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑇𝑃2 + 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ2
𝑝𝑚) ] 
𝑝2
∗ = (1 − α2
𝜆2
Λ − λ1
𝜆1
Λ − λ2
)
−1
[(1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑇𝑃1 + 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ2
𝑝𝑚 + 𝛼
𝜆1
Λ − λ2
((1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑇𝑃1 + 𝛼
𝜆𝑚
Λ − λ1
𝑝𝑚) ] 
For Quality or Quantity?  
The Impact of ACO Formation on 
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how primary care providers (PCPs) change their referral patterns to 
specialists after they join a Medicare Shared Savings Program Accountable Care Organization 
(ACO). We find that primary-care providers respond differently to ACO formation depending on 
the degree to which the providers have a pre-existing relationship with specialists in the ACO. 
Relatively speaking, the smaller the previous PCP-specialist relationship, the bigger the response. 
We also find that primary-care providers without a pre-existing relationship with ACO specialists 
make up a large share of the ACOs PCPs and referrals. PCPs that sent a large share of referrals to 
specialists that join an ACO in the years prior to ACO formation decrease the number of patient 
they refer to those specialists. 
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1  Introduction 
Substantial efforts have been underway in recent years to adopt payment models that tie provider 
reimbursement to the quality or value of care provided (Burwell, 2015). Notably, Congress created 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The 
program, administered by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), allows 
collections of physicians, hospitals and other health providers to voluntarily create accountable 
care organizations (ACOs). The organizations collectively take responsibility for a large patient 
population, and can receive payments that are tied to the quality and cost of the care that they 
deliver.  
The hope for ACOs in the Medicare Shared Savings Program is that by promoting integration and 
providing quality-based incentives, ACOs will improve cooperating and reducing waste, therefore 
increasing the efficiency with which healthcare is delivered. While recent research has indicated 
that the program has achieved cost savings and improved quality (CMS, 2015b), a potential 
concern with the ACO program is that collaborative agreements across ACO providers could 
enable the exercise of market power among participants, which could lead to an increase in the 
price of medical care, or other anti-competitive behaviors.  
Given the competing forces inherent with the creation of these organizations, ACO formation 
poses a unique challenge for antitrust enforcement. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have recognized these challenges. While they have provided 
some limited waivers for ACOs, and have outlined requirements for ACOs to avoid antitrust 
scrutiny, they have noted that providers that join a Medicare ACO have the potential to engage in 
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anticompetitive practices (FTC and DOJ, 2011). While preliminary analysis has shown that few 
providers meet the criteria for increased scrutiny on their own, little research has analyzed provider 
behavior following the decision to participate in an ACO (Kleiner et al., 2016).  
Because Medicare prices are not negotiated, but rather are set administratively, there is no explicit 
price-based opportunity for Medicare ACOs to engage in anticompetitive conduct. However, Jay 
Levine, Co-Chair of Antitrust Practice Group, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, bluntly stated an 
“ACO is nothing more than a collaboration of competing providers” (Cheung-Larivee 2012) and 
ACOs can still run afoul of antitrust laws by self-referring, steering, gainsharing or creating tying 
contracts. Dominant ACOs could tie sales of their services to a private payer’s purchase of other 
services from providers that do not participate in the ACO. This “tying contract” would require a 
purchaser to contract with all physician groups under common ownership, even if only one, of 
many physician specialty groups under the same ownership, participates in the ACO. Large ACOs 
could also require exclusivity, to discourage providers from contracting with payers outside the 
ACO, and could restrict the dissemination of information on the cost and performance of the ACO 
(Feinstein, 2014). For example, a dominant ACO with large market share could control referrals 
and potentially prevent non-Medicare payers from steering patients to specific providers. Such an 
entity could also tie sales of their services to a private payer’s purchase of other services from 
providers that do not participate in the ACO. Finally, and most relevant to this paper, an ACO with 
a large market share could control referrals and potentially prevent payers from steering patients 
to specific providers. This could allow participating practices to grow their market share by 
guaranteeing referrals while maintaining independence, a concern that regulators have specifically 
expressed.  
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By combining physician referral data with information on physician ACO affiliation, we analyze 
the degree to which ACO affiliation impacts physician referral patterns in terms of the referrals to 
providers overall, in the ACO network and out of the ACO network. This project builds on 
previous work examining the impact of hospital ownership on physician referrals, physician 
responses to incentives and firm behavior under cooperation agreements short of mergers. The 
extent to which ACO participation affects physician referral patterns is of significant economic 
and policy interest given the unique arrangement under which ACOs operate and the increasing 
share of providers that participate in ACO programs. 
This paper proceeds as follows: In section two, we provide the relevant background on ACOs and 
the previous literature about provider behavior. In section three, we introduce our data sources and 
describe relevant statistics. In section four, we explain our empirical strategy. Section five contains 
our results which are summarized in section six. In section seven, we conclude. 
2  Background 
The goal of the Medicare Shared Savings Program is to reduce unnecessary spending and waste 
while improving patient outcomes.  ACOs represent an attempt to change provider incentives with 
the goal of ensuring that healthcare provided to Medicare beneficiaries is both high-quality and 
cost-effective. Their creation is part of a larger shift in the medical payment methodology away 
from fee-for-service, and towards a method of payment that rewards high-value care. 
Groups of providers that choose form an ACO to jointly take responsibility for a set of Medicare 
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are retroactively attributed to the ACO if a primary care doctor, 
defined as a physician with the specialty General Practice, Family Practice, Internal Medicine or 
Geriatric Medicine, within the ACO provides the beneficiary a plurality of their primary care, as 
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measured by Medicare allowed amounts. Only traditional, fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries 
can be attributed to an ACO.  
If an ACO is able to provide care to these patients at a lower cost than expected CMS may pay the 
ACO a portion of the cost savings. The expected cost is calculated using past cost for the ACO 
and risk-adjustments for the patients. Recently, CMS adjusted this methodology to also factor in 
regional averages to the expected cost calculation. An ACO can also be liable for a portion of cost 
overruns if they elect to participate in the two-sided, savings and losses, option. In practice, 99% 
of MSSP ACOs are in the one-sided option. The appeal of the two-sided, shared savings and losses 
model is that if there are savings, the portion that goes to the ACO is higher: 60% rather than the 
50% in the savings-only version. 
However, even if an ACO generates savings it may not be eligible for the shared savings payouts. 
First, the ACO must meet a standard of care as measured by 30 quality metrics. Then, the ACOs 
generated savings must meet or exceed the minimum savings rate (MSR), which is between 2% 
and 4% depending on the size of the MCO. In 2015, of 392 Medicare ACOs 202 produced savings 
but only 119 generated enough savings to receive bonus payments from CMS; 189 generated 
losses. 
The shared savings program was set up with the hope that the potential for financial rewards would 
align physician incentives with the goals of efficiency and effectiveness. While there is a 
substantial literature that has examined the extent to which physician behavior responds to 
financial incentives, the predicted physician response is unclear for ACO arrangements. Ho and 
Pakes (2014) show that physicians with capitated compensation arrangements are more likely to 
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refer patients to lower-priced hospitals,20 while Baker et al. (2014) demonstrate that physician 
practices acquired by hospitals are more likely to refer patients to the hospital that owns their 
practice. Physician responses to such incentives have also been documented for practices whose 
income is tied to prescription drug profitability (Iizuka, 2012), and physicians who own imaging 
equipment (Baker, 2010). However, Rebitzer and Votruba (2011) note that because ACOs do not 
require participants to limit themselves to a single ACO, ACO formation may be less likely to 
elicit a large behavioral response.  Rebitzer and Votruba (2011) furthermore suggest that ACOs 
are likely to be most effective in settings where care is already integrated, suggesting that ACOs 
may do little to change care referral patterns across providers. 
Shared savings payouts are only one part of the complex set of incentives and tradeoffs facing 
physicians as they join, or consider joining an ACO. Primary-care doctors both have a strong role 
in controlling cost, and appear to get most of the shared savings payouts (Evans 2015), therefore, 
the shared saving incentive seems most relevant to them. However, Frandsen and Rebitzer (2013a) 
argue that that the performance incentives in ACOs are “under-powered” and thus too weak to 
elicit meaningful changes in provider behavior. To achieve the savings, providers must lower the 
amount of care and the corresponding reimbursements. ACO participation has increased 
substantially in recent years, with some specialties reporting that as many as 30% of providers 
have joined these organizations (Medscape, 2015). It is doubtful that the potential for shared 
savings alone would be sufficient to induce such large a share of providers to form ACOs. 
There are many other factors that providers must when deciding whether to participate in an ACO. 
For example, in a list of reasons physicians should join ACOs, put together by a healthcare thought 
                                                 
20  A capitated arrangement is one in which a medical provider is given a set fee per patient, regardless of the 
treatment required. 
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leader, the focus was on the potential economic benefits, such as extending the referral network 
and increasing access to both specialists and beneficiaries (Govette 2015). While patient health 
and cost reductions were mentioned, the author did not view those as the primary justifications for 
joining an ACO. 
Furthermore, ACO startup costs can be very high. Estimates of the startup costs for an ACO range 
from $2 million to $26 million ($2 million CMS commissioned Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration project21, $4 million National Association of ACOs22, $11.6 to $26.1 million 
American Hospital Association23).  A large portion of these costs are infrastructure investments 
that are necessary to fully meet the ACO reporting requirements and helpful to successfully 
achieve the efficiency goals, such as electronic health record systems (EHR), referral management 
software, or additional non-physician care management staff. These investments can be used to 
increase practice efficiency and improve the patient experience for a provider’s entire patient 
population, thereby increasing patient satisfaction and retention for lucrative private patients as 
well. Not being able to implement these technologies could put a practice at a competitive 
disadvantage (Westgate 2013). Joining an ACO can provide access to capital, either from larger 
providers in the ACO, especially hospitals (Colla 2016), or from a CMS incentive program24. 
It could be that ACOs are behaving like firms. One role of firms is to manage the allocation of 
capital and labor within the firm to make use of comparative advantages and therefore increase 
overall efficiency. Physician group practices perform a similar role in efficiently matching patients 
                                                 
21 http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/healthcare/will-acos-show-financial-returns  
22 http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/accountable-care-organizations/acos-need-4m-of-startup-capital-
survey-finds.html  
23 http://www.aha.org/presscenter/pressrel/2011/110513-pr-aco.shtml  
24 https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2014-Press-releases-items/2014-
10-15-3.html  
130 
 
with specialists (Epstein, Ketcham and Nicholson 2010), and some researchers have found an 
association between large, multispecialty practices and higher quality care at a lower cost (Weeks 
et al 2010, Tollen 2008). A hope of policy makers is that ACOs can provide efficiency benefits 
that are similar to large, multi-specialty firms without the corresponding anti-competitive 
concerns. While the savings have been small, preliminary results on the ACO program have been 
mostly positive, indicating that ACOs may be successfully controlling costs (Nyweide 2015). 
The access to capital and electronic medical record systems that could come with joining an ACO 
are appealing incentives for smaller practices, especially primary care providers. The hope of 
increased efficiency through better management of records, patients and referrals could be a large 
factor in the decision, particularly if it is financed by a larger provider or hospital in the ACO. 
There does not seem to be prima facie reasons for a hospital to incur this cost, while simultaneously 
pursuing a reduction of the quantity of care and the corresponding reimbursements. A potential 
counterbalancing incentive could be the ability to secure quantity through the tightening of referral 
networks. Rick Weil, a partner at Oliver Wyman and a member of the global consulting firm's 
Health and Life Sciences Practices notes that there is “a huge incentive to keep the referrals within 
the ACO” and urges practices to consider participating in an ACO soon to avoid a decline in 
referral volume (Westgate 2013). While PCPs may also want to increase their referral network and 
options, this desire to secure referrals is especially true for specialists (Dupree 2014).  
In this paper, we investigate the impact of ACO formation on the referral relationship between 
PCPs and specialists. We are seeking to add to our understanding about the potential incentives 
for ACO formation and the behavior of physicians once they have formed an ACO. 
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3  Data 
Our data on physician referrals is provided by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS). Medicare refers to this as “patient referral” data and following them and other literature, 
we do as well; however, it is more precisely “shared patient” data as this dataset captures any 
patient sharing relationship between providers of health services within a given time frame (either 
30, 60, 90 or 180 days) whether or not there existed a formal referral. This dataset is publicly 
available and is constructed using the National Claims History (NCH) database which includes 
most Medicare claim types: Inpatient, Outpatient, Home Health Agency (HHA), Skilled Nursing 
Facilities (SNF), Carrier claims and Durable Medical Equipment Regional Carrier (DMERC) 
claims. It has information on referrals from 2009 through part of 2015, which allows us to observe 
changing referral patterns over time. 
At the year level, we observe the referring physician (that is, the physician the patient saw first), 
the receiving physician, the number of shared connections (patient-visits) and the count of unique 
shared patients. Due to privacy constraints, this data set omits physician pairs that share fewer than 
10 patients. 
We use the Accountable Care Organization Provider Level File from CMS to identify providers 
in ACOs. The dataset includes a list of every Shared Savings Program Accountable Care 
Organization, the date the ACO began operating, the county primarily served, and all associated 
participating practices’ taxpayer identification numbers (TINs). This file does not include Pioneer, 
Next Generation or Comprehensive ESRD Care ACOs and these types of ACOs are not included 
in our analysis. We confirmed the quality of the ACO data by checking our list against SK&A’s 
list of the top ACOs25. We found that our data showed a similar number of locations and physicians 
                                                 
25 SK&A Market Insight Report “Top 30 Accountable Care Organizations” http://www.skainfo.com/reports/top-
accountable-care-organizations Last accessed 6/15/2017 
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for these six Medicare ACOs: Health Connect Partners, Advocate Physician Partners, Indiana 
University Health ACO, Arizona Care Network, Iowa Health Accountable Care and Mercy ACO. 
Our data include ACOs that started in four different waves: April 2012, July 2012, January 2013 
and January 2014. For analysis in which we separate out the ACOs by start year, we treat both the 
2012 ACOs cohorts as one group and do not perform any corrections to account for the fact that 
relatively speaking, some of the 2012 cohorts started up to six months later in the year. Table 19 
shows characteristics of the ACOs by start date. 
A similar number of ACOs started in each year, with 111, 103 and 119 starting in 2012, 2013 and 
2014 respectively.  ACOs that joined in 2014 on average consist of fewer firms, defined by a tax 
identifier (24 vs 34) and fewer overall primary care providers (69 vs 93) and specialists than ACOs 
formed in 2012 and 2013. The number of primary care providers (PCPs) per firm (conditional on 
having at least one) was similar across all cohorts (3), and for firms that did not join an ACO. 
The official start date is the date after which CMS begins to track and score the ACO for shared 
savings purposes. However, the membership of the Medicare Accountable Care Organizations is 
finalized early on during the previous year and the providers could have been planning to form the 
ACO for even longer. Therefore, for our analysis, we view the year that the ACO membership is 
finalized as year 0 and the first year of the ACO as year 1. We will refer to the year prior to the 
announcement as the prior year, so the “prior year” for an ACO that officially started in January 
2013 is 2011. 
Accountable Care Organizations are defined as a collection of providers that bill under a set of 
taxpayer identifiers numbers (TINs). In order to be associated with the ACO, Medicare billings 
must be associated with one of the TINs. While physicians can bill under multiple tax identifiers, 
in our data (2013) only 7% of the physicians bill using a TIN not associated with their ACO. 
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Over our analysis timeframe we hold constant the NPIs in an ACO, that is if Doctor A1 is in firm 
B1 which is part of ACO C1 in 2012, but Doctor A1 was not in firm B1 in 2010 (and ACO C1 did 
not exist) we still would be interested in how his behavior changes. Likewise, if Doctor A2 was in 
firm B2 in 2010, but not in B2 in 2012 and B2 joined ACO2 in 2012 we would NOT be interested 
in how Doctor A2’s behavior changed. This allows us to avoid results driven by changes in the 
composition of practices, and in particular, practices growing larger. While the relationship 
between practice composition and ACO formation may be an interesting research area, it is out of 
the scope of this work. 
To associate physicians with practices, and thus ACOs, we use CMS’s Medicare Data on Physician 
Practice and Specialty (MDPPAS). This MDPPAS file also includes information on physician and 
practice billings as well as physician specialty. In addition to associating physicians with 
Accountable Care Organizations, this data set allows the grouping of providers from the Medicare 
relational data into practices using their Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). This will allow us 
to observe behavior at the practice level.  
Although a firm can include PCPs and specialist, we exclude from analysis the PCP-firm pairs 
where the PCP is part of the firm as we are trying to examine the impact of a new relationship, the 
formation of the ACO, rather than examine changes to pre-existing relationships. As the PCP and 
specialists were already in the same firm, we would not expect to see a substantial changes to 
referral patterns resulting from the formation of an ACO. This data also extends from 2009 to 
2014, allowing us to observe relationships and behavior before and after ACO formation. 
Because we are interested in how the formation of ACOs impacts physicians actively directing 
patients, we concentrate on the referrals from primary care providers (PCPs) to a set of specialists 
as we believe that these types of relationships are most likely to reflect that type of behavior. We 
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categorize physicians with the specialties Family Practice, Internal Medicine and General Practice 
as PCPs. We analyze referrals to the following seven specialties: cardiology, gastroenterology, 
general surgery, nephrology, ophthalmology, orthopedic surgery, and pulmonary disease. We 
chose this set because we believe these specialties are the ones most likely to reflect an active, 
directed referral from a PCP. We also believe that in most markets there are options for these types 
of specialists both in and out of the ACOs. We omit physician extenders, emergency medicine and 
more specialized types such as neurosurgery. 
Because CMS assigns patients to ACOs based on their primary care provider, ACOs must contain 
PCPs. More than 99% of ACOs have a Family Practice doctor, and the same share of ACOs have 
a physician with the Internal Medicine specialty. A much smaller share (53%) have a General 
Practitioner. A high percentage (86%) of ACOs included at least one of these seven specialties, 
and more than a fourth contain them all. This aligns with another study that found 16% of ACOs 
were composed entirely of primary care physicians (Schulz 2015).  
ACOs without any of our seven specialties of interests were not included, as in those ACOs, there 
are no PCP-specialist relationships to analyze. Table 20 shows characteristics of the Medicare 
Accountable Care Organizations by start year, for only those ACOs that included at least one 
specialist. 
Table 21 shows the characteristics of our sample of ACOs by specialty. The most numerous 
specialty is cardiology with 3,631. Cardiology is also the most likely of the seven selected 
specialties to be found in an ACO with 70% of ACOs including at least one cardiologist. The 
lowest share of ACOs contain an ophthalmologist (40%). On average, an ACO has four of these 
seven specialties, with a fifth of them having all seven. 
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For firms with at least one primary care provider, 31.7% of those firms included providers with 
other specialties. A similar share of firms with primary care providers that joined ACOs were 
multispecialty (30.2%). For firms with at least one specialist of interest, 35.3% of those firms 
included providers with other specialties. A much higher share of specialty firms joining ACOs 
were multispecialty (52.2%). 
 
4  Empirical Strategy 
To analyze how referral patterns are impacted by the formation of accountable care organizations, 
we use an event study approach. With data from both before and after the formation of accountable 
care organizations, we can estimate the conditional means for each of our metrics of interest by 
year, relative to year the ACO membership was finalized. We term the year that the ACO was set 
year zero, and the first year the ACO is scored on performance is year 1. With this approach, the 
changes in referrals over time are not constrained to be linear, and the change in referrals with the 
ACO after formation is, likewise, not constrained by a functional form. We also look at the referral 
behavior for providers that do not join an ACO, but at some point in our analysis period referred 
to a specialists in an ACO. 
If we believe that, absent the ACO formation, changes to ACO PCPs referrals patterns would be 
similar to changes to non-ACO referrals patterns we could isolate the causal impact of ACO 
formation by observing the differing changes between these two groups. However, we know that 
the formation of ACOs is an endogenous choice made simultaneously by the PCPs and the 
specialists. We can check the trends in referrals patterns prior to the ACO formation to see how 
likely it is that the referrals patterns would have remained similar between ACO PCPs and non-
ACO PCPs without the formation of the ACO. If there are significant differences in the pre-period 
136 
 
trends, then it is likely that even without the formation of the ACO, the referral patterns compared 
across the two groups would have differed. 
If that is the case, we can still examine referrals within ACO PCPs and look for a marked change 
at the point of ACO formation. While non-ACO PCPs may not serve as a sufficient control group, 
substantial changes in referral patterns in the pre vs post period for ACO PCPs may indicate the 
impact of ACO formation. We would need to assume that contemporaneous shocks at the point of 
the ACO forming were not the driver of referral pattern changes, however, because the ACOs 
formed in three different years, this is less of a concern. 
As part of our analysis strategy, we will also investigate whether providers with plausibly different 
reasons to join an ACO, identified through their pre-ACO formation referral share, have different 
patterns of change across the year coefficients in the periods leading up to the formation of the 
ACO compared to the periods after ACO formation. Below we formally specify the equations we 
will empirically estimate.  
In our first set of regressions, we estimate the number of referrals in a year that a PCP in an ACO 
refers to specialty providers in the ACO. Our unit of observation is a primary care provider, year: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑠
𝐴
𝑠∈𝑆
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, ACO Referrals, is indexed by 𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑖 and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. We include PCP 
fixed effects (𝛾𝑖) report the results with and without this control. The variable 𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑠  is an indicator 
that is one if the ACO formed s years after time t, that is if an ACO formed in 2012, an observation 
in time 2012 would be 1 only for s=0 and an observation in time 2014 would be 1 only for s=2. 
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The coefficients of interests are the 𝛼𝑠 coefficients (𝑠 ∈ {−4,3}), and in particular, we are 
interested in how these coefficients change as s moves from -1 (pre-period) to +1 (post-period).  
We are interested to see if ACO PCPs are increasing referrals to ACO specialists. This could be 
impacting efficiency as well. If we believe that there is overuse in the healthcare system, some of 
that may consist of unnecessary specialist visits. A decline in total referrals could indicate PCPs 
proactively reducing wasteful overuse. However, if there are efficiency gains from specialization 
across the ACO, an increase in referrals may reflect the exploitation of these efficiencies. 
Next, we estimate the effect that ACO formation has on the number of referrals from a PCP in an 
ACO to non-ACO specialist providers: 
 
𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑠
𝑂
𝑠∈𝑆
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
In this specification, the dependent variable is Other Referrals. The meaning of the other 
coefficients and variables are unchanged from specification (1). 
We examine the total number of referrals, to see how these changes are impacting the net number 
of referrals. If ACO PCPs are trying to reduce utilization, they may reduce the number of total 
referrals to specialists: 
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𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑠
𝑂
𝑠∈𝑆
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
We also look at the patients sent from the PCP to specialists in the affordable care organization as 
a share of the total patients sent by the PCP, which enables us to observe the net combination of 
changes in the ACO PCPs referrals of patients to ACO providers, patients to non-ACO providers 
and total patients, and gives us a general idea of how ACO specialists have changed in relative 
importance to the PCPs. Formally, we examine the share of patients from PCP i that are referred 
to specialist in 𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑖’s ACO. This is given by 𝑆𝑖𝑡: 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∑𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗∈𝐽
/∑𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡
∀𝑗 
= ∑𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗∈𝐽
/ (∑𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗∈𝐽
+ ∑𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗∉𝐽
) 
 
Where J is the set of specialist providers in the same accountable care organization as 𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑖. The 
regression equation to be estimated is therefore: 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑠
𝑆
𝑠∈𝑆
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
Finally, to examine whether changes in referrals are driven by the specialists being in any ACO, 
or the specialists being in the same ACO as the PCP we estimate the number and share of referrals 
sent from PCPs in ACOs to specialists in other ACOs: 
 
139 
 
𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑠
𝑂
𝑠∈𝑆
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
 
We also estimate equations 1-4 for primary care providers that refer to a specialists in an ACO, 
however, in equation (4) we are estimating the share to any ACO specialists, as the non-ACO PCPs 
do not belong to any particular ACO. 
 
By Pre-Period Referral Share 
As discussed, providers join ACOs to achieve different goals, such as the shared savings payouts, 
the investment incentives provided by CMS for upgrading technologies like electronic health 
records (EHR), or increased access to provider networks and patient retention and acquisition. We 
would expect different responses to joining an ACO, in terms of referral patterns, based on the 
different goals. A factor in those goals could be the position of the provider in the network of ACO 
providers prior to the formation of the ACO and one indicator of this position is the level of 
relationship with the other providers in the ACO in the years prior to forming the ACO. Providers 
who already have a strong, established relationship would be less likely to join together for the 
goal of increasing their provider network. Instead, those types of providers would most likely be 
pursuing the shared savings payouts or attempting to secure capital for infrastructure investments. 
On the other hand, it is more likely that groups of providers who do not have much of a pre-existing 
relationship are joining together to establish a provider referral network and secure access to 
patients. The potential for this type of tacit patient-sharing agreement is higher in formal ACOs 
due to the inherent, pre-existing sharing of patient information, the alignment of incentives, and 
the potential joint investments that come along with formal ACO formation 
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To allow for the potential that heterogeneous ACO formation goals correspond with the level of 
the pre-existing relationship, we estimate equations one through five separately for subgroups of 
PCPs. We categorize PCPs into five groups based on the pre-existing relationship between the 
PCPs and the ACO specialists, measured by the share of the PCP referrals that are to specialist in 
the ACO in the years prior to the formation of the ACO. The first three groups, Groups 1-3 
respectively, are terciles. The highest tercile, Group 3, sent more than 67% of their referrals to 
ACO specialists. The middle tercile, Group 2, sent between 29% and 67% of their referrals to ACO 
specialists. Finally, the lowest tercile, Group 1, sent more than 0%, but fewer than 29% of their 
referrals to ACO specialists in the years prior to the formation of the ACO. 
The fourth group consists of PCPs who had no referrals to specialists in ACOs in the prior periods. 
We term these PCPs “Group 0”. Finally, there are PCPs who during the prior years did not send 
any referrals to our specialists of interest, either ACO or non-ACO. We label these PCPs as the 
null group, as it is impossible to calculate a prior period referral share.  
Examining this group, it seems that many of the physicians are just starting their practices. The 
median age for a physician in this group is 34 vs 49 for physicians in the other group. We also 
looked at our billing data (MDPPAS) to see if whether they were not billing Medicare, or just not 
referring patients. The average first in the billing data year for the null group is 2011 and the 
average for the other PCPs is 2009.1 (our data only goes back to 2009). The two facts support the 
hypothesis that most of these physicians are either new doctors or new to Medicare. Most ACOs 
have providers representing more than one type. In fact, 68% of providers are in an ACO with all 
five and the average provider is in a group with 4.38. 
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For PCPs not in ACOs, we categorize them using the same share cutoffs explained above. The 
cutoffs were chosen to make the groups equal for ACO PCPs, so unlike with the ACO PCPS, the 
non-ACO PCPs do not have an equal number of providers in Groups 1-3. 
 
5  Results 
We estimate, using OLS, the event study coefficients from equations (1) through (5). The results 
for ACO PCPs can be found in 
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Table 25 through Table 30 and results for non-ACO PCPs can be found in Tables 31-34. Standard 
errors are clustered at the PCP level for all specifications. 
When looking at ACO PCPs referrals in the aggregate, we observe a constantly increasing number 
of referrals to ACO specialists with an average increase of 21 referrals in the three years leading 
up to ACO formation (table 7), and a slightly faster increase of 42 the four years after. However, 
referrals to non-ACO specialists change dramatically after the formation of the ACO. In the pre-
period, there is a very slight, insignificant drop of 3 referrals, from 205 to 203. After the formation 
of the ACO, ACO PCPs decrease their referrals to non-ACO specialists, by 50, a drop of 25% 
(table 8). The share of referrals to ACO specialists increases in the pre-period from 27% to 34% 
and increases in the post period to 47% (table 10). 
Overall, non-ACO PCPs changed their referrals very little in the years leading up to ACO 
formation increasing referrals to non-ACO specialists by 3% and to ACO specialists by 2% (table 
13). After the formation of the ACOs, non-ACO PCPs decreased referrals to non-ACO and ACO 
specialists by a similar absolute amount, 7 and 6, respectively; however, as a share of the prior 
year baseline this represents a small 3% drop for non-ACO specialists (table 13), but a large, 21% 
drop to ACO specialists. Consequently, while the share of referrals to ACO specialists had be 
stable at around 10% prior to the formation of the ACO, after formation dropped to 9% (table 16). 
At the aggregate level, we see smooth increases in referrals from ACO PCPs to ACO specialists, 
in terms of both number of referrals and share of total referrals. However, this aggregation masks 
significant changes that occur at the point of formation for sub-populations of providers, which 
become evident when we separately analyze the PCPs based on their pre-existing relationship with 
the specialists in the ACO. We create these analysis groups for both PCPs in ACOs, and PCPs not 
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in ACOs using the same criteria based on the share of referrals to ACO specialists in the pre-
period. In what follows, we discuss the results for each group, contrasting the trends prior to ACO 
formation with the trend after ACO formation. 
First, we discuss primary care providers that sent more than 67% of their referrals to ACO 
specialists in the period prior to ACO formation. We refer to these PCPs as Group 3. PCPs that 
joined ACOs and PCPs that did not both sent a similar share of their referrals the year before ACO 
formation, 83% and 87% respectively, however, their prior trend differed.  
PCPs that joined the ACO averaged nearly 205 referrals per year the year before they joined, and 
had increased referrals by more nearly 50 over the four years before. The level for PCPs that did 
not join an ACO was significantly lower, 154 referrals per year, and leading up to the formation 
of ACOs, their rate of increase was smaller as well, adding only 5 referrals per year over the same 
period. 
After the ACO formed, both sets of providers decreased referrals to ACO specialists and overall. 
For PCPs in ACOs, the decrease in referrals to ACO specialist was from 170 to 150, but the overall 
decrease was large, 205 to167, driven by a 50% decrease in referrals to non-ACO specialists. In 
net, for these providers the share of referrals increased to 92%. In contrasts, non-ACO PCPs 
doubled their referrals to non ACO specialists, 35 to 70, over this time-period while significantly 
decreasing referrals to ACO specialists - from 120 referrals to 64, a decrease of nearly 50%. Three 
years after the formation of the ACO, PCPs who had been sending 83% of their referrals to 
specialists in the ACO only sent 54%. It is not clear from our data the exact cause of this large 
drop in the share. It could be that non-ACO PCPs feel a competitive threat from the formation of 
the ACO and are consequently trying to find their own set of partners. Alternatively, there could 
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be a capacity issue where the ACO specialists cannot treat the both increased number of patients 
from ACO PCPs and the non-ACO PCPs’ patients. 
For PCPs in Group 2, providers that sent between 29% and 67% of their referrals to specialists in 
ACOs, those that join ACOs sent slightly more overall referrals (386 vs 367) in the year prior to 
the formation of the ACO than those that did not. 
In this group, ACO PCPs were sending an increasingly large share of their patients to specialists 
in ACOs leading up to those PCPs joining their ACOs. In the three years leading up to ACO 
formation, their share, on average, increased by 13.7%. This was primarily driven by an increase 
in referrals to ACO specialists, 22%, but they did decrease referrals to non-ACO specialists as 
well, but only by 8% (from 212 to 196). In contrast, in the prior periods, PCPs in Group 2 that did 
not join the ACO only barely changed their share of referrals to specialists in ACOs. 
Surprisingly, after the ACO is formed PCPs in the ACO cease to increase the number of referrals 
to ACO specialists. However, they dramatically decrease the referrals to non-ACO specialists, and 
the net effect is that the share continues to climb at nearly the same rate it was climbing in the pre-
period, rising from 52% to 66% three years after ACO formation. Referrals to specialists in ACOs 
which the PCP does not participate in do not grow. Instead, they fall more significantly than 
referrals to non-ACOs. 
For PCPs not affiliated with an ACO, there is a very large drop in referrals to specialists affiliated 
with ACOs. On average, these types of referrals decline from 163 to 105, a drop of 35%. While 
non-ACO PCPs decrease the number of referrals overall, the decline to non-ACO specialists is a 
much less pronounced 5%. Consequently, the share of referrals to non-ACO specialists increases 
in the post-period to 64%, from a base of 55%. 
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We categorize primary care providers that sent more than 0% but less than 29% of their referrals 
in the periods prior to ACO formation to specialists that would eventually join an ACO as Group 
1. These providers sent, on average, more referrals than the other providers with ACO PCPs 
sending 520 and non-ACO PCPs averaging 547 in the period prior to ACO formation. In the period 
leading up to ACO formation both ACO PCPs increased their overall referrals by 24 and non-ACO 
PCPs increased their referrals by 3. 
In the periods prior to the formation of the ACO, ACO PCPs increased the number of referrals to 
ACO specialists by 21. However, most of this increase occurred in the year just prior to the ACO 
formation.  
In the three years leading up to ACO formation, non-ACO PCPs slightly decreased the number of 
referrals to ACO specialists, dropping from an average of 44 per year to an average of 41 per year, 
and slightly increased referrals to non-ACO PCPs, from 501 to 506. This meant that the share of 
referrals going to a specialist in an ACO dropped from 9.5% to 8.6%.  
After the formation of the ACO, PCPs in ACOs increased their referrals to specialists in ACOs by 
20, a marked 25% increase off the prior year baseline, and decreased referrals to non-ACO 
specialists by an even larger share, 35%, and much larger absolute amount, 160 referrals per year. 
Notably, referrals to specialists in ACOs which the PCP does not participate decrease slightly more 
than referrals to non-ACOs, falling 40%. For these PCPs, in the pre-period referrals to other ACOs 
made up a significant portion of total referrals, 10%. 
Surprisingly, non-ACO PCPs also significantly decrease referrals to non-ACO specialists, 
dropping from 506 to 416, a drop of 17%. However, as a percentage this is much smaller than the 
drop to ACO specialists, which is 23%. Consequently, for non-ACO PCPs, the share of referrals 
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to ACO specialists falls from 8.8% to 7.7%. The overall drop in referrals for both ACO and non-
ACO PCPs is large and similar in magnitude, 25% and 27% respectively. 
A significant share of PCPs that refer to ACO specialist in our dataset do not refer to any ACO 
specialists of interest prior to the formation of the ACOs. We refer to these PCPs as Group 0. For 
PCPs in the ACO, that share is 31% and for PCPs out of the ACO the share is 47%. In the pre-
period, ACO and non-ACO PCPs had a similar number of total referrals to non-ACO specialists, 
230 and 210, though non-ACO PCPs were growing at a slightly faster rate adding an average of 9 
referrals over the pre-period compared to 4 for ACO PCPs.  
After the ACOs form, non-ACO PCPs only add four referrals to ACO specialists while reducing 
referrals to non-ACO PCPs by 10, while ACO PCPs added 32 referrals to ACO specialists and 
decrease referrals to non-ACO specialist by 72. Three years after ACO formation, non-ACO PCPs 
refer 1.4% of their referrals to ACO specialists while ACO PCPs are referring 17.6%. Like Group 
1, in the year prior to ACO formation, Group 0 also sends a sizable share of their referrals to ACOs 
they do not join, nearly 13%. After formation, this share drops to 10%. As seen with the other 
groups, relatively speaking, this is a larger drop than the drop of referrals to non-ACO specialists. 
Finally, some primary care providers in our dataset did not refer to any of our specialists of interest 
during the pre-period. Providers of this type make up 16% of PCPs that join an ACO, and 14% of 
non-ACO PCPs that at some point refer to an ACO specialist. While these PCPs had no recorded 
referrals in the pre-period, in the last period of our data on average they sent more referrals than 
every group except Group 1, with 233 and 280 referrals for ACO and non-ACO PCPs respectively.  
In the year that the ACO is formed, ACO PCPs send 48% of their referrals to ACO specialists 
while non-ACO PCPs only send 8.8%. Three years after formation, ACO PCPs have increased 
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that share to 60%, while non-ACO PCPs decrease their share to 8.6%. For ACO PCPs, on average 
they send 7.3% of referrals to ACOs they do not join in the year their ACO is formed, but only 
4.2% three years after joining. 
For a more easily consumed comparison, I graph the coefficients in tables 25 through 34 in figures 
14-19. Each figure includes graphed coefficients for each of the five subgroups as well as an 
overall, and represents referrals from either PCPs in ACOs or non-ACOs PPOs to one of the 
following sets of specialists, as detailed below: ACO, Non-ACO, Other ACO, Any. Either share 
or levels 
 Figure 14: The share of referrals to specialist in an ACO: PCPs that join an ACO vs PCPs 
not in an ACO 
 Figure 15: The number of referrals from a PCP in an ACO: to specialists that join an ACO 
vs specialists that do not 
 Figure 16: The number of referrals from a PCP not in an ACO: to specialists that join an 
ACO vs specialists that do not 
 Figure 17: The number of referrals to specialist not in an ACO: PCPs that join an ACO vs 
PCPs not in an ACO 
 Figure 18: Total number of referrals to specialist: PCPs that join an ACO vs PCPs not in 
an ACO 
Focusing on figures 14 and 15, we can make the following four observations: first, when we look 
for a response for PCPs joining an ACO (figure 14 and figure 15), overall, PCPs that join an ACO 
seem to have been increasing the number of referrals to ACO specialists prior to the formation of 
the ACO. However, it looks like after the formation of the ACO they decrease referrals to non-
ACO specialists. In the three years before ACO formation the average share of referrals sent to 
specialists in an ACO goes from 30% to 34%. In the three years after, the average share increases 
to 47%. For non-ACO PCPs, the changes are much smaller. In the three years before ACO 
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formation the average of referrals increases from 9.9% to 10.2%. In the three years after, the 
average share of referrals from non-ACO PCPs to specialists in an ACO decreases to 9.1%.  
Second, there appears to be a large response at the some of the extremes. ACO PCPs who had not 
previously sent any referrals to the ACO significantly increase referrals (from 0% to 17.5%). Non-
ACO PCPs, who previously had sent a high share of their referrals to ACO specialists significantly 
decrease referrals (82.5% to 54.0%). 
Third, there is some response in the middle. ACO PCPs who had previously sent a low share, 
slightly increase referrals to ACO specialists (16% to 29%) and significantly decrease the number 
of referrals to non-ACO specialists. Non-ACO PCPs, who had previously sent a medium share of 
referrals to specialists in the ACO decrease referrals to ACO specialists (from 45% to 36%). 
Fourth, there is little response at the other extremes. For PCPs who were already sending a 
significant share of their referrals to specialists in the ACO, they do not continue to increase the 
raw number of referrals, though a declining number of referrals to non-ACO specialists result in 
an increasing average referral share – from 87.3% to 92.1%. For PCPs that did not join the ACO, 
and previously sent no referrals to an ACO, the share of referrals sent barely changes going from 
0 to 1.7%. 
There are big differences in the referral patterns among primary care providers who previously did 
not record any Medicare referrals, the null group in figures 15. Those that join an ACO send a 
significant (>50%) share of their referrals to specialists in the ACO while those that do not join an 
ACO, send a much smaller share (9-10%). 
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Looking at figure 20, it appears that changes are not driven by something special about PCPs that 
join ACOs and specialists that join ACOs, as there is no impact on referrals of PCPs in ACOs to 
specialists in other ACOs. In fact, as a share of prior year referrals, the drop in referrals to other 
ACOs is slightly larger than the drop in referrals to non-ACO providers (7/22 = 32%, vs 
49/202=24%).  
Figure 18 shows that there is an overall drop in referrals in each of the groups. This is likely an 
artifact of the way we are constructing our analysis dataset. We fix the set of physicians that we 
are going to analyze in “year 0” – when the ACO is announced. As time progresses there is a 
natural rate of professional attrition, due to physicians retiring or passing away. We see an attrition 
rate of around 5% in our data, where attrition means we stop observing a physician. While we do 
not know the cause of this, or if they will reappear.  While their figure includes physicians 
relocating, SK&A estimates that the move rate for primary care physicians is above 10%26.  
This leads to one more comparison, the predicted levels from the regression coefficients compared 
with a fixed 5% attrition rate (figure 19). I calculate referrals as a share of year 0 referrals, and 
subtract this from what would be expected with a compounding 5% attrition rate (95%, 90.3%, 
85.7% and 81.5%).  
Overall, both PCPs in ACOs and non-ACO PCPs that refer to ACOs have a decline that not very 
different from a 5% attrition rate. However, looking at referrals to specialists in ACOs there is a 
stark difference is true for all the groups, 1-3 (this metric is not applicable for ACOs in group 0 or 
                                                 
26 SK&A, “Healthcare Provider Move Rates - Physician Specialties, Hospital and Pharmacy Staff Titles”. Market 
Insights Report. October 2016. Accessed from http://www.skainfo.com/reports/provider-move-rates  
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the null group). The shift towards ACOs is most pronounced group 3 – the group with a small prior 
relationship. And the shift away from the ACO is most pronounced in group 1 – the group with 
the largest prior relationship. 
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6  Summary 
When analyzing the referral patterns from ACO PCPs to ACO specialists, we observe a substantial 
pre-period increase. This illustrates that the formation of the ACO is an endogenous choice. We 
also notice that the response to ACO formation differs substantially based on the PCP pre-period 
relationship with the specialists. For PCPs with similar average referral rates to ACO specialist in 
the pre-period, those that have been increasing their share are more likely to be the ones that form 
the ACO. Interestingly, for ACO PCPs that had previously been referring to ACO specialists, they 
stop increasing the number of referrals to ACO specialists after joining the ACO. However, the 
aggregate number of referrals to ACO specialists increases at a similar rate which is driven by 
ACO PCPs that had not previously referred to an ACO specialist, and ACO PCPs that had 
previously not referred to any specialists. For all groups of ACO PCPs with referrals to non-ACO 
specialists, ACO formation is associated with a significant drop in referrals to non-ACO 
specialists, and a net overall drop in referrals. There was no pre-trend in the level of non-ACO 
referrals. 
In net, the share of referrals from ACO PCPs to ACO specialists grows both in the pre-period and 
in the post period. However, the source of the change in share is different. In the pre-period, it is 
driven mainly by an increase in referrals from groups 1-3. In the post-period, the overall increase 
in share is driven both by the decrease in number of referrals to non-ACO specialists, and the 
increase from PCPs that had not previously referred to ACO specialists. Non-ACO PCPs also 
lowered their overall number of referrals. While they dropped referrals to ACO and non-ACO 
specialists, the drop was much more pronounced for ACO specialists. 
 
152 
 
7  Conclusion 
Payment methods other than fee-for-service are becoming increasingly prevalent. While there is 
an increasing number of large, multi-specialty practices, other, less integrated associations 
between primary care provider and specialists, such as accountable care organizations, are 
increasingly common as well. Primary care providers have unique and mixed motivations for 
joining affordable care organizations. Each provider enters that arrangement with a different prior 
relationship with the other ACO, and responds differently to the formation of the ACO. We show 
that there is a heterogenous response to joining an ACO, and the level of the pre-existing 
relationship determines the type of response a PCP will have. Overall, PCPs joining an ACO 
decrease the number of referrals to specialists, by decreasing the number of referrals to specialists 
outside the ACO while still increasing referrals to specialists inside the ACO. However, PCPs 
without a prior relationship with ACO specialists significantly increase both the referrals to ACO 
specialists and total referrals.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 19: All ACOs by Start Date 
 
 
 
 
Table 20: ACO’s with a Specialists by Start Date 
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Table 21: Physician Counts by Specialty 
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Table 22: Physicians by Quartile Summary Statistics 
 
  
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO 
formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No 
referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
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Table 23: Primary Care Providers Summary Statistics 
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Table 24: Specialists Summary Statistics  
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Table 25: Referrals from ACO PCPs to Specialists in the ACO: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-formation Referral Group 
  
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
  
Dependent Variable: Referrals to ACO Specialists from ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior -18.90 *** -51.09 *** -40.39 *** -21.11 ***
(0.966) (3.897) (3.749) (1.86)
3 yrs prior -16.84 *** -34.46 *** -37.58 *** -17.59 ***
(0.693) (2.449) (2.554) (1.321)
2 yrs prior -8.35 *** -18.58 *** -18.57 *** -10.77 ***
(0.388) (1.496) (1.426) (0.787)
1 yr prior
9.42 *** 6.45 *** 6.39 *** 12.96 *** 6.53 *** 17.60 ***
(0.459) (1.54) (1.39) (1.058) (0.426) (1.02)
1 yr post 18.69 *** 1.15 -0.25 16.43 *** 17.54 *** 62.35 ***
(0.693) (1.832) (1.763) (1.331) (0.859) (2.326)
2 yrs post 31.61 *** -6.14 *** 2.34 22.68 *** 29.06 *** 110.10 ***
(1.035) (2.279) (2.343) (1.908) (1.4) (3.458)
3 yrs post 34.78 *** -19.59 *** -5.93 * 18.37 *** 32.86 *** 130.20 ***
(1.494) (3.426) (3.355) (2.483) (1.977) (4.586)
Prior Yr Mean 74.91 *** 168.70 *** 189.70 *** 71.97 *** 0.00 0.00
(0.365) (1.081) (1.037) (0.687) (0.374) (1.067)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations
Overall
High ACO Share Medium ACO Share Low ACO Share No ACO Refs
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 Group 0
ACO Formed
173,142 30,384 30,366 30,372
28,857 5,064
27,99054,030
5,061 5,062 9,005
No Refs
Group Null
4,665
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Table 26: Referrals from ACO PCPs to Specialists NOT in the ACO: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-formation Referral Group 
  
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
  
Dependent Variable: Referrals to on-ACO Specialists from ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior 2.19 5.49 *** 16.16 *** -2.83 -4.26
(2.288) (1.525) (4.592) (7.981) (4.006)
3 yrs prior 1.65 2.74 *** 2.21 13.91 ** -4.62
(1.446) (0.871) (3.047) (5.441) (2.833)
2 yrs prior 2.87 *** 2.05 *** 1.51 16.49 *** -2.06
(0.832) (0.557) (1.641) (3.149) (1.723)
1 yr prior
-7.98 *** -0.42 -12.04 *** -32.81 *** -12.48 *** 23.84 ***
(0.834) (0.672) (1.625) (2.653) (1.826) (1.296)
1 yr post -20.15 *** -5.99 *** -34.48 *** -75.29 *** -36.11 *** 70.61 ***
(1.198) (0.863) (2.233) (3.526) (2.433) (2.912)
2 yrs post -31.54 *** -12.21 *** -55.23 *** -118.30 *** -55.52 *** 93.96 ***
(1.555) (0.942) (2.534) (5.12) (3.143) (3.426)
3 yrs post -44.57 *** -17.92 *** -73.29 *** -160.00 *** -72.95 *** 103.40 ***
(2.218) (1.234) (4.082) (6.989) (4.302) (4.276)
Prior Yr Mean 191.20 *** 36.30 *** 196.40 *** 447.80 *** 229.10 *** 0.00
(0.676) (0.443) (1.238) (2.198) (1.426) (1.148)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations
High ACO Share Medium ACO Share Low ACO Share No ACO Refs
30,372 54,030
Overall
Group 0 Group Null
ACO Formed
28,857 5,064 5,061 5,062 4,665
27,990
No Refs
9,005
173,142 30,384 30,366
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1
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Table 27: Total Referrals from ACO PCPs to Specialists: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-formation Referral Group 
  
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
 
Table 28: Referrals from ACO PCPs to Specialists in OTHER ACOs: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-formation Referral 
Group 
Dependent Variable: Total Referrals from ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior -16.71 *** -45.60 *** -24.24 *** -23.94 *** -4.24
(2.656) (4.927) (7.215) (8.57) (4.055)
3 yrs prior -15.19 *** -31.72 *** -35.37 *** -3.68 -5.64 **
(1.746) (3.029) (4.969) (5.892) (2.864)
2 yrs prior -5.48 *** -16.53 *** -17.05 *** 5.72 * -2.06
(0.987) (1.878) (2.676) (3.392) (1.723)
1 yr prior
1.44 6.03 *** -5.65 ** -19.85 *** -5.95 *** 41.43 ***
(1.043) (2.009) (2.694) (3.05) (1.886) (1.895)
1 yr post -1.46 -4.84 ** -34.74 *** -58.86 *** -18.56 *** 133.00 ***
(1.521) (2.387) (3.469) (4.05) (2.55) (4.34)
2 yrs post 0.07 -18.35 *** -52.89 *** -95.61 *** -26.45 *** 204.10 ***
(2.08) (2.864) (4.223) (5.832) (3.4) (5.77)
3 yrs post -9.79 *** -37.51 *** -79.22 *** -141.60 *** -40.09 *** 233.50 ***
(2.964) (4.18) (6.212) (7.984) (4.664) (7.201)
Prior Yr Mean 266.10 *** 205.00 *** 386.10 *** 519.70 *** 229.10 *** 0.00
(0.838) (1.385) (1.991) (2.446) (1.452) (1.852)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations
Overall
Group 3
High ACO Share
Group 2
Medium ACO Share
Group 1
Low ACO Share
Group 0
No ACO Refs
ACO Formed
173,142 30,384 30,366 30,372 54,030
5,061 5,062 9,005
Group Null
No Refs
4,665
27,990
28,857 5,064
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Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
  
Dependent Variable: Total Referrals to other ACOs from ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior 0.17 -0.59 -1.29 1.53 -0.06
(0.563) (0.453) (1.282) (1.905) (0.984)
3 yrs prior -0.17 -0.04 -0.20 1.44 -1.36 *
(0.361) (0.244) (0.664) (1.356) (0.736)
2 yrs prior -0.02 0.27 * -0.50 2.08 *** -1.11 **
(0.211) (0.162) (0.339) (0.766) (0.473)
1 yr prior
-0.65 *** 0.18 0.30 -3.36 *** -1.88 *** 2.77 ***
(0.223) (0.175) (0.373) (0.715) (0.512) (0.32)
1 yr post -1.87 *** -0.71 *** -0.53 -7.24 *** -5.10 *** 7.53 ***
(0.342) (0.207) (0.916) (0.976) (0.699) (0.664)
2 yrs post -4.03 *** -1.40 *** -3.36 *** -13.64 *** -8.75 *** 9.49 ***
(0.401) (0.216) (0.446) (1.396) (0.938) (0.752)
3 yrs post -6.28 *** -2.34 *** -6.68 *** -19.59 *** -11.02 *** 9.76 ***
(0.509) (0.291) (0.82) (1.469) (1.223) (0.941)
Prior Yr Mean 20.76 *** 3.82 *** 16.39 *** 51.35 *** 26.15 *** 0.00
(0.173) (0.108) (0.277) (0.574) (0.393) (0.25)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations 30,372 54,030
Overall
Group 3
High ACO Share
ACO Formed
28,857 5,064 5,061 5,062 9,005 4,665
27,990173,142 30,384 30,366
Medium ACO Share
Group 2 Group 1 Group 0 Group Null
Low ACO Share No ACO Refs No Refs
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Table 29: Referrals from ACO PCPs to ACO Specialists as a Share of Total Referrals: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-
formation Referral Group 
  
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
  
Dependent Variable: Share of Total Referrals to ACO specialists, from ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior -7.0% *** -13.3% *** -13.7% *** -6.8% ***
(0.00274) (0.00857) (0.00843) (0.00512)
3 yrs prior -4.5% *** -6.8% *** -8.3% *** -5.3% ***
(0.00171) (0.00413) (0.0048) (0.00356)
2 yrs prior -2.4% *** -3.0% *** -4.2% *** -3.6% ***
(0.00118) (0.00278) (0.00331) (0.00247)
1 yr prior
3.0% *** -0.8% *** 2.9% *** 3.7% *** 4.8% ***
(0.00118) (0.00244) (0.00266) (0.00233) (0.00194)
1 yr post 6.3% *** 1.0% *** 6.3% *** 6.4% *** 9.4% *** 3.5% ***
(0.00148) (0.00278) (0.00313) (0.00284) (0.00285) (0.00669)
2 yrs post 9.6% *** 2.4% *** 9.6% *** 10.1% *** 13.9% *** 7.2% ***
(0.00189) (0.00308) (0.00371) (0.00384) (0.00407) (0.00833)
3 yrs post 13.2% *** 4.6% *** 14.5% *** 12.7% *** 17.6% *** 11.0% ***
(0.00282) (0.00459) (0.0056) (0.00565) (0.00616) (0.0106)
Prior Yr Mean 34.2% *** 87.4% *** 52.1% *** 16.4% *** 0.0% 47.9% ***
(0.000876) (0.00172) (0.00204) (0.00172) (0.00608)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations 25,639 28,378 28,973 42,988
9,005
ACO Formed
28,857 5,064 5,061 5,062
134,789
4,665
8,811
High ACO Share Medium ACO Share Low ACO Share No ACO Refs No Refs
Overall
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 Group 0 Group Null
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Table 30: Referrals from ACO PCPs to Specialists in OTHER ACOs as a Share of Total Referrals: By Years Since ACO Formation and 
Pre-formation Referral Group 
   
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
  
Dependent Variable: Share of Total Referrals to Other ACOs, from ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior 0.6% *** 1.3% *** 1.3% *** 0.8% ** -0.3%
(0.00181) (0.00319) (0.00365) (0.00319) (0.00356)
3 yrs prior 0.3% *** 0.4% *** 0.8% *** 0.5% ** -0.2%
(0.00107) (0.0013) (0.00193) (0.00213) (0.00234)
2 yrs prior 0.0% 0.2% * 0.1% 0.3% ** -0.4% **
(0.00075) (0.000929) (0.00123) (0.00143) (0.00171)
1 yr prior
-0.2% *** 0.3% *** 0.0% -0.1% -0.8% ***
(0.000761) (0.000914) (0.00108) (0.00132) (0.00182)
1 yr post -0.8% *** -0.1% -0.3% ** -0.6% *** -1.9% *** -1.0% **
(0.000883) (0.000915) (0.00118) (0.00158) (0.0022) (0.00406)
2 yrs post -1.4% *** -0.3% *** -0.6% *** -1.4% *** -2.8% *** -1.9% ***
(0.00103) (0.000914) (0.00127) (0.00195) (0.00273) (0.00487)
3 yrs post -1.9% *** -0.3% * -1.1% *** -2.1% *** -2.9% *** -3.1% ***
(0.00159) (0.00174) (0.00197) (0.00298) (0.0041) (0.00649)
Prior Yr Mean 7.9% *** 1.2% *** 4.4% *** 10.2% *** 12.9% *** 7.3% ***
(0.000542) (0.000599) (0.000793) (0.000953) (0.00126) (0.00364)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations
ACO Formed
High ACO Share Medium ACO Share
134,789 25,639 28,378 28,973 42,988
4,665
8,811
Overall
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 Group 0 Group Null
28,857 5,064 5,061 5,062 9,005
Low ACO Share No ACO Refs No Refs
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Table 31: Referrals from non-ACO PCPs to ACOs Specialists: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-formation Referral Group 
  
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
  
Dependent Variable: Referrals to ACO Specialists from Non-ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior 0.58 ** -0.59 2.79 2.85 ***
(0.227) (2.519) (1.904) (0.413)
3 yrs prior 0.53 *** -0.05 4.18 *** 1.54 ***
(0.15) (1.779) (1.275) (0.261)
2 yrs prior 0.19 ** -1.95 * 1.32 * 0.51 ***
(0.0844) (1.017) (0.705) (0.148)
1 yr prior
-1.29 *** -6.90 *** -11.30 *** -1.59 *** 0.44 *** 2.25 ***
(0.0838) (1.077) (0.683) (0.134) (0.021) (0.11)
1 yr post -3.19 *** -23.44 *** -28.56 *** -4.31 *** 1.25 *** 9.03 ***
(0.154) (1.914) (1.213) (0.24) (0.0523) (0.33)
2 yrs post -4.79 *** -38.53 *** -42.78 *** -7.09 *** 2.08 *** 15.28 ***
(0.221) (2.721) (1.694) (0.345) (0.0878) (0.556)
3 yrs post -6.37 *** -56.16 *** -58.06 *** -9.78 *** 2.96 *** 24.82 ***
(0.29) (3.446) (2.12) (0.443) (0.132) (0.907)
Prior Yr Mean 30.98 *** 120.40 *** 163.30 *** 41.07 *** 0.00 0.00
(0.072) (0.899) (0.558) (0.112) (0.0261) (0.167)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 Group 0 Group Null
2,169,852 77,298 177,402 593,676 1,019,154 302,322
High ACO Share Medium ACO Share Low ACO Share No ACO Refs No Refs
ACO Formed
361,642 12,883 29,567 98,946 169,859 50,387
Overall
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Table 32: Referrals from non-ACO PCPs to non-ACO Specialists: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-formation Referral Group 
  
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
  
Dependent Variable: Referrals to Specialists not in an ACO from Non-ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior -9.02 *** -3.74 *** 4.51 * -5.68 ** -8.88 ***
(0.95) (1.121) (2.511) (2.606) (0.963)
3 yrs prior -5.72 *** -2.68 *** 3.24 ** -2.05 -7.05 ***
(0.615) (0.728) (1.652) (1.691) (0.643)
2 yrs prior -3.41 *** -0.60 1.64 * -4.08 *** -4.77 ***
(0.347) (0.398) (0.905) (0.955) (0.361)
1 yr prior
-0.48 5.81 *** -1.97 ** -13.91 *** 3.34 *** 22.45 ***
(0.333) (0.646) (0.901) (0.807) (0.425) (0.453)
1 yr post -3.37 *** 15.60 *** -4.88 *** -41.14 *** 0.05 95.74 ***
(0.626) (1.395) (1.652) (1.453) (0.799) (1.367)
2 yrs post -5.93 *** 24.13 *** -7.87 *** -65.30 *** -3.39 *** 158.70 ***
(0.927) (2.185) (2.374) (2.103) (1.201) (2.251)
3 yrs post -7.70 *** 33.69 *** -10.96 *** -90.28 *** -9.79 *** 255.40 ***
(1.229) (3.053) (3.12) (2.719) (1.538) (3.67)
Prior Yr Mean 273.90 *** 34.41 *** 204.30 *** 506.80 *** 210.80 *** 0.00
(0.293) (0.642) (0.706) (0.698) (0.36) (0.68)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations
ACO Formed
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 Group 0 Group Null
Low ACO Share No ACO Refs No Refs
593,676 1,019,154 302,322
361,642 12,883 29,567 98,946 169,859
2,169,852 77,298 177,402
50,387
Overall
High ACO Share Medium ACO Share
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Table 33: Total Referrals from non-ACO PCPs to Specialists: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-formation Referral Group 
   
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
 
  
4 yrs prior -8.45 *** -4.33 7.30 * -2.83 -9.32 ***
(1.052) (3.276) (3.991) (2.839) (0.966)
3 yrs prior -5.19 *** -2.73 7.42 *** -0.51 -7.27 ***
(0.677) (2.254) (2.634) (1.824) (0.645)
2 yrs prior -3.22 *** -2.54 ** 2.96 ** -3.57 *** -4.77 ***
(0.382) (1.257) (1.445) (1.03) (0.361)
1 yr prior
-1.77 *** -1.08 -13.27 *** -15.50 *** 3.77 *** 24.70 ***
(0.363) (1.395) (1.397) (0.863) (0.432) (0.484)
1 yr post -6.56 *** -7.84 *** -33.44 *** -45.45 *** 1.31 104.80 ***
(0.682) (2.587) (2.518) (1.553) (0.818) (1.45)
2 yrs post -10.72 *** -14.39 *** -50.64 *** -72.39 *** -1.31 174.00 ***
(1.006) (3.78) (3.538) (2.245) (1.235) (2.391)
3 yrs post -14.07 *** -22.47 *** -69.02 *** -100.10 *** -6.82 *** 280.20 ***
(1.329) (4.892) (4.517) (2.894) (1.583) (3.904)
Prior Yr Mean 304.90 *** 154.80 *** 367.60 *** 547.90 *** 210.80 *** 0.00
(0.319) (1.179) (1.097) (0.749) (0.369) (0.722)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 Group 0 Group Null
ACO Formed
361,642 12,883 29,567 98,946 169,859 50,387
High ACO Share Medium ACO Share Low ACO Share No ACO Refs No Refs
2,169,852 77,298 177,402 593,676 1,019,154 302,322
Overall
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Table 34: Referrals from non-ACO PCPs to ACO Specialists as a Share of Total Referrals: By Years Since ACO Formation and Pre-
formation Referral Group 
  
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the physician level. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level ** 5% *** 1% 
Groups defined by the average share of referrals to ACO providers in the years prior to ACO formation: 
Group 3 >67% |  67%> Group 2 > 29% | 29% > Group 1 > 0% | Group 0 =0% | Group Null – No referrals to Specialists in the pre-period 
Dependent Variable: Referrals to ACO Specialists as a share of Total Referrals from Non-ACO PCPs
4 yrs prior 0.3% *** 2.3% *** 0.1% 0.9% *** -0.1%
(0.05%) (0.60%) (0.33%) (0.08%) (0.01%)
3 yrs prior 0.3% *** 2.7% *** 0.6% *** 0.4% *** -0.1%
(0.03%) (0.39%) (0.22%) (0.05%) (0.01%)
2 yrs prior 0.1% *** 1.2% *** 0.4% *** 0.1% *** 0.0%
(0.02%) (0.23%) (0.12%) (0.03%) (0.00%)
1 yr prior
-0.3% *** -5.5% *** -1.8% *** -0.1% *** 0.3% *** 0.0%
(0.02%) (0.25%) (0.12%) (0.03%) (0.01%) (0.00%)
1 yr post -0.6% *** -13.5% *** -4.3% *** -0.2% *** 0.7% *** -0.2%
(0.03%) (0.45%) (0.19%) (0.05%) (0.02%) (0.17%)
2 yrs post -0.9% *** -21.0% *** -6.1% *** -0.6% *** 1.1% *** -0.3%
(0.04%) (0.67%) (0.27%) (0.07%) (0.03%) (0.32%)
3 yrs post -1.2% *** -28.5% *** -8.2% *** -0.8% *** 1.4% *** -0.2%
(0.06%) (0.92%) (0.35%) (0.08%) (0.04%) (0.48%)
Prior Yr Mean 10.2% *** 82.5% *** 44.9% *** 8.6% *** 0.0% ** 8.8% ***
(0.02%) (0.20%) (0.09%) (0.02%) (0.01%) (0.26%)
PCP FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of PCPs
Observations
Overall
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 Group 0 Group Null
ACO Formed
361,642 12,883 29,567 98,946 169,859 50,387
High ACO Share Medium ACO Share Low ACO Share No ACO Refs No Refs
1,665,970 52,853 151,550 544,577 818,611 98,379
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Figures 
Figure 13: Analysis Combinations 
 
The above table shows the different combinations of referring PCP, receiving 
specialists that are analyzed. The colors of the cells are what is used in the figures 
below. 
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Figure 14: Share of Referrals sent to the PCPs ACO, vs share sent to another ACO: 
By Pre-formation Referral 
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Figure 15: Number of referrals from ACO PCPs: to ACO Specialists vs non-ACO 
specialists 
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Figure 16: From non-ACO PCPs 
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Below are figures with the same data, only with constant axes to better show the 
relative size of the impacts. 
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Finally, the same figures with constant axes expressed as a share of the year 0 total. 
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 Figure 17: Number of Referrals to Non-ACO Specialists. ACO PCPs vs Non-ACO PCPs 
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Below are figures with the same data, only with constant axes to better show the 
relative size of the impacts. 
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Figure 18: Total Number of Referrals. ACO PCPs vs Non-ACO PCPs 
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Figure 19: Share of Referrals from ACO PCPs to specialists in the same-ACO vs 
specialists in another ACO 
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 Figure 20: Referrals – difference from assumed attrition rate 
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